War Beyond Borders

Indian Muslims and the Politics of Belonging Under Modi’s Foreign Policy

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched a strike against Iran, initiating a broader regional crisis that impacted US military bases across the Gulf, regional security, and the Strait of Hormuz. This action followed escalating tensions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, regional influence, and Israel’s security doctrine. The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader since 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, by the United States provoked Iranian retaliation and contributed to widespread regional instability. The assassination was highly symbolic and destabilizing, targeting the ideological core of Iran’s post-1979 political order. Consequently, the conflict shifted from a conventional military confrontation to a regime security crisis for Iran. Subsequently, Mojtaba Khamenei, son of Ali Khamenei, was appointed as the new supreme leader, indicating the persistence of a hardline approach amid widespread shock and the rapid escalation of the regional conflict. The resulting shock and anxiety spread across the continent and had global repercussions, affecting energy markets, shipping routes, inflation, food security, diaspora communities, diplomatic relations, and shifts in global power and ideology. India has also been affected by this crisis, particularly in terms of its energy market and its balance-of-power strategy in West Asia.

Under Prime Minister Modi, India has shifted from a traditionally pro-Palestinian stance and a focus on relations with Iran, Turkey, and other Gulf nations to a more explicit strategic normalization with Israel. The motivations for this shift, the broader geopolitical context, and the potential consequences have significantly influenced domestic minority politics. This is particularly evident among Indian Muslim communities, especially Shia Muslims, who seek continued relevance given Iran’s religious and ideological significance. As a result, external crises increasingly shape domestic politics and policy, particularly when the sentiments, expressions, and visibility of Indian Muslims are viewed with suspicion.

India’s internal politics are analyzed through the interactions among governance, foreign policy, Muslim political subjectivity, and economic vulnerability. A central issue is how geopolitical developments translate external crises into daily tests of loyalty, concepts of ‘good citizenship,’ and permissible expressions of grief for Muslim communities. Ahmed (2022) highlights the widening gap between formal citizenship and lived belonging for Indian Muslims, describing a constitutional and political environment in which Muslims are citizens by law but remain contingent in practice.

The increase in anti-minority hate speech has positioned Indian Muslims at the intersection of geopolitics, identity, and democratic exclusion. Local responses by Indian Muslims to violence in the West Bank and Gaza have intensified political instability and anxiety. In Kerala, pro-Palestinian protests have raised concerns about humanitarian issues and human rights violations; however, such demonstrations have led to investigation, criminalization, and surveillance, rendering public Muslim solidarity both visible and vulnerable (Nazir 2024).

Similarly, the Israel/US-Iran conflict has influenced political anxieties and expressions, further widening the gap between formal citizenship and lived belonging for Indian Muslims. Such political anxieties depended on the government’s Citizenship (Amendment) Act (2019). Despite such anxieties, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (2019) movement demonstrated that Muslims continue to engage with constitutional language through protest, public performance, and civic solidarity.

Besides, the Israel/US-Iran conflict caused a political economy of insecurity that impacted Indian minorities, particularly those concentrated in informal employment, self-employment, insecure housing, and Gulf-linked remittance networks.

The Shift in Modi’s Foreign Policy

Modi’s foreign policy has shifted toward explicit strategic normalization with Israel, while simultaneously seeking to strengthen bilateral relations with Israel, Gulf regimes, and Iran, independent of the Palestinian question that previously shaped West Asia policy. In 2019, the Modi government altered the tone and public visibility of India’s regional diplomacy, yet maintained the overarching framework of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment (Rather 2025). Modi’s visit to Israel in February 2026, immediately preceding the war, signaled mutual agreement to intensify defense cooperation and pursue a free trade agreement. Consequently, India and Israel publicly affirmed their strategic partnership, whereas Iran’s role in India’s foreign policy and planning remains trade-dominated. India-Israel bilateral trade reached 3.75 billion in 2024-25 (Ministry of External Affair, February 2026), compared to India-Iran bilateral trade at 1.68 billion in 2024-25 (Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, May 2024).

Although the India-Iran partnership has not been entirely diminished, the hierarchy of partnerships has shifted. The current emphasis is on connectivity and continental energy access, rather than defense or cultural cooperation. India continues to underscore the importance of Chabahar, having signed a 10-year contract to equip and operate the Shahid Behesti terminal, reaffirmed in 2026. Sanctions on Iran persist as a significant risk to the project. Despite these risks, Chabahar represents a symbolic partnership in which Iran remains indispensable. Israel cannot replace Iran’s geo-strategic role in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and overland connectivity.

