Edraak is our newsletter that honours the Muslim world’s diversity, reflected in the multitude of its socio-economic conditions and political institutions spanning across the continents. Traced back to its Arabic origins, إدراك encompasses timely and thorough insights into the developments of the Muslim-majority countries.

We organise the Muslim-majority countries into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life.

Burkina Faso: “Forget Democracy”

Burkina Faso’s military leader Ibrahim Traoré told citizens in a televised interview this week to “forget about the issue of democracy,” saying “democracy isn’t for us” and citing Libya as evidence that democratic systems have historically produced instability. The remarks follow a rapid dismantling of political infrastructure: in January, the government dissolved over 100 political parties and confiscated their assets; parliament had already been suspended, and the electoral commission was disbanded in 2025. Since seizing power in September 2022, Traoré has used emergency law to arrest, disappear, and forcibly conscript critics, dissidents, and judges. Insinuating that security crises justify suspending political rights is the oldest authoritarian playbook in existence. Dissolving parties, confiscating assets, and conscripting critics are not emergency measures; they are the elimination of any future accountability mechanism. When a ruler tells you to “forget democracy,” what he means is: forget that power can be taken from him.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution building.

Giving Democracy a Chance

On 7 April, barely 90 minutes before Trump’s deadline to bomb Iran, the countries agreed to a two-week ceasefire secured through Pakistan’s mediation. Trump credited direct overnight conversations with the Pakistani Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal, Asim Munir. The negotiations towards a final agreement will likely be held in Islamabad on Friday, 10 April 2026. Iran’s key demands for these negotiations are, most notably, acceptance of Iranian sovereignty of the Strait of Hormuz, withdrawal of all US combat forces from the Middle East, lifting of all US, UNSC and IAEA sanctions, and full compensation for war damages inflicted since 28 February. Trump said the US received Iran’s 10-point proposal and believes it is “a workable basis on which to negotiate,” contingent on Iran agreeing to the “complete, immediate and safe opening” of the Strait of Hormuz.

Turkey and Syria launch JETCO

The first meeting of the Turkey-Syria Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) took place on 7 April 2026. Turkey, along with regional Arab partners, has committed $11 billion total for Syrian infrastructure. An industrial free zone near the Turkish-Syrian border is under planning to attract Turkish manufacturers, create jobs, and support voluntary refugee returns. Economic liberty in a post-conflict state requires physical infrastructure before it requires markets. Syria cannot trade, attract investment, or employ its population without electricity, roads, and airports.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

Pakistan’s Senate Committee rejects the female participation provision

The Senate Standing Committee on Parliamentary Affairs reviewed the Elections (Amendment) Bill, including a proposal mandating 33% women representation among party office-bearers, with penalties for non-compliance. Senator Dr. Zarqa Suharwardy Taimur also suggested quotas for non-Muslims and persons with disabilities, and allocating 10% of party funds for inclusion programmes. However, the committee rejected these provisions, citing concerns over excessive regulatory interference in internal party affairs. Members argued that while inclusion is important, such measures make the political process “more complex”, and the focus should stay on “practically enforceable” provisions.

UN Reviews Systemic Violations of Afghan Women’s Rights

A United Nations legal review has found that 16 policies imposed by the Taliban since August 2021 violate Afghanistan’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The report evaluates measures affecting education, employment, healthcare, and public participation. It highlights bans on girls’ education, limits on women’s work, and restrictions on movement as key concerns, alongside rules enforcing dress codes and male guardianship. These Taliban policies are forming a system of institutionalised discrimination, violating core principles of equality and non-discrimination under international law.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

France tries to ban its largest annual Muslim gathering

On 3 April 2026, Paris police chief Patrice Faure issued an order prohibiting the 40th Annual Meeting of Muslims of France at the Le Bourget Exhibition Centre, citing a “major terrorist risk” from far-right groups and a “particularly tense international context”. This cultural conference and trade fair draws tens of thousands of Muslims from across Europe and had not been held since 2019. The Muslims of France association immediately filed an emergency injunction arguing the ban was a “manifest breach of the right to assemble.” A French court overturned the ban the same day, allowing the event to proceed. The ban’s announcement nonetheless coincided with France’s preparation of a new “anti-separatism” law targeting Muslim organisations accused of promoting ideologies incompatible with the Republic’s principles.

Codifying Fiqh for Contemporary UAE Legal Systems

Al Muntada Al Islami organised a specialised seminar titled “Codifying Fiqh and Its Contemporary Applications,” bringing together scholars, judges, and legal experts to examine the transformation of Islamic jurisprudence into structured legal systems. Over two days, discussions explored definitions of fiqh codification, legislative processes in the UAE, and the integration of Sharia principles with modern laws. Participants highlighted fiqh’s flexibility in addressing financial, social, and judicial matters, alongside the importance of judicial ijtihad and institutions like the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions in harmonising standards.

Are You Coming?

Join us on Thursday, 9th April at 5:00 PM PKT for an open and informal virtual gathering where we will share where we are headed, and most importantly, hear from you. What would you like us to cover? What conversations do you want Edraak to start?

This is your space as much as it is ours, and we want your voice in it.

Date: Thursday, 9th April 2026

Time: 5:00 PM PKT (8:00 PM MYT)

Platform: Zoom

Link: https://zoom.us/j/96887175432?pwd=lw76Z0ivWYOME2juTCtuqNjyHNMRbv.1

Meeting ID: 968 8717 5432

Passcode: 002099

Historically, it was the backbone of a self‑sustaining, civil, and private social order—one that powered education, healthcare, and community welfare across the Muslim world for centuries. Today, my argument is straightforward: if we want real socio‑economic transformation, we must rebuild Waqf as an institution of social capital, not as an arm of the state. This is what has been done in many countries, especially in Türkiye, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

At the heart of this discussion is the concept of social capital, or what my friend Maszlee Malik calls ihsani capital—capital rooted in the Islamic value of Ihsaan. A virtuous society is not one where citizens are endlessly dependent on the state, but one where individuals are economically and politically independent, yet socially interdependent. This is the essence of a “big society”: strong communities, trusted institutions, and voluntary cooperation. Waqf was historically the most powerful instrument for building this kind of society.

For most of Islamic history, up until barely a hundred years ago, Waqf functioned as a perpetual, private, and civil institution, free from state control. It financed schools, hospitals, water systems, and social services on a sustainable basis. It worked precisely because it was shielded from political interference. Unfortunately, this changed. First under colonial administrations, and later under so‑called independent nation‑states, Waqf was gradually taken over by the state. And when that happened, the institution lost its soul. The vibrant social institution of Waqf, quite frankly, died in the hands of the state.

But—and this is crucial—resurrection is possible. Waqf can be revived, but only if we begin with serious legal reform. The starting point must be clear: the state must be taken out of the laws that govern Waqf. Regulation is not the same as control, and oversight is not the same as ownership. If we fail to understand this distinction, Waqf will remain trapped in bureaucratic paralysis.

Let me illustrate this with a concrete example: the Islamabad Capital Territory Waqf Properties Act, 2020. The Act defines Waqf property appropriately—as property permanently dedicated for religious, pious, or charitable purposes—and claims to ensure proper management, transparency, and protection against misuse, including compliance with anti‑money laundering and counter‑terrorist financing measures. On paper, this sounds reasonable. But in practice, the appointment of a serving BPS‑19 Chief Administrator of Waqf with authority to appoint managers of Waqf properties clearly demonstrates how deeply the state controls Waqf management. This is not empowerment of society; this is administrative takeover.

There is, however, a potentially promising development. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan has proposed amendments to the Companies Act, 2017, introducing the concept of Waqf management companies. These not‑for‑profit entities would be licensed and regulated under a dedicated framework, mandated to manage Waqf assets strictly in accordance with Shariah and the stated objectives of the Waqf. This proposal, if designed carefully, could represent a shift away from direct state control toward professional, accountable, and mission‑driven management. The opportunity here is significant—but only if independence is genuinely protected. However, as Waqf is a provincial subject, it is difficult to imagine the application of this proposal, even if implemented, across the country.

Now, let us consider why this matters so urgently, especially in Pakistan.

