Consent, Child Marriages, and Women’s Liberty under the Taliban’s Decree No.18
By Sarina Tareen
Afghan women have faced growing legal and social limitations under the Taliban government. Since taking power again in August 2021, the Taliban has issued a series of policies that have restricted the rights of women and girls in a war-torn country. These restrictions have affected education and employment. Also reduced women’s public presence in society. International Human Rights organizations have repeatedly criticized these policies, who argue that these laws have created one of the most restrictive environments for women in the world.
The restrictive measures do not end here. Recently, the Taliban also introduced a new decree on marriage. The latest Decree No.18, published by the de facto Ministry of Justice on 14 May 2026, sets out the conditions for divorce and marriage for women. The decree does not set a minimum age for marriage. It allows a child who was forced into marriage to seek cancellation of their marriage only after reaching puberty.
According to Afghan spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, “Adult women’s consent is necessary during nikkah (marriage). No one can force women to marry by coercion or pressure.” He further stated, “A woman is not a property but a noble free human.” The decree also states that widows have the right to choose whether to remarry. The decree further specifies that no one shall compel the widow to marry, not even her relatives.
At first glance, the decree appears to address the issue of forced marriage. It appears as a move toward safeguarding women’s rights in marriage. But the specifics of the law give rise to deeper issues of consent, child marriage, and legal protection. It uses the term “Adult women” without clearly defining what is meant by “adult.” This creates a loophole that allows child marriage to continue within existing law.
According to women’s rights activist Pashtana Durrani, stated that “the bigger issue is that girls are already banned from education and women are excluded from the workforce. In these circumstances, consent is of little value. Several women’s rights movements denounce the law as a form of systemic violence against women, calling it a misogynistic decree aimed at suppressing women’s rights.”
Previous laws, such as the “Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice,” regulated women’s mobility, clothing, and their voice in public, forming the broader repressive framework within which Decree No.18 must be understood.
In this wider context, the new decree raises questions about its real impact. While consent is stated in the decree, it does not guarantee the conditions required for free choice. In addition, the decree reinforces the position of men in marriage. There are greater legal obstacles for women in divorce proceedings. There are fewer procedural requirements for men. This results in unequal marital rights and undermines women’s protection. The law makes it impossible for girls and women to seek divorce against their husbands’ will. It also suggests that women cannot divorce their husbands solely on the grounds of his absence or failure to provide financial support.
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has also voiced concern about the decree, citing the erosion of Afghan women and girls’ rights. However, the Taliban dismissed international criticism, stating that objections come from those opposed to Islam and the Islamic system. In Islam, marital consent is a key component of the concept of marriage. A woman’s approval is required for Nikkah. The Quran (Surah An-Nisa 4:19) stresses, “Do not inherit women against their will. Highlighting the protection of women’s consent and dignity in marriage. Islam also allows women to initiate separation through khula, as referenced in Qur’an 2:229, reinforcing the principle of mutual rights in marriage.
The selective textualism underlying Decree No. 18 poses a question with implications beyond Afghanistan: when religious doctrine is systematically filtered through a single jurisprudential lens, does the resulting edifice still constitute Islamic understanding, or a politicised simulacrum of it?