In the broader framework, India’s policy does not represent a transition from Iran to Israel; rather, it reflects a narrowed, infrastructure-focused relationship with Iran alongside a more publicly celebrated partnership with Israel. This dual approach influences domestic politics and policy, as Israel’s prominent relationship is viewed with apprehension by Muslim communities in light of the ongoing Gaza genocide, Israel’s attack on Lebanon, and the Israel-Iran war.

During the conflict involving Israel, the United States, and Iran, India has maintained a balanced diplomatic stance, consistently advocating for restraint and diplomacy in the Israel-Iran confrontation. However, India did not endorse the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s June 2025 statement condemning Israel attach on Iran (Parashar, 2025). As a result, India’s policy remains dehyphenated in doctrine but increasingly uneven in public signaling, defense cooperation, and ideological alignment. India’s approach, including statements against violence toward Palestinians and human rights violations affecting Muslims, has generated anxiety among local Muslim communities and reinforced sentiments of “othering” (Said 2016).

Citizenship without Belonging- Indian Muslims

Religious and emotional responses among Muslims have increased markedly over the past five years since Shaheen Bagh Protest 2019 against the he Citizenship (Amendment) Act, prompting critical examination of legal exclusion and the precarious status of Muslim citizenship. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 intensified the sense of otherness by granting religion-based fast-track citizenship to non-Muslims from neighboring countries, thereby excluding persecuted Muslims and reinforcing strict documentary requirements, policing, and discrimination. Thus, the legality of the CAA accentuates the perception that Muslim belonging is subject to adjudication rather than presumption. As a result of these legislative measures, widened the gap between formal citizenship and a sense of belonging in their own nation.

Muslim political representation remains disproportionately low relative to demographic presence, thereby weakening democratic participation. The social geography of safety is evolving, where Muslim communities are increasingly compelled to reside in segregated environments, not due to citizenship-based security, but because such segregated spaces are derived from social protection, economic engagement, and political marginalization. These spatially segregated areas prioritize safety and social protection over convenience or infrastructure quality. Thus, when formally equal citizens experience unequal geographies of risk, genuine belonging becomes an elusive prospect, and citizenship is experienced as socially conditional.

In 2024, anti-minority hate speech increased by 74% compared to 2023 (Singh, 2025), contributing to its normalization in public discourse and further marginalization of Muslim communities. Digital platforms have also become increasingly hostile, intensifying anxiety, amplifying rumors, and generating pervasive insecurity that extends into educational, professional, and electoral environments. Thus, anti-Muslim hate sentiments are normalized in both electoral and non-electoral contexts and rooted in the sense of ‘otherness.’

West Asia Politics and Contested Indian Muslim Solidarity

Indian Muslim responses to the US/Israel and Iran 2026 war should be conceptualized as mediated solidarity rather than straightforward identification. This mediation is influenced by factors such as theology, secularism, and regional context. Notably, protests against the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei were organized in Delhi, Hyderabad, Jammu, and Lucknow. Protesters raised anti-US and anti-Israel slogans, carried portraits of Khameni, and performed rituals including marsiya recitation. The All India Shia Personal Law Board declared three days of national mourning, and black flags were displayed at mosques throughout Uttar Pradesh. Kashmir has historically been known as “Iran-e-Sagheer,” or “little Iran,” reflecting centuries of religious, cultural, artistic, and linguistic ties with Iran. Protesters viewed Iran as embodying a profound civilizational connection. As a result, Khamenei was regarded not only as a contemporary political leader but also as a figure of moral, religious, and cultural significance (Masood, 2026). The protests led to the detention of more than 200 individuals, particularly Muslims, and the imposition of internet and movement restrictions in Kashmir. They heightened security in Delhi and Hyderabad due to the overlap of Holi and Ramzan.

The protest also exemplified counter-geopolitical citizenship. While protesters do not directly influence India’s foreign policy, they contest the moral legitimacy of US-Israel military power from public spaces in India, such as Jantar Mantar, Imambaras, mosques, and public squares. These venues function as alternative diplomatic arenas where ordinary citizens articulate grassroots foreign policy positions.