According to the Giving in Pakistan Report 2025, faith‑based giving and deep compassion for those in need run through every neighborhood and community in the country. Pakistan ranks 17th out of 101 countries in overall generosity. Pakistanis give on a massive scale: Rs. 770 billion annually. Yet more than half of this generosity is direct, informal giving to individuals, while only a portion flows through institutions. The institutionalized charity market alone is around Rs. 362 billion.

Now imagine the implications if Waqf were allowed to function properly as a trusted, independent institution. If this institutional giving were strategically allocated—say, toward education—at a cost of Rs. 45,000 per child per year (as estimated by The Citizens Foundation), Pakistan could bring 8 million children into schools every year and close the education gap within just three years. This is not fantasy. This is arithmetic. In other words, we need roughly $1.29 billion—already being given by society, just not being organized effectively.

So, the conclusion is unavoidable.

Pakistan does not suffer from a lack of generosity. It suffers from a lack of trust in civil institutions—and that distrust is largely the result of excessive state control. If we truly want Waqf to drive socio‑economic development, we must revamp Waqf laws, remove the state from direct control, and trust society to deliver. When society is trusted, it responds. When institutions are free, they innovate. And when Waqf is restored to its rightful place, it can once again become a pillar of sustainable development.

Remarks by Dr. Ali Salman at the Prof. Khurshid Ahmad International Conference 2026 Mobilizing Waqf and Zakat for Socio-Economic Empowerment: Policy Perspectives on Entrepreneurship and Sustainability organized by Allama Iqbal Open University and Institute of Policy Studies delivered on 3^rd April 2026.

Your readership means everything to us. Whether you have been with us from the beginning or just recently found your way to Edraak, we are deeply grateful for the curiosity and commitment you bring to this conversation about the Muslim world.

We have been wanting to directly engage with you. Join us on Thursday, 9th April at 5:00 PM PKT for an open and informal virtual gathering where we will share where we are headed, and most importantly, hear from you. What would you like us to cover? What conversations do you want Edraak to start?

This is your space as much as it is ours, and we want your voice in it.

Date: Thursday, 9th April 2026

Time: 5:00 PM PKT (8:00 PM MYT)

Platform: Zoom

Link: https://zoom.us/j/96887175432?pwd=lw76Z0ivWYOME2juTCtuqNjyHNMRbv.1

Meeting ID: 968 8717 5432

Passcode: 002099

We hope to see you there!

Edraak is our newsletter that honours the Muslim world’s diversity, reflected in the multitude of its socio-economic conditions and political institutions spanning across the continents. Traced back to its Arabic origins, إدراك encompasses timely and thorough insights into the developments of the Muslim-majority countries.

We organise the Muslim-majority countries into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide

This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life.

Israel’s Knesset passes death penalty law for Palestinians

On 30 March 2026, the Knesset voted 62–48 to mandate death by hanging as the default punishment for West Bank Palestinians convicted of deadly attacks by military courts. The law, championed by far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who opened champagne in the chamber, removes the longstanding requirement for a unanimous three-judge panel, allowing a two-thirds majority instead. Critically, it applies to Palestinians but not to Israeli settlers convicted of equivalent crimes. A death penalty applied to one population under occupation, with no equivalent for the other, is discriminatory justice by definition. The UN, EU, and the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, and the UK condemned the legislation as discriminatory and illegal under international law.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability

Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution building.

UN Commission documents Syria’s war crimes

The UN’s Independent Commission of Inquiry released its latest Syria report this month, marking 15 years since the 2011 uprising. While 1.5 million refugees have returned since Assad’s fall and Syria has established two new bodies on transitional justice and missing persons, the Commission documented that government forces killed over 1,400 Alawite civilians in coastal regions in March 2025, and over 1,500 Druze and Bedouin in Suweida in July 2025. Syria is escaping one era of mass atrocity while producing another. Political liberty in post-authoritarian transitions requires that the new authority not reproduce violence in new sectarian forms. For Alawite, Druze, and Kurdish communities, the 2030 horizon still feels distant.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling

These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

BJP demolishes the Masoom Baba shrine in Uttar Pradesh

Authorities in Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh, demolished the Masoom Baba shrine, associated with Hazrat Baba Jafar Ali Shah, citing a drainage canal widening project. The demolition continues a well-documented pattern: in BJP-ruled states since 2022, hundreds of mosques, shrines, and Muslim-owned properties have been demolished under anti-encroachment or development campaigns. Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s bulldozer has become a literal campaign symbol, shown at political rallies. When a bulldozer becomes a campaign symbol, it signals which communities the state regards as its primary constituents. The right to maintain religious heritage and equal application of state power are both eroded when demolitions follow these lines.

Indonesia’s educated women outperform men

A March 2026 analysis by Kiroyan Partners reframed Indonesia’s female labour gap as an economic emergency rather than a social issue. Women’s labour force participation reached 56.7% in 2025, but it still trails men’s by 27 percentage points. Nearly 63% of working women remain in the informal economy without social protection. The 2022 ILO survey found 71% of workers experienced workplace harassment. McKinsey estimates the gender gap costs the economy $135 billion annually. When structural barriers, not individual choice, determine who participates in the economy, that is an economic liberty deficit encoded in social norms and weak institutional protection. A 71% harassment rate is not background noise; it is a systematic exclusion mechanism.

Bangladesh’s new government is in power

Bangladesh’s newly elected government, led by Tarique Rahman, has officially been sworn into power, marking a significant political transition for the country. Almost immediately, the administration has been confronted with pressing challenges, most notably a deepening energy crisis that has strained the electricity supply and economic activity. At the same time, humanitarian concerns, including conditions faced by Rohingya refugees, remain urgent. The government’s early days have been defined less by long-term reform and more by crisis management, as it seeks to stabilize essential services while setting the tone for its broader policy agenda.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability

Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

Malaysia launches FIKRALab

Malaysia’s Securities Commission launched FIKRALab on 26 March 2026 under its Capital Market Masterplan 2026–2030. Built on Maqasid al-Shariah, the lab develops financial instruments delivering ethical objectives and economic impact simultaneously. Malaysia holds 24% of global Islamic finance assets, a market projected to reach $5.96 trillion in 2026. The lab directly targets the country’s RM101 billion SME financing gap, positioning Islamic finance as a tool of economic inclusion, not merely a compliance checkbox for global halal markets. FIKRALab asserts that economic systems can be designed from within an Islamic value framework.

UAE women outperform men in AI course completion

A Coursera report released in March 2026 revealed a sharp paradox in the UAE’s AI education landscape: women complete Generative AI courses at rates 2.4 percentage points higher than men and yet represent only 24% of total GenAI enrolments, a share declining 1% annually. This runs counter to global trends, where women’s GenAI participation rose from 32% in 2024 to 36% in 2025. The UAE’s overall GenAI enrolment surged 344%, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing AI learning markets. As 92% of UAE firms prioritise AI skills while facing documented talent shortages, the structural exclusion of women from entry is a competitiveness failure. The barrier is course design and access pathways, not capability.

Article Pick

Read “Is Islam a Religion?” by Asma T. Uddin () , where she argues that labeling Islam as a political ideology rather than a religion is a growing strategy used to justify denying Muslims constitutional protections in the United States.

She highlights how this framing, seen in Texas controversies and political rhetoric, threatens broader religious freedom by allowing governments to selectively decide which beliefs deserve protection.

This is not a question people often ask directly. When religion enters conversation, it usually revolves around belief, identity, or sometimes conflict. Yet in a world where different faiths constantly interact, another question begins to surface. What role does religion actually play in shaping human freedom, and how does it influence the choices individuals and societies make?

Religion is often framed as something that imposes limits. It is associated with rules, obligations, and boundaries. At the same time, religion has historically served as a source of justice, dignity, and moral protection. This tension creates an important starting point. Instead of asking whether religion restricts freedom, it may be more useful to ask how religion shapes freedom and what kind of liberty it encourages.

Divergence Across Religious Traditions

At first glance, religions seem to diverge significantly. They differ in theology, rituals, traditions, and historical development. Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and other traditions each offer distinct understandings of authority, morality, and human purpose. These differences shape communities and identities, and at times, they create distance between people.

These divergences influence how societies are structured and how individuals interpret responsibility. Because of this, religion is often seen as a dividing force. Yet focusing only on differences overlooks something equally important. Beneath these distinctions, shared concerns begin to appear. Questions about justice, dignity, and moral responsibility appear across traditions, even when expressed differently. This suggests that while religions diverge in form, they often converge in purpose.

