Reform Or Reinforcement? Kazakhstan’s New Constitution and the Politics of Power
By Farishta Maqbool
Kazakhstan’s new constitution is described as democratic. However, if it removes international legal oversight, restricts NGO funding, and allows the vice president to be appointed rather than elected, can it truly be considered a democracy? Or is Kazakhstan repeating its old history once again?
On the day Kazakhstan’s ambassador presented the new constitution to Brussels as democratic, human rights organizations delivered a totally different verdict, questioning whether the reforms represent a new era or are once again increasing presidential power.
Before understanding the debate, we need to look at Kazakhstan’s constitutional history. Independent since 1991, a 1995 constitution under Nursultan Nazarbayev granted the president significant powers, including the ability to suspend parliament and the constitution during emergencies.
In 2019, Nazarbayev resigned, and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev took control. Change began in January 2022, when protesters demanded political reform during Bloody January. Tokayev suspended the government and removed Nazarbayev from his security post. Five months later, he announced a political reform plan called “New Kazakhstan.” Referendum held in June 2022 brought changes, i.e., the president must leave his party, relatives cannot hold senior jobs, the president serves one seven-year term, and the Constitutional Court was restored.
Moving to 2026, a new constitution was announced despite major reforms in 2022. Official results claim 87% support. Major changes include: a unicameral legislature giving more power to the president; a vice president appointed by the president, not elected; a new People’s Council (Halyk Kenesi) of 164 members appointed by the president with power to propose laws; international law cannot override Kazakh law; NGOs must make foreign funding public; and the right to strike was removed.
But does this make governance more efficient, or is it weakening democracy? At an April 20 roundtable in Brussels, Kazakhstan’s ambassador called these changes democratic progress. However, Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for Human Rights strongly disagreed.
The government’s claims do not align with the constitutional text. According to the government, the unicameral parliament will be more efficient and effective. However, it will increase the power of the president, like the older system of Kazakhstan. The president will have the power to appoint the chairman of parliament and can shut parliament down. The president-appointed council can bypass elected lawmakers whenever it seems appropriate to him. So, Kazakhstan’s new parliament is weaker, not stronger, than its predecessor.
Similarly, referendum results require skepticism. The 2022 referendum occurred in a “restrictive media environment”. The 2026 draft appeared ten days after the Constitutional Commission was established, leaving no room for revision. In state-controlled media, voters receive only the government’s framing. High numbers in managed systems tell us more about state control than public enthusiasm.
Removing international law as a priority is also problematic. As Amnesty International noted, the Constitutional Court can disregard international human rights decisions if deemed incompatible. Russia made the same change in 2020 and ignored European court rulings. Kazakhstan’s change opens the same door.
Moving forward, the vice president and the People’s Council add tools to presidential power. Both are appointed by the president. The vice president serves as a loyal successor. The People’s Council allows the president to bypass parliament.
Similarly, NGO funding raises concerns. Article 6, Section 5 requires full disclosure of foreign funding. Russia’s 2012 “foreign agent” law began similarly and expanded into fines and closures.
A fair look shows Kazakhstan’s new constitution shows that it gives more power to the president, not less. According to Chatham House, “The changes will cement Tokayev’s grip on power.” The OSCE/ODIHR found “a lack of transparency and inclusion in the drafting of a new constitution.”
Some things have improved Nazarbayev’s special status is gone, and the president now serves only one term. But most changes give the president more control: an appointed vice president, an appointed People’s Council that can make laws, no priority for international law, restrictions on NGOs, and the removal of the right to strike. The 87% voting result shows people were tired of the old system, not that they agreed with every new rule.
The real test will come in 2029, when Tokayev’s term ends, and we see if he leaves.