Politics of Fatwa in Indonesia: From the Crescent to the Hajj Compensation
By Pradana Boy Zulian
This article describes and analyzes fatwa in an Indonesian context. It shows how the nature and functions of fatwa have evolved from its initial state as merely a legal opinion to a tool for reinforcing certain religious orientations and group identity-making. By taking two cases of fatwa regarding the identification of new crescent moon (hilal) or the beginning of a new month in Islamic calendar; and the fatwa related to hajj compensation or the slaughtering of livestock as part of hajj fine (dam and hadyu); it can be clearly be seen that there is a growing tendency from certain Muslim groups to “speak in the name of God” through the imposement of their interpretations over others; and at the same time view others’ interpretations as not in accordance with Islamic principles. Furthermore, it reveals that such dynamics contradict the empirical situation in Indonesia, where Islamic law is not officially part of the national legal system, which cannot be enforced as a binding law for all members of society.
Sociologically, fatwa is an integral part of Muslim societies. In all courses of Islamic legal history, fatwas have played pivotal roles in shaping the configuration of Islamic law within certain societies. Moreover, a fatwa is a bridge that connects new emerging realities in Muslim communities with the established religious texts. In other words, a fatwa facilitates the harmonious relationships between changes and authenticity in Islamic law. However, how fatwa operates in respective ummah varies greatly depending on many circumstances, one of them being the modern constitution that certain countries adopt. Indonesia is an interesting case when it comes to the debate on how fatwa runs against the backdrop of the modern constitution. On the one hand, Indonesia is not an Islamic country in the sense that Islam is not the sole ideology and source of law for the country. But, on the other hand, Islam is a living law that broadly rules Indonesian Muslims’ lives in many aspects, especially in the realm of family law. This contradictory nature has led to a complex discourse on and practice of fatwa in Indonesia. Fatwa-related debates often take place in Indonesia, and it has been so for a considerable time.
The Crescent Moon and the Dam
In an Indonesian context, it is almost undeniable that the celebration of Idul Fitri is not observed concurrently by all Muslim groups. This is due to differences in methods adopted by Muslim groups of the country in identifying the new crescent or the starting date of a new month. In general, four methods are adopted by Indonesian Muslim groups, namely hisab (a scientific calculation based on astronomical theories) which is practiced by Muhammadiyah, the modernist-inclined group; ru’yah (direct vision of the crescent either by bare eyes or technological aids) employed by Nahdlatul Ulama’ which is known as traditioanlist Muslim group; MABIMS criterion which refers to the crescent visibility criteria set by religious affairs ministers of four countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Singapore, which represent the state’s position; and Kalender Hijriyah Global Tunggal or a Unified Islamic Global Calendar, which refers to a global Islamic calendar agreed upon by Muslim worldwide.
In 2026, during Idul Fitri, public unrest arose. It stemmed from a statement from Cholil Nafis, a vice-chairman of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) or Indonesian Council of Ulama. He boldly made a public assertion that celebrating Idul Fitri on a day other than the Government’s decision is forbidden (haram). Nafis based his statement on two fatwas, namely a fatwa issued by MUI and Nahdlatul Ulama, one of the largest Islamic organizations of the country. The statement soon triggered controversy for at least two reasons. One reason is that not all Indonesian Muslims celebrated Idul Fitri on the day as decided by the Government. This group is led by Muhammadiyah, a reformist-leaning Islamic movement in Indonesia, which adopts hisab as its method. Another reason pertains to the term haram used by Nafis. In Islamic legal terms, haram refers to forbidden actions and things. The use of the term haram has psychologically brought a strongly negative connotation. Therefore, those who identify as observing haram deeds will be highly offended and feel marginalised, or even prosecuted. Equally, when haram is attributed to actions, it carries consequences of severe punishment as the action is unacceptable; and when it is attributed to things, it could refer to anything legally unconsumable under Islamic law, such as ham, blood, or alcohol. It is reasonable, consequently, that MUI’s bold stance on the issue is considered insensitive and controversial.
When the controversy regarding Idul Fitri’s date was about to subside, and Nafis publicly made his apology for his insensitive utterance, another fatwa-related controversy came to the fore, although with lighter weight. It is related to the hajj compensation or fine (dam and hadyu). The problem originated from a progressive and contextual thought proposed by some state agencies and Muslim groups that urge the slaughtering of livestock of the hajj dam in Indonesia rather than in Saudi Arabia. Such a thought is based on the maslaha paradigm, that the slaughter of dam livestock and the distribution of meat in Saudi Arabia does not bring more maslaha (public benefits) compared to when they are slaughtered and distributed in Indonesia, where the number of underprivileged groups might outnumber those in Saudi Arabia. Even if the number of underprivileged groups in Indonesia and Saudi are comparably the same, slaughtering of livestock in Saudi Arabia will only increase the abundance of meat, which in most cases is left unconsumed.
In relation to this innovative, progressive, and contextual understanding, the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah of the Republic of Indonesia issued a letter which opened the possibility for Indonesian pilgrims to choose to pay their dam and hadyu in Saudi Arabia or in Indonesia. This is not unprecedented. In previous years, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was responsible for pilgrimage management before it was handed over to the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah, has officially delegated the authority to the Indonesian National Zakat Agency known locally as Badan Amil Zakat Nasional or BAZNAS to collect, manage and distribute fund of hajj dam as well as manage the slaughtering livestock and distribution of the meat for the needy. Parallel to this situation, Muhammadiyah, through its council responsible for Islamic legal issues, the Majelis Tarjih, in 2026 issued a fatwa stating that paying hajj fine and slaughtering livestock of dam out of the Holy Land, especially in Indonesia, is legally permitted.