Convergence Around Moral Responsibility

Across traditions, there is a recurring belief that human life carries value and that society should not be shaped purely by power or convenience. This convergence shifts how religion is often understood. Instead of appearing as a system of restrictions, religion begins to look more like a framework that guides freedom.

This idea appears across traditions in different ways. In Islam, the belief in Allah as the ultimate authority shapes moral responsibility. In Christianity and Judaism, God plays a similar role. While the language differs, the pattern remains consistent. Human beings are not viewed as the final source of what is right and wrong. Instead, moral authority exists beyond individual preference, shaping how freedom is understood and practiced.

At first, this may seem like a limitation on human choice. If there is a higher authority, then freedom must operate within certain boundaries. However, without any moral reference point, freedom can easily become unstable. It can shift depending on who holds power or what society prioritizes at a given moment. In that sense, moral boundaries do not necessarily take freedom away. Rather, they help preserve it by preventing freedom from becoming arbitrary or unequal.

Human Choice and Religious Limitations

This relationship becomes clearer when looking at how religions treat human life. Despite theological differences, there is strong overlap in viewing life as sacred. The Qur’an describes the killing of one person as if all humanity has been killed, and saving one life as saving all of mankind. In Genesis, human beings are described as being created in the image of God. These ideas place limits on human action, but those limits exist to protect dignity and justice.

Seen from a liberty perspective, these limits do not simply restrict freedom. They shape it. Freedom becomes meaningful when it exists alongside responsibility. This idea also appears in political philosophy. John Stuart Mill argued that freedom should exist until it harms others, writing that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community… is to prevent harm to others.” This reflects a similar balance between liberty and responsibility that appears across religious traditions. Without responsibility, freedom risks becoming domination, where the strong define freedom at the expense of others. Religious frameworks, in this sense, attempt to prevent that imbalance.

This is where human choice and religious boundaries begin to overlap. Individuals are free to make decisions, but those decisions operate within moral structures that aim to protect society. Rather than eliminating freedom, these boundaries give it direction.

Interpretation, Flexibility, and Liberty

This is where the discussion becomes more complex, especially when considering how religious teachings are interpreted. One distinction emerges between viewing scripture as guidance and viewing it as rigid law. When religious teachings are approached as guidance, they allow room for interpretation and adaptation as societies change.

This flexibility has historically existed within many traditions. Islam developed multiple schools of thought. Judaism’s rabbinic tradition produced layers of interpretation. Christianity also developed diverse theological traditions. These examples suggest that interpretation has always been part of religious life.

When interpretation becomes rigid, conflict often follows. This conflict appears not only between religions but also within them. On the other hand, when diversity of thought is allowed, it creates space for dialogue. Liberty within religion itself becomes important. The ability to interpret and engage with tradition allows religion to remain connected to society rather than isolated from it.

Shared Humanity Beyond Religious Difference

This idea also appears in everyday life. In a medical emergency, people rarely ask about the doctor’s religion or background. What matters is whether they can help. Competence and trust become more important than identity. This simple example reflects something deeper about how societies function.

Shared human concerns often bring people together, even when beliefs differ. An ideal society would not divide people primarily by religion or identity, but would emphasize dignity and contribution. Justice, in this sense, becomes practical rather than theoretical, and freedom becomes something lived rather than simply discussed.

Freedom Between Guidance and Choice

Still, this vision feels somewhat distant. Interfaith cooperation remains limited, and modern human rights frameworks are not always applied consistently. This creates a gap. Religion carries moral direction but often lacks unified global engagement, while international systems provide structure but sometimes lack moral consistency.

Instead of viewing religion and society as opposing forces, it may be more useful to see them as connected. Religion can offer moral grounding, while society determines how those values are applied in practice.

Freedom, in this sense, emerges between guidance and choice. Religions may diverge in belief and practice, but they often converge in their concern for dignity, justice, and human value. Human choice may seem limited by religious boundaries, yet those boundaries may also create the conditions necessary for meaningful freedom.

So the question still remains. Is religion something that limits freedom, or is it one of the forces that makes freedom possible in the first place?

Adapted from Edraak Webinar Series #8 - Searching for Common Grounds with Dr. Mohsin Naqvi and Dr. Ali Salman.

The linking between Islam, development, and democracy has been a constant and debated topic in comparative politics and the development paradigm. Prominent school of modernization theories always painted this straight line: economic development leads to democratic consolidation, frequently suggesting that religious cultures, particularly Islam, serve as impediments to this trajectory (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1996). Recent academic research has contested this form of cultural determinism, illustrating considerable diversity among Muslim-majority societies in terms of political systems and developmental stories (Stepan & Robertson, 2003; Donno & Russett, 2004). Yet, a substantial segment of this discourse continues to be disproportionately focused on the Middle East, resulting in the under-theorization of South Asian Muslim experiences.

Bangladesh is an analytically significant outlier in this study. Even though democracy is still shaky, authoritarianism is on the rise, and institutions are rarely get held to account, the country has made great strides in human development, such as reducing poverty, improving health services, and increasing women’s education and participation in the workforce (Mostofa & Subedi, 2021; World Bank, 2023a; UNDP, 2022). Even with all the political turbulence, the country has attained significant progress in human development metrics (World Bank, 2023a; UNDP, 2022). The coexistence of developmental progress and democratic stagnation really challenges the traditional idea on the essential role of liberal-democratic institutions in fostering social and economic developments.

So, here’s the question this article asks: What insights can Bangladesh teach us about alternative ways to growth and democracy in Muslim-majority countries? It contends that Bangladesh exemplifies how human development can precede—and in specific areas partially replace—liberal-democratic institutions. This has been achieved not chiefly by a robust developmental state, but by a dynamic civil society, comprehensive non-governmental welfare services, and pragmatically negotiated religious norms that embrace social change without secularization. This article adds something new to the fields of comparative politics and development studies by positioning Bangladesh as an analytical case rather than an anomaly. First, it challenges the traditional modernization idea that associates democracy, secularism, and growth. Second, it highlights how much religious values and informal community networks can shape a country’s progress and development. Third, it broadens the empirical and theoretical landscape of debates on Islam and democracy beyond Middle Eastern—focuses and argues the necessity for more contextually attuned strategies for governance and development in Muslim-majority societies.

2. Bangladesh’s Developmental Trajectory: Key Analytical Insights

Bangladesh’s developmental story is analytically significant not for its accomplishments, but for the manner in which it has transpired within a shaky democracy. The country exemplifies a trajectory where human growth progresses not just through strong democratic institutions, but by institutional stability, non-state entities, and deep socially ingrained traditions.

Over the past thirty years, Bangladesh has steadily improved life expectancy, lowered child mortality, enrollment into schools, and pulled millions out of poverty (UNDP, 2022; World Bank, 2023a). These advancements have transpired, while dealing with messy elections, weaker checks and balances, and more power concentrating in the hands of a few. This isn’t really a story of democracy getting stronger. Instead, as many scholars point out, what’s happening is closer to competitive or electoral authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The following Figure 1 illustrates the pattern: the pattern: Human development keeps moving up, but democracy slides back with enduring stagnation and regression.

The analytical challenge is to elucidate: why hasn’t development stalled, even with all the political turmoil? A central factor is steady policy continuity across regimes, especially in health, education, family planning, and rural development. All administrations—military, quasi-democratic, and elected—have mostly maintained a technocratic consensus on the fundamental social policies, letting party politics mess with these priorities (Quadir, 2010; Parnini, 2012). So, progress has been propelled more by elite consensus on developmental priorities than by democratic accountability, with the depoliticization of welfare provision. This really challenges the premise that democratic competition is essential for lasting human development (Lipset, 1959).

Another defining characteristic of Bangladesh’s growth model is the pivotal involvement of non-governmental organizations. Prominent NGOs like BRAC and Grameen have not only filled gaps left by a weak state, but also built entire systems for education, healthcare, microfinance, and disaster relief at an unparalleled scale (Kolisetty, 2014). These organizations function not just as service providers, rather they have become institutional alternatives to the government, creating new ways for people and the state to connect. This NGO-led growth is fundamentally tied into a moral economy shaped by Islamic ethics. The practices of zakat, sadaqa, and waqf-inspired charity have aligned with secular development goals, generating a legitimacy that is frequently absent in solely technocratic institutions (Fukuyama, 2001). Instead of undermining religious values, NGOs have often embraced them, framing development in moral terms that align with local religious sensibilities. This confluence elucidates why significant non-state involvement has garnered social acceptance and political viability. Moral legitimacy effectively mitigates institutional deficiencies and inadequate state accountability.

Gender dynamics in Bangladesh really show how flexible social norms can shape real change. The presence of women in the workforce, especially within the garment industry, alongside extensive involvement in microfinance initiatives, has significantly altered household economies and gender role (Kabeer, 2012). These changes have emerged in a Muslim-majority community often presumed to be opposed to women’s participation in public economic jobs. This change signifies pragmatic religious adaptation rather than indicating secularization (Islam & Islam, 2018). In Bangladesh, Islamic standards have been socially negotiated, permitting women’s employment and movement to be rationalized through necessity, family welfare, and moral respectability (Al Mamun & Hoque, 2022). Development has arisen not from leaving religion behind, but from its recontextualization to fit everyday practices. This highlights a broader analytical insight: in Bangladesh, development has advanced through normative flexibility and social compromise rather than doctrinal secularism, confusing strict dichotomies between Islam and modernity.

3. Democracy, Governance, and Informality

Bangladesh’s political trajectory over the last twenty years is most accurately interpreted as competitive authoritarianism, characterized by the coexistence of formal democratic institutions with systematic limitations on political competition. Although elections are conducted routinely, their legitimacy and credibility has increasingly been questioned due to the lack of judicial independence, the weakening of electoral watchdog bodies, restrictions on opposition activity, and the growing concentration of power within the executive (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Riaz, 2020). Consequently, the nuts and bolts of democracy in Bangladesh have worn down over time, even though the rituals of elections are still there.

Despite institutions falling apart, the country hasn’t collapsed into chaos or lost its grip on politics. Instead, governance has been maintained through a web of informal network, such as patron-client relationships, party-oriented resource allocation, and individualized power structures. Political loyalty is frequently rewarded with jobs, social welfare benefits, or protection, whereas disagreement may lead to expulsion from these networks (Khan, 2013). Such arrangements substitute impersonal rule-based governance and contribute to a measure of political stability in the absence of robust institutions. Nevertheless, they also reinforce elite supremacy and restrict substantial opportunities for citizen accountability.

In these informal government settings, moral authority plays a vital role in legitimizing function. Politicians lean on religious symbols, moral language, and promises of stability to shore up their own authority, especially at the local level. Mosques and madrasas aren’t just places for prayer or study; they double as hubs for settling disputes, helping with welfare, and keeping the community running smoothly (Wood, 2007). Religious leaders frequently serve as middlemen between the populace and the government, converting bureaucratic power into comprehensible moral language. This mediation is particularly crucial in rural regions, where the state barely shows up and people don’t put much faith in official institutions. Instead of serving as a substitute for the state, these religious and informal entities are intricately intertwined with it. Local politicians build ties with mosque committees, madrasa administrators, and religious figures to boost their own influence, motivate voters, and keep society in check (Riaz & Fair, 2010). The lines between government and informal power get blurry, resulting in a hybrid political system whose legitimacy comes from both moral authority and official, legal institutions.

The primary analytical conflict, however, lies in the political ramifications of this informality. Although informal networks and religious mediation can enhance governance by settling disputes, allocating resources, and compensating for ineffective institutions, they also chip away at democracy. Decision-making becomes unclear, rule enforcement becomes discretionary, and political participation depends on allegiance rather than entitlements. Citizens interact with the state not as individuals possessing rights, but as clients situated inside hierarchical social structures. Bangladesh’s example demonstrates that informality can keep the system working for a while, but in the long run, it hinders real democratic progress, and keeps things stable for those in power, instead of holding them accountable.

Comparative Insights and Theoretical Implications

The development and governance trajectory of Bangladesh becomes clearer when analyzed comparatively. It demonstrates how Muslim-majority societies uniquely navigate the relationship among Islam, development, and democracy.

Bangladesh vs. Pakistan

In Bangladesh, people turn to Islam more as a part of daily life and community than as a strict political agenda. Religious norms and institutions—mosques, madrasas, and zakat practices—have been effectively incorporated into development projects, gender programs, and local administration. This weaves religion into the fabric of society, strengthening community ties and giving a boost to non-government groups that help people out (Fukuyama, 2001; Wood, 2007). The state has predominantly permitted religious heterogeneity and local negotiation of Islamic values, fostering policy continuity and gradual societal change even within a framework of competitive authoritarianism.

Pakistan’s history tells a different. Here, Islam hasn’t just been a source of values—it’s been used as a centralized ideological tool for state formation. Since the Objectives Resolution of 1949 (Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 1949), the state has endeavored to weave Islamic principles into the country’s laws and government through various Islamization initiatives under military regimes, frequently undermining political plurality and institutional stability (Gurchani, Imran, & Malik, 2024; Nasr, 2000; Lieven, 2011). This top-down instrumentalization of Islam has constrained development policy by privileging ideological conformity over pragmatic social programming. The contrast illustrates that the role of Islam in governance—resource versus ideological mandate—significantly shapes the capacity of Muslim-majority societies to achieve developmental outcomes alongside, or independent of, democratic consolidation.

Bangladesh vs. Indonesia

Indonesia offers a different perspective for comprehending the importance of institutional design. Unlike Bangladesh, which sticks with a more centralized framework, Indonesia’s post-Suharto decentralization has enhanced the authority of subnational administrations, resulting in varied approaches to policy execution and democratic engagement (Hadiz & Robison, 2005). Decentralization boosted local accountability and made the democratic process more meaningful.

Still, it sometimes hindered the consistent execution of development initiatives, so there’s a clear trade-off: more inclusive governance, but less consistency in following through on big projects (Anwar, 2019). Conversely, Bangladesh has leaned on a centralized system and utilized elite consensus to maintain cohesive human development policies despite fragile democratic institutions.

Bangladesh vs. Egypt

The comparison between Bangladesh and Egypt elucidates how divergent governmental approaches to religion and civil society shape development and democratic outcomes in Muslim-majority societies. Despite both countries exhibit weak democracy and authoritarian habits, their developmental trajectories significantly differ in institutional structure and legitimacy sources. In Bangladesh, development has progressed through social developmentalism, significantly contributed by non-state actors, consistent policy implementation, and the pragmatic integration of Islamic principles in welfare provision. Religious institutions and ethical practices, like mosque-based social mediation, serve as socially ingrained resources that bolster the legitimacy of NGO-led and community-based development initiatives (Fukuyama, 2001; Wood, 2007). Instead of being dominated by the state, religious authority is negotiated, allowing Islam to function as a flexible moral framework that fosters gradual societal change and ongoing human development, even in the context of competitive authoritarianism (Lewis, 2012).

In contrast, Egypt represents authoritarian developmental statism, marked by consolidated governmental control over economic policies, welfare assistance, and religious organizations. Religious authority is bureaucratized and subordinated to the state through entities like al-Azhar and the Ministry of Religious Endowments, constraining the autonomy of religious actors and civil society (Brown, 2017; Moustafa, 2014). Despite large-scale infrastructural and macroeconomic initiatives, Egypt has struggled to achieve inclusive human development outcomes compared to Bangladesh, particularly in education quality, gender inclusion, and social mobility (UNDP, 2022; World Bank, 2023b).

Bangladesh vs. Turkey

A comparison between Bangladesh and Turkey really shows how much state power and the way religion is built into institutions shape both development and democracy. Both countries have a kind of competitive or electoral authoritarianism, but they take very different paths when it comes to weaving Islam into government and development frameworks. In Bangladesh, Islam is predominantly detached from official state ideology, serving primarily as a cultural and social resource integrated into daily routines, welfare distribution, and local administration. Developmental gains have been driven by NGO-led services, informal networks, and elite agreement on fundamental social policies, rather than by a robust, centralized state government (Quadir, 2010; Parnini, 2012; Kolisetty, 2014). Religious norms have been pragmatically adapted to facilitate women’s involvement in labor, education, and social mobility, enabling development without ideological secularization or formal democratic enhancement (Kabeer, 2012; Al Mamun & Hoque, 2022).

Turkey, in contrast, integrates robust state institutions with the political instrumentalization of Islam. Turkey’s historical trajectory, influenced by a centralized bureaucratic culture, has been primarily state-driven, with Islam progressively integrated into governance via electoral mobilization and party politics, rather than through informal social mediation unlike Bangladesh (Keyman, 2014). Under competitive authoritarianism, religious legitimacy has been employed to consolidate executive authority, reform public institutions, and marginalize opposition, thereby contributing to democratic backsliding despite sustained economic and infrastructural development (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016). In contrast to Bangladesh’s decentralized religious authority, Islam in Turkey has become more closely integrated with governmental power, so constraining its function as an independent source of social capital.

This comparative analysis signifies that neither state power nor authoritarian rule alone determines developmental outcomes in Muslim-majority countries. Bangladesh exemplifies how socially ingrained religion can offset deficient formal institutions, facilitating human growth via negotiated and community-driven religious practices. In contrast, Turkey and more notably Egypt, exemplify how the institutionalization of religion inside a robust state may coexist with economic advancement while eroding democratic pluralism. These disparities underscore that the political and developmental impacts of Islam are influenced more by institutional setting and governance methods than by dogma. The following Table 2 delineates the types of developmental governance in Muslim-majority countries, emphasizing how differences in state capability, civil society involvement, and the political influence of Islam all shape the varied development-democracy configurations.

These comparisons also underscore the overarching theoretical understanding that Muslim-majority states do not adhere to a singular, deterministic course from Islam to democracy or development. Instead, they demonstrate multiple modernities, wherein institutional frameworks, state strategies, and religious-social norms interact in context-specific manners. Bangladesh exemplifies a developmental paradigm wherein Islam functions as a legitimizing and adaptive resource, centralized authority ensures policy consistency, and civil society mitigates inadequate democratic structures. Comparative analysis, thus, challenges uniform assumptions on Muslim politics and underscores the importance of context-specific frameworks for comprehending the diversity of political and developmental outcomes.

5. Core Lessons and Implications

The analysis of Bangladesh’s development and governance trajectory reveals several critical lessons with both empirical and theoretical relevance for comparative politics and development studies. Firstly, Bangladesh exemplifies that development does not require prior democratic consolidation. Contrary to linear modernization theories, which assert that economic growth and human development inherently accompany democratic institutionalization (Lipset, 1959; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Ciftci, 2010). Even with shaky democratic institutions and deficient institutional accountability, Bangladesh has achieved significant advancements in health, education, and poverty alleviation (UNDP, 2022; World Bank, 2023a). Policy continuity, elite consensus, and technical execution have guaranteed that developmental can advance even when democratic mechanisms remain fragile or performative.

Second, the Bangladeshi experience challenges the presumption that Islam intrinsically impedes development. Instead, Islam can serve as a developmental facilitator by offering moral legitimacy, fostering social solidarity, and establishing normative frameworks for welfare distribution. The incorporation of religiously motivated principles—such as zakat and waqf—into NGO-led and community-oriented development programs has facilitated widespread societal acceptability and cultural relevance, hence augmenting their efficacy (Fukuyama, 2001; Wood, 2007). Islamic social capital can be pragmatically utilized to facilitate development, especially in environments with constrained formal state capability, rather than acting as a hindrance to modernization.

Third, Bangladesh exemplifies how civil society can substitute for weak state institutions, facilitating governance and providing public goods in sectors such as health, education, and microfinance. NGOs such as BRAC and Grameen Bank have emerged as quasi-institutional entities, connecting the state with local communities and cultivating social trust. This paradigm enhances developmental outcomes but involves democratic compromises. Dependence on informal governance networks and religiously legitimated moral authority can bypass official accountability mechanisms, so entrenching elite supremacy and limiting citizen engagement in decision-making (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Riaz & Fair, 2010).

These discoveries collectively suggest a deeper theoretical implication: the comparative analysis of Muslim-majority states necessitates moving beyond normative prescriptions for democracy and liberal institutions. Instead of supposing that democratic consolidation is a prerequisite for human development, scholars and policymakers ought to embrace a contextual governance approach, focusing on the interplay of local institutions, religious norms, and civil society in generating particular developmental outcomes. Bangladesh exemplifies an alternative modernity where human development, social stability, and practical religiosity coexist, demonstrating that institutional design, policy continuity, and social integration are as essential as formal democratic processes in influencing societal advancement.

*Professor Dr. Md. Thowhidul Islam

Center for General Education

International Islamic University Chittagong

Bangladesh-4318. Cell: +88-01817078263

E-mail: tauhidcox@gmail.com; tauhidcox@iiuc.ac.bd.

Scopus ID: 57208297573 I ORCID ID: 0000-0002-2407-8422

Web of Science Researcher ID: ACL-8228-2022

Google Scholar I ResearchGate

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The case of Amara Waqas is instructive precisely because of how ordinary it is. As an Air Force officer, she was still unable to prove ownership of assets she had materially contributed to. Before this writ, an appellate court stripped her of even a 30 percent share of her own dowry on a technicality, what feminist legal scholars call the “neutrality trap”: laws framed without gender bias that nonetheless produce profoundly gendered outcomes when applied to structurally unequal circumstances.

The data context is relevant here; In Pakistan, only 2% of women own land despite 70% working in agriculture, and the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey found that 98% of married women hold no property whatsoever. Customarily, women carry disproportionate shares of unpaid domestic and care work. Women perform 76.2% of all unpaid care work and spend 4.2 hours daily on it, compared to 1.7 hours contributed by men globally. Financially, the gender inclusion gap stood at 34% as recently as December 2023. The IHC’s ruling begins to name that invisibility for what it is: a form of structural dispossession.

The court’s comparative jurisprudence is well-grounded in Islamic law. Malaysia and Indonesia have embedded similar protections within Islamic law through the harta sepencarian doctrine, dismantling the claim that property equality contradicts Islamic jurisprudence. Justice Kayani also correctly cited Surah Al-Baqarah and Surah Al-Ahzab by reinstating the fact that Islam has never prohibited legislation protecting women’s property rights, rather, the contrary. Pakistan’s own CEDAW ratification obliges the state to eliminate property-based discrimination under Article 16, an obligation the CEDAW Committee reiterated in its 2020 Concluding Observations on Pakistan. Nearly three decades after ratification, no comprehensive legislative framework for matrimonial property distribution exists. The Family Courts Act, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, and the Nikahnama together represent a patchwork that protects women’s formal rights in theory while leaving enforcement toothless in practice.

Thus, the court’s recommendations to make the Nikahnama column mandating equal property division and to formally educate on Column 18 rights are practical. Column 18 has long offered women a mechanism to stipulate divorce rights. Extending its architecture to cover property is both logistically feasible and culturally legible. Similarly, the recommendation to educate girls about their Nikahnama-based rights reflects an understanding: “legal reform without legal literacy is merely symbolic”.

What the judgment cannot accomplish alone is the transformation of the structural conditions that make women economically vulnerable in marriage in the first place. According to Pakistan’s 2017 census and subsequent household surveys, women own less than three percent of agricultural land and a similarly marginal share of formal property. Financial inclusion remains sharply gendered: the Karandaaz Financial Inclusion survey suggests that women constitute around 14 percent of bank account holders. In this context, even an equitable matrimonial property regime will benefit primarily women who have assets to divide and will leave the most economically marginalised women, those in rural areas or informal labour, still outside its protections.

It exposes a legal and social architecture that has long treated women’s domestic labour and property rights insignificantly, a fiction that benefits those who enjoy the labour while refusing to compensate for it. Thus, it is a foot in the right direction, but needs to be coupled with literacy, enforcement, and cultural evolution.

This newsletter covers developments from 17 March to 25 March 2026, from global terrorism rankings, Azerbaijan’s New tax ammendments and infrastructure promises in Niger to Pakistan’s pollution paradox, Sudanese refugees’ education crisis, Al-Aqsa under closure, and Iraq’s reckoning with its past.

We organise the Muslim-majority countries into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life.

Religious Freedom Denied: Al- Aqsa Sealed for Eid Prayers

On the first day of Eid al-Fitr, 20 March 2026, Palestinian worshippers were barred from entering Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque compound and the Old City for the first time since Israel seized East Jerusalem in the 1967 war. Israeli authorities cited the security situation stemming from the ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran. Access to all holy sites within the Old City, including the Al-Aqsa, the Western Wall, and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, had been closed since 6 March. The Islamic Waqf, which administers the mosque, warned that what is framed as a temporary wartime measure risks becoming permanent, which strikes at the heart of cultural and religious freedom in Jerusalem, raising the question of whether emergency powers are being used to permanently reshape who controls access to the third holiest site in Islam.