The anti-war protest, associated rituals, and expressions of Muslim political sentiment within a constrained public sphere should not be interpreted solely as pro-Iran demonstrations. The killing of Khameni revealed a significant gap between formal citizenship and lived belonging among Indian Muslims. While Indian Muslims possess the formal right to protest, their public expressions of solidarity with events in West Asia are frequently met with suspicion, surveillance, and security interventions. Such emotion and political marginalization are derived from the existing anti-muslim sentiments. The restrictions imposed in Kashmir, increased policing of diplomatic zones in Delhi, and heightened scrutiny of online content illustrate the domestic securitization of global Muslim grief (Masood, 2026).

Moreover, the government adopted a cautious stance, refraining from issuing an official statement on Israel/US-Iran until the protests had spread across Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. This approach was perceived as a strategic balancing act, given India’s significant defense and technology ties with Israel and the US, as well as its energy, connectivity, diaspora, and civilizational interests in Iran and the Gulf (Anshuman & Rashid, March 2026).

Consequently, the protest revealed a deeper democratic tension; even though citizens possess formal citizenship, their emotional and political identification with global Muslim suffering is frequently viewed with suspicion. The killing of Khamenei produced not only a geopolitical rupture in West Asia but also a domestic atmosphere of anxiety, surveillance, and contested belonging within India.

Political Economy of Insecurity- Oil Shock, Remittance, and Indian Muslims

The protest is also connected to economic anxieties, as indicated by Owaisi’s remarks concerning oil prices, Indian workers in West Asia, and remittances. He condemned the killing of Khamenei and cautioned that instability in West Asia would have direct economic consequences for India, particularly through rising oil prices and disruptions to remittances from Indian workers (Times News Network, 2026).

Following the Iran-Israel war of 2026, issues such as rising fuel prices, weakened Gulf economies, threats to Indian workers abroad, and reduced remittances have directly impacted everyday livelihood security. India receives 70% of its oil from West Asia and the Strait of Hormuz (Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, 2026). The conflict involving Iran increased oil and gas prices, widened India’s import bill, and threatened inflation and economic growth. These effects have permeated daily life through higher transport costs, increased LPG cylinder prices, rising petrol and diesel prices, and mounting pressure on small businesses.

Anxiety among Indian Muslims intensified because a larger proportion of Muslim workers are self-employed and underrepresented in salaried public and private sector employment. The fuel price shock directly affects their profit margins, mobility, and household consumption. Inflation and fuel price shocks are not merely abstract macroeconomic indicators; they directly reduce income and consumption. Moreover, if Gulf economies experience a slowdown, leading to reduced demand for migrant labor, disrupted shipping, or uncertain remittance flows, Muslim households with Gulf connections may face additional economic pressure. Thus, the war imposes an indirect minority cost: a burden that is not officially communal but is socially differentiated.

The protest addressed both moral and economic issues, condemning US-Israel military power while also expressing concerns about the fragile economic lifeline that connects Indian Muslim families to the Gulf. Consequently, the war shifted the global solidarity of the Muslim community into a domestic conversation focused on livelihood security, minority vulnerability, and contested citizenship.

Conclusion

The Israel/US-Iran war of 2026 illustrates how geopolitical crises affect not only foreign policy but also the everyday experiences of minority communities through emotions, suspicion, discourse, and economic insecurity. For Indian Muslims, this conflict is not just a distant event in West Asia; it is a domestic issue that raises important questions about belonging, loyalty, and democratic participation. While Indian Muslims have formal citizenship, their ability to express grief and solidarity is limited. Political criticism and concern are increasingly influenced by a majoritarian public sphere that often views Muslim emotions with suspicion. India’s shift from a historically balanced engagement with Iran, Palestine, and the Arab world to a celebrated strategic alignment with Israel heightens these anxieties. This diplomatic shift also carries significant symbolic implications within India’s domestic politics.

For many Indian Muslims, the growing diplomatic ties with Israel, along with restrictions on showing support for Palestine and the rise of anti-minority rhetoric, are seen as part of a larger shift that marginalizes both the political and emotional spheres of the Muslim community. As a result, the sense of belonging among Muslims is once again challenged during a global crisis. This situation raises ongoing questions about whether Indian Muslims can freely exercise their citizenship rights—such as protesting, speaking out, mourning, and seeking justice—without feeling the need to prove their loyalty constantly. The Israel-U.S. conflict with Iran reflects Indian democracy, illustrating how minority rights are upheld not only by law but also by the broader political environment in which these rights are exercised.

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