However, while maslaha is taken as the most fundamental basis for this progressive thought, it cannot be implemented smoothly. In response to the Ministry of Hajj letter regarding the hajj fine, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) sent a letter called tadzkirah to the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah of the Republic of Indonesia. Tadzkirah, which literally means “warning,” is to strongly urge the Ministry of Hajj to withdraw the letter that has been widely circulated. Based on established fiqh views, MUI claimed that slaughtering dam livestock outside the Holy Land of Mecca is forbidden (haram). In addition, MUI believed that the Ministry’s letter has also created unrest and debates among Indonesian pilgrims, which potentially ruins the quality of their pilgrimage. As the case with the Idul Fitri date determination, MUI referred the tadzkirah to the fatwa on the subject issued in 2011. Interestingly, the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah opted not to withdraw their decision, but at the same time, it paid respect to MUI’s decision.
Analysis
The two situations described above can be taken as a context to understand how debates regarding fatwa aroused in the Indonesian context nowadays. Furthermore, the cases also clearly showed that there is a tendency to reinforce certain interpretations and understandings of religion as the standard state’s position or stance. This is obviously problematic and ideological at the same time. By ideological, I mean something which is not based on sociological and empirical situations. Some of the problems that can clearly be found are as follows.
Firstly, identifying a religious deed as haram on the interpretable aspects of Islamic law, as in the case of Idul Fitri celebration other than the state’s version, is a sort of religious authoritarianism or discursive coercion. Borrowing Khaled Abou Fadl’s formulation, some religious interpretations often served as the “voice of God” that speaks “in the name of God.” Consequently, Islamic law, which is divinely ordained by God, has often been hijacked by certain authorities at the cost of other interpretations or understanding. It is evident that Fadl’s critical assertion can be applied to both cases mentioned above. Similarly, the general chairman of Muhammadiyah, Haedar Nashir, clearly underlined that the state should not “intervene” to define which religious discourse is valid when it comes to interpretable dimensions of Islam.
Secondly, a fatwa is the result of ijtihad. Theoretically speaking, Islamic legal scholars have formulated a principle that states that one ijtihad cannot be overturned by another ijtihad. MUI’s fatwa, which rules slaughtering dam animals out of the Holy Land as haram is a form of ijtihad. Equally, the conviction that the Ministry of Hajj follows on the dam and Muhammadiyah’s decision on the day of Idul Fitri, different from that of the Government, is another form of ijtihad. However, when MUI issued tadzkirah, which warned the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah to withdraw the letter regarding the hajj dam, it can be viewed as an attempt to overturn the Ministry’s legal thought or ijtihad. Equally, this is Muhammadiyah’s fatwa on the identification of the new crescent moon based on hisab (astronomical calculation) and KHGT method. While Muhammadiyah’s ijtihad is theoretically valid and accepted, MUI’s decision to qualify haram for those who celebrate Idul Fitri other than the Government’s decision has obviously violated the principle of tolerance and plurality in ijtihad, which, at the same time, showed the tendency towards the regimentation of religious ideas.
Theoretically speaking, a fatwa is not binding. Muslim legal scholars such as Qaradawi and al-Qasimi are convinced of the voluntaristic nature of fatwa. Fatwa is broadly understood as opinions stated by a legal scholar, technically known as a mufti, in response to questions raised by a mustafti, Muslims who raise the questions to a mufti, generally due to his/her doubt over certain issues or in the process of getting comparative arguments of one or more issues being faced. As a matter of opinion, the fatwa does not have binding effects. Rather, obeying a fatwa is voluntary, even for the mustafti who asked for the fatwa. However, the tendency to reinforce fatwas as if it is a binding law seen in both cases is an anomaly.
Thirdly, the unification of Islamic legal interpretations is something impossible to achieve. Historically, the emergence of different Islamic legal schools (madzhab) in the classical era of Islam is undebatable evidence of the multi-interpretability of Islamic law. Deeming other Muslim groups’ interpretation of Islamic law as haram is, at the same time, normatively unacceptable and empirically unfeasible. As a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia is home to a great variety of orientations and understandings of Islam.
Constitutionally speaking, some scholars identify Indonesia as a secular country, in the sense that the law of religion does not rule people’s lives. The Indonesian national legal system is composed of many elements, such as customary law, the Dutch legal system as a result of its occupation of the country, and Islamic law. As a consequence, Indonesia constructed its own version of law based on the state philosophy of Pancasila. Consequently, diverse Muslim groups exist in the country along with their own understanding of religion. When those Muslim groups face unprecedented issues and realities related to Islamic law, they will exert their ability to extract how Islamic law rules over these new developments based on their respective methodologies. Under the Indonesian constitution, all interpretations are valid and acceptable, given that they are not contradictory to Indonesian basic values.
Closing
It is clear from the above discussion that fatwa is one of the most vibrant aspects of Islamic law in Indonesia. Fatwa has been both fundamental and instrumental in dynamizing Islamic legal discourse and practice in Indonesia. However, within this vibrant dynamic, a tendency towards authoritarianism and the regimentation of religious discourse cannot be overlooked. As Islamic law is subject to varied interpretations, attempts to build uniformity of legal understanding among diverse groups of Indonesian Islam are highly unfeasible.
The discussion also underlines how fatwa has evolved from merely unbinding legal opinions over certain issues and problems (both newly emerged and established) to the battleground of ideology. The above-analysed cases proved that the textual and contextual understanding of Islamic legal norms compete. While all interpretations are valid methodologically, the tendency of textual groups to disqualify others’ understanding is an anomaly that potentially threatens the plurality of Islamic legal interpretation in an Indonesian context.