Sudan’s Lost Generation: 76% of Refugee Children are not in School

A March 2026 UNHCR survey assessed that three-quarters of Sudanese refugee households surveyed reported that their children were no longer attending school, despite 41 per cent of families having school-age children. The findings extend beyond education. None of the 294 households surveyed possessed birth certificates, 87 per cent had no identity documents, and only 10 per cent had access to basic sanitation and clean water. Children without identity documents exist in legal grey zones, unable to enrol formally, vulnerable to exploitation, and at risk of permanent statelessness.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution building.

Peace Returning to a Scarred Community

Governor Mohammed Umaru Bago of Niger visited Kagara in Rafi Local Government Area during Eid Salah, bringing concrete pledges to a community long defined by kidnappings, displacement, and insecurity. He confirmed that work on several development projects, including a 10 km and a 5 km road, a new Government Science College, increased security for the state hospital and a mini airport, will commence shortly in Kagara State. The Emir of Kagara also noted that improved security had enabled farmers to return to their fields and the revival of the traditional horse-riding festival. These are the textures of a normal life reclaimed.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

The World’s Most Polluted Country Plants Trees

IQAir’s 2025 World Air Quality Report ranked Pakistan the most polluted country in the world, with fine particulate levels nearly thirteen times above WHO standards. The health toll, premature births, cardiovascular disease, and cognitive decline, falls heaviest on the urban poor and children. Days later, Pakistan marked Forest Day on March 24 with nationwide tree-planting drives. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa launched a campaign targeting one million saplings planted in a single day under the Green KP initiative. Clean air is not a privilege; it is a right. The ceremonial enthusiasm is failing to substitute for industrial regulation, enforcement against crop-burning, and a real urban emissions policy.

Iraqi PM Al-Sudani vows against tyranny

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani commemorated the anniversary of the Halabja chemical attack and the broader Anfal campaign this week, honouring victims of Ba’athist atrocities, including the Sha’ban Intifada, the massacre of scholars, and the gassing of thousands of Kurdish civilians in March 1988. Al-Sudani framed remembrance as a democratic obligation, pledging that Iraq’s institutions would guard against any return to authoritarian rule. Such statements are exercises in transitional justice: the recognition of authoritarian crimes is itself a form of political protection.

Global Terrorism Index 2026

The Global Terrorism Index 2026 carries meaningful good news. Deaths from terrorism fell 28 per cent globally to 5,582, with 81 countries recording improvements, showing the lowest number of deteriorations in the Index’s history. IS, while remaining the deadliest terrorist organisation, was active in fewer countries, dropping from 22 to 15. Large-scale attacks were notably absent, and average lethality per attack declined from 2.1 to 1.8 deaths. In Muslim-majority Africa, five Sahelian countries recorded falls in both deaths and incidents, with Burkina Faso alone seeing a 44.8 per cent drop in terrorism deaths.

In sub-Saharan Africa, 71 per cent of recruits cited human rights abuses by state security forces as their tipping point, while a quarter pointed to the total absence of economic opportunity. Thus, terrorism, in these regions, is not a crisis of faith, but of governance. Where states protect economic life, the appeal of armed extremism withers. Liberty is not only a moral good; it is the most durable counterterrorism strategy available.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

Azerbaijan’s Amended Tax Code

Azerbaijan’s amended tax code entered into force today, introducing a triple exemption on the import of qualifying rare vehicles from VAT, excise duty, and customs. A car qualifies as rare if it is over 40 years old and retains its original engine, body, and chassis, or has been restored to factory specifications. This comes from Azerbaijan’s larger 2026 Tax Code amendments. Covering 145 changes across 45 articles, it signals a deliberate pivot toward economic flexibility. Non-oil private sector income tax drops as low as 3%, and micro-businesses, media outlets, theatres, cinemas, and museums receive significant tax relief. Classic cars, artworks, and antiques are now VAT and excise-exempt. The framework is designed to offer encouragement by actively removing barriers to participation in legitimate markets that had previously operated with little dedicated legislative support.

Article Pick

Read “Why so many Muslims feel disconnected from their faith” by Faisal Kutty, which explores how public expression of faith remains strong while internal gratification is plummeting. He explores the complex relationship between the way faith is presented, practised and preached.

This newsletter covers developments from 7 March 2026 to 17 March 2026, from the hereditary succession in Iran to the ongoing Afghan refugee crisis, provides updates from the D-8 Summit, and features two stories from OIC and CAIR in observance of the International Day to Combat Islamophobia.

We organise the Muslim-majority countries into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life.

Iran: A Dynasty Declared

On March 8, Iran’s 88-member Assembly of Experts announced the election of Mojtaba Khamenei as the Islamic Republic’s third Supreme Leader since its founding in 1979. The announcement came after days of intense pressure by the IRGC and current global tensions. The succession carries deep contradictions, increasing challenges for political freedom in Iran. Although Iran’s ruling ideology formally opposes hereditary succession, Mojtaba had built a loyalty structure and was considered a potential successor by IRCG even before his father’s death, despite never having held elected office.

A recognition for media freedom: WAFA receives Media Professionalism Award

The Palestinian News and Information Agency WAFA received the inaugural Media Professionalism Award from the Union of News Agencies of the OIC during a Ramadan Forum in Jeddah. Palestinian Minister Ahmed Assaf noted that the recognition comes amid extremely challenging conditions, with WAFA having lost hundreds of journalists during Israel’s assault on Gaza while continuing to report daily under direct targeting by Israeli occupation authorities. Celebrating this recognition is, therefore, a celebration of the enduring power of free expression, where freedom and liberty persist even under threat. The award falls within the framework of the Jeddah Charter for Media Responsibility, a joint Muslim World League and UNA initiative establishing ethical standards for journalism and formally countering hate and Islamophobia in media.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution building.

Afghan Refugees Crisis

A total of 341 Afghan refugees had been arrested during raids conducted in the tehsils and district headquarters of Swabi on Sunday. Amid escalating border tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, 7,015 Afghan migrants were arrested or detained across Pakistan, with over 150,000 deportations, according to UNHCR and IOM updates in Pakistan alone. The escalating tensions in Iran have also affected the livelihood of 750,000 Afghan refugees in Iran. These refugees have limited shelter, livelihoods, or protection. Many deported families had lived in Pakistan and Iran for decades, while some children had never even set foot in Afghanistan. The current situation reflects a troubling curtailment of the security of life at the expense of the regional crisis, where the fundamental right to live freely and without fear is increasingly being challenged.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

D-8 Summit postponed

The D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation Summit is a gathering of eight developing Muslim-majority countries aimed at strengthening economic cooperation, promoting trade, and advancing shared development goals among member states. Originally scheduled for April 13–15 in Jakarta, officials said the ongoing war and lack of de-escalation made it difficult to convene leaders safely. The delay underscores how geopolitical crises ripple, disrupting economic cooperation among Muslim-majority states. The summit was planning on deeper collaboration on trade, the halal economy, and digital connectivity through the D-8 framework. A new summit date has not yet been announced.

Senegal Doubles Prison Sentences for Homosexual Relations

Senegal’s parliament approved a bill on March 11 doubling the maximum prison sentence for same-sex relations to ten years, and imposing three-to-seven-year sentences for those advocating for LGBTQ rights. The measure passed overwhelmingly in the National Assembly and now awaits final approval from President Bassirou Diomaye Faye.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

OIC Marks International Day to Combat Islamophobia at UNESCO

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) observed the International Day to Combat Islamophobia with a high-level roundtable meeting at UNESCO headquarters in Paris on March 13. Addressing the audience during the meeting, OIC Secretary-General Hissein Brahim Taha stated that emerging technologies, mainly AI, are fueling Islamophobia. He urged countries, technology companies, and civil society organizations to strengthen cooperation in combating hate speech on social media.

CAIR Report: Record Islamophobia in the US — “The Right to Be Different” Narrowed

CAIR’s 2026 Civil Rights Report documented 8,683 discrimination complaints involving Muslims in the United States during 2025. Released March 10 and titled The Right to Be Different, this report marks the highest number of discrimination complaints since CAIR began tracking such incidents in 1996. CAIR researchers concluded that five federal bills were introduced in 2025 that would effectively ban the practice of Islam or bar Muslims from entering the United States, while a “Sharia-Free America Caucus” now claims 45 Congressional members.

Article Pick

Read “How the Islamic Republic Made Islam Unpopular” by Mustafa Akyol. He argues that faith cannot be imposed by the power of a state, its laws, and its squads, and needs no theocracy. It only needs liberty.

Catch Mustafa Akyol soon on the Edraak Podcast, “Between Texts and Freedom: Where Islamic Thought Meets the Modern Idea of Liberty” on Podbean! Mustafa Akyol will explore the concept of freedom in Islamic thought in comparison with modern political understandings of liberty, and reflect on whether a tradition grounded in submission can offer a coherent account of freedom.

The end of Islamism?

The shocking assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatullah Khamenei during the onset of the attack on Iran by US-Israel provides us an opportunity to revisit the ideology that Khamenei, and modern Iran, represented. Iranian sociologist Asef Bayat referred to it as Islamism and considered post-1979 Iran the culmination of Islamism. It may also be referred to as Political Islam. Bayat defined Islamism as a set of “ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an “Islamic order” – a religious state, shari‘a law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities.” He also added the element of social justice and a focus on the poor in this ideology. Iran is the only example of a religious, or rather a theocratic state, in the modern world in the 20th century, where religious clergy dictates and controls politics, defence, and economy.

Rise of Post-Islamism

Islamism or Political Islam could not be expanded beyond Iran as a state system, though it continued to inspire political and violent movements. During the 1990s, Asef Bayat started arguing the rise of what he called “Post-Islamism” which he contrasted with Islamism. In his words, post-Islamism differs because “it represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty… It wants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom …, with democracy and modernity, to achieve what some have termed an “alternative modernity” … Whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights. Yet, while it favors a civil and nonreligious state, it accords an active role for religion in the public sphere.”

Post-Islamism has several demonstrations. The rise of AKP in Türkiye, the emergence of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, the democratisation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the transformation of Tunisian political party Annahda from Islamic Democrats to Muslim Democrats. Asef Bayat produced an edited volume, “Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam,” published in 2013, in which he provided a comprehensive review of these trends. The reversals since then, especially of the Arab Spring, indicate that the contest is far from over. In many places, Islamism and Post-Islamism live side by side.

Sans economics: The reversal of some post-Islamist movements

The failure of the post-Islamist movement, for example, in Tunisia, was largely a result of the lack of appreciation of economic factors, which underlie the democratic transition. Annahda, when it came to power, could not present a credible plan to transform economic governance and to control corruption, which became a part of a pervasive state during authoritarian times. The recent protests in Iran, triggered by “bazaari” (merchant class), which were then brutally suppressed by Iran’s government, were also mainly triggered by deteriorating economic conditions- and in particular inflation and depreciation. In other words, economics did not get a prominent place in the post-Islamism thesis.

Islam and Liberty as a new path?

Islam and Liberty Network, which was founded in 2011 in Istanbul as a network of Muslim scholars, researchers, and thinkers, offers a path for peace and prosperity to the Muslim world. In a way, this can be understood as a post-Islamist non-movement, using the words of Asef Bayat. Its intellectual framework has three pillars- economic freedom, religious freedom, and political freedom (in no particular order).

This intellectual framework of a free society draws inspiration from the Islamic civilizational history and a liberal interpretation of the religious text, and it is not the same as embracing the West. I am not being oblivious to the hegemonic powers and their designs of the world. In fact, I consciously recognize religious symbols being invoked in the current war, especially in the US and Israel. However, as someone who believes that faith and freedom can co-exist, I am of the opinion that we need these three pillars: economic, religious, and political freedom to evolve a society that cares for its people and provides a foundation for security, justice, and prosperity.

Liberty is a precondition for Security

The 20th century ended with a major lesson for political economy. Countries that could not offer economic security and freedom to their citizens collapsed despite credible defence capabilities. The collapse of the USSR and the fall — and disintegration — of Eastern European countries offer clear examples.

Let me make a slightly different argument. The Muslim countries, which did not allow at least some level of autonomy and freedom to their people AND demonstrated military ambitions, collapsed badly when confronted with material, military and technological challenges from regional and global hegemonic powers.

Iraq in the 1980s and later in 2000s and Libya after 2010 exhibited this failure. These dictatorships first failed domestically first and then succumbed to external threats. Afghanistan is also on the same path. With the fall of religious leadership, and significant asymmetry in defence capabilities, Iran may be the next case of a closed society, military ambition and a collapse.

On the other hand, Muslim majority countries with strong defence systems and with relatively open economic and political systems have done well on both liberty and security. Türkiye has stood its ground, as a strong country and strong economy. Pakistan, although struggling economically, has established its military prowess in recent times and has also demonstrated its credibility as a responsible nuclear state overcoming significant obstacles.

Interestingly, both Türkiye and Pakistan have struggled with the political ambitions of their militaries. Türkiye adopted a tougher stance where its political leadership, backed by its economic successes in the first 10 years of this century, managed to secure its authority. In Pakistan, we believe more in negotiation rather than an open contest between powerful stakeholders. We may find our own balance in due time. I wrote here in 2015, that Pakistan is now a post-Islamist state and no more than a bogeyman of Islamism despite its constitution’s religious orientation. Thus both Türkiye and Pakistan are examples of post-Islamism.

The lesson for post-Islamist world should be clear. We need a pro-liberty stance. We should build on liberty to achieve security, and we need economic security to guarantee our freedoms. This is our only insurance against internal strife and external threats.

The author is a founding member and CEO of Islam and Liberty Network (L) Foundation. This article is written in his personal capacity.

Read here a latest interview by Asef Bayat: https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/iran-after-khamenei/

This newsletter covers developments from 17 January to 6 March 2026, from the deepening war between Iran and the US-Israel alliance to aid bans in Gaza that threaten survival. It also covers the UN’s alarm over a renewed war in South Sudan, and the new penal code in Afghanistan that has institutionalized gender violence and curtailed fundamental freedoms.

We organize the Muslim-majority countries into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily lives.

Gaza: Aid Bans and Collective Punishment

Several international organizations, including MSF and NRC, have been banned from operating in the Gaza Strip, placing nearly two million people at further humanitarian risk. Israel’s Ministry for Diaspora Affairs has imposed strict transparency rules requiring NGOs in Gaza to disclose detailed staff and funding information, threatening licence revocation for actions such as “delegitimizing” Israel or pursuing legal cases against IDF soldiers.

Aid groups argue the measures are politically motivated, violate data-protection laws, and risk undermining independent humanitarian work in Gaza, where hundreds of aid workers have already been killed, and relief access remains fragile. 17 organizations have filed a petition against Israel’s new sanctions, deeming them violations of international humanitarian law.

Iran War: Liberty Cannot Be Imposed

The United States and Israel launched a major military campaign against Iran, code-named Operation Epic Fury, on 28th February, 2026. This comes just as sensitive trade negotiations between Tehran and Washington, facilitated by Oman, were underway. Deemed necessary to “eliminate imminent threats from the Iranian regime,” it occurred amid a period of internal turbulence in Iran, where the economy has contracted, inflation has soared, and nationwide protests have called for political reform since late 2025. As Trump urges the Iranian people to “take over your government. It will be yours to take”, he undermines an important fact: external military force and foreign aggression have historically failed to deliver lasting stability, prosperity, or domestic agency. Early reports indicate hundreds of casualties and over 700 wounded across multiple cities of Iran, including women and children. Schools, civilian infrastructure, and residential areas were hit, prompting closures and emergency directives from Iranian authorities. Most notably, the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, in these airstrikes ended his 37-year rule. The attack also reportedly killed 40 senior Iranian officials, including the heads of the Revolutionary Guards, armed forces, and intelligence services, as well as members of Khamenei’s family. These developments are escalating this war into a regional crisis.

Historically, the Islamic regime of Iran has declared the US and Israel as its primary enemies and has maintained a publicly hostile stance while supporting militant insurgencies in the region.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution building.

UN Warning on South Sudan

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan warns of a looming return to full-scale war, citing escalating atrocity risks. Presented in front of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, CHRSS discussed how the renewed fighting between government soldiers and the SPLA-IO shows rising political tensions. More than 450,000 children are at risk of acute malnutrition, 250,000 people are left without healthcare, and women have reported 250 cases of widespread, systematic sexual violence. For a country that gained independence in 2011 with hopes of self-determination, the warning underscores how fragile freedom remains when governance fails to protect citizens.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

Afghanistan’s new penal code

A new penal code that “formally removes equality between men and women before the law” was signed by Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, Supreme Leader of Afghanistan, and is the first comprehensive criminal law issued under the Taliban administration in Afghanistan. The 119-article, 60-page Decree No. 12 presents harsher penalties for organizing animal fights than for domestic violence. Under the decree, a man who severely beats his wife, causing a visible injury, faces up to 15 days in prison, and only if the woman can prove her case before a judge. This consolidated earlier restrictions on girls’ education, women’s employment, and public conduct. Human rights advocates say it marks a further erosion of individual liberty, legal equality, and protections for Afghan women and children.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

Britain: Anti-Palestinian Repression and Civil Liberties

The European Legal Support Centre reported 964 documented cases, between 2019 and 2025, of anti-Palestinian repression in Britain. These cases range from workplace discrimination to restrictions on protest. The two main allegations used, as noted by the report, against any Palestinian solidarity movement are support for terrorism and antisemitism. The report also notes that UKLFI has been involved in 128 incidents that led to institutional repression of Palestine solidarity.

Singapore Muslim Festival 2026: Faith, Culture, and Community

The Singapore Muslim Festival 2026, held at Singapore Expo from February 13–15, brought together government ministers, Islamic scholars, entrepreneurs, and diplomatic representatives, including His Excellency Mohammad Alghamdi, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Singapore, in a three-day celebration of Islamic heritage, regional ties, and community life. Organised by Jamiyah Singapore under the theme “Hajj & Umrah: Prepare Your Heart, Mind & Soul,” the festival featured SEERAH exhibitions, Islamic calligraphy, a virtual reality journey through Makkah and Madinah, and a platform for Muslim-owned enterprises.

Article Pick

Read “The Politics of Silence Around Islam” by Ada Akpala. The article explores why open conversations about Islam remain rare in the West, despite Muslims being a significant and permanent part of society. It argues that fear, mislabelled Islamophobia, and hesitancy to confront Islamism hinder honest dialogue, leaving space for extremists on both sides and challenging integration and democratic values.

The conversation unpacks Edraak’s core vision: developing a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the Muslim world by moving beyond conflict-centric and security-focused narratives. During the conversation, Dr. Salman and Ms. Nusaybah explain the structure of Edraak Weekly, which tracks key developments across four zones of the Muslim world, and Edraak Monthly, which will feature long-form analysis, podcasts, and book reviews.

This episode also situates Edraak within the broader mission of the Islam and Liberty Network, focused on advancing informed conversations around religious, economic, and political freedoms in Muslim societies.

Listen to the podcast here.

Associate Professor in Islamic Legal Studies

University of Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia

SINCE the fall of Suharto in 1998, almost three decades ago, Indonesia has turned into a democratic country. By democratic, it may refer to many dimensions. But in general, democracy in Indonesia might be understood in terms of freedom of speech, the establishment of new political institutions, and open space for expressions from diverse groups within society. In addition, the democratic nature of Indonesia in the post-Suharto era is also evident from the lifting of so many political restrictions, which have enabled suppressed public voices to emerge. Among those voices, expressions of Islam in various orientations and agendas are the most notable. The important point with this phenomenon is that the diversity of Islamic voices in Indonesia stands on different positions regarding many important issues, with democracy being one of its important ingredients. Considering this fact, it is interesting to analyse how diverse Muslim groups in Indonesia play their respective roles in the Indonesian emerging democracy and in which ways Muslim voices matter for the future of democracy in the country.

Before moving further, however, one important point must be underlined. Regarding democracy in Indonesia, there have been some remarkable questions circulated among scholars and the public. Those include: Is Indonesia a real democracy? Has Indonesia substantially adopted democracy as its political system? Or what kind of democracy is actually Indonesia practicing? In this relation, before discussing the place of Islam in Indonesian democracy, this article will initially discuss this question by laying down theoretical fundamentals on democracy. By this, measuring the Indonesian case of democracy from a theoretical point of view is important.

Is Indonesia a Democracy?

Let’s start with the nature of democracy. Fareed Zakaria (2003) argues that “democracy is a political system marked by… by free and fair elections, rule of law, separation of powers, protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.” Among many other elements, Zakaria lists free and fair elections. Likewise, Samuel P Huntington identifies democracy as a system of government that is characterized by the presence of open elections. In his words, “Election, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy.” The primacy of election as a feature of democracy can also be justified from Larry Diamond’s (1990) view. She defines democracy as “a system of government in which the people choose their leaders in regular, free, and fair elections and enjoy basic civil and political liberties.” Election as the basic requirement for a democracy to work is also echoed by Francis Fukuyama (2014). He believes that “Modern democracy is defined by regular, competitive, multiparty elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, conducted by secret ballot.”

However, others view democracy as not merely about elections. Amartya Sen (2005), for example, maintains that democracy is not merely a system of elections. Further, he stresses the presence of “a way of public reasoning” as a fundamental ingredient of democracy. On par with Sen’s judgement of democracy, Jürgen Habermas (1996) argues that an established democracy must take care of the deliberation of opinion and will. In his own words, democracy “rests on the institutionalization of deliberative processes of opinion- and will-formation.”

Although all those concepts might not be sufficient to measure the theoretical foundation of democracy as a whole, those views of prominent scholars in political studies can be employed to initially evaluate the nature of Indonesian democracy. Taking one or two basic elements of a democracy as analytical units, it would be sufficiently evident that Indonesia is a democracy. The system of election in Indonesia since 1998 has dramatically changed. Led by a body named Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Indonesian Commission for General Elections), Indonesia employs a direct presidential election, open-list proportional representation for legislative elections, and majoritarian regional representation. This system has made the Indonesian election system the most liberal in the world. By this parameter, it is difficult not to qualify Indonesia as a democracy.

Subsequently, the other parameter of democracy is the separation of powers. In this respect, Indonesia is indeed an excellent model for democracy. In fact, long before the fall of Suharto, the Indonesian governmental system had been characterized by the separation of powers, and it had brought the three pillars of trias politica into existence. However, in practice, it was an executive-heavy government, in which the executive dominated the governance, while legislative and judicial bodies mostly played as legitimizers of any decisions that the executive took. The situation changed in the Reform Era, where legislatives hold very strong control overthe government. In the current context, it is not an exaggeration to conclude that the separation of powers has both formally and practically functioned.

As a result, from the theoretical point of view, Indonesia is undoubtedly an emerging democracy in the world.

Indonesian Muslim Voices on Democracy

Now, let’s evaluate how the dynamics of democracy in Indonesia influence and are influenced by Muslim groups in the country. Sociologically speaking, Indonesian Islam is featured by its diverse orientations in many respects, such as in methods of text interpretation, ideological leanings, political orientations, or attitude towards modernity. In my previous study (2007), I developed a category of Indonesian Islam based on their religious orientations. They are moderate, progressive-liberal, and radical-conservative groups. The first group refers to Muslims who embrace middle positions in such elements as: the position towards religious text (the Qur’an and Sunnah), accept Indonesian state ideology, and show a proportional response towards the West and its civilization. The progressive-liberal orientation, on the other hand, apply contextual approach towards religious text, shows a very positive response to the West and its intellectual achievement. Furthermore, this group also sees the adoption of Western values and modernization as the main pathways for Muslims to cure their malaise. In contrast to the second, the radical-conservative group exhibits a textual orientation in understanding and practicing religion. Furthermore, they show disagreement with humanly-created political systems or systems of government and advocate for the adoption of Godly-directed political systems.

Although this dynamic may seem resonate with what has been taking place in many Muslim-majority polities, the Indonesian case of Muslim’s voices diversity on democracy shows its unique case.

Firstly, to build further analysis based on my categories on Indonesian Muslim groups, all three groups show different attitudes towards democracy. The first group, represented bythe two largest moderate Muslim groups of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’, show proportional response towards democracy. Professor Haedar Nashir, the general chairman of Muhammadiyah Central Board, advocates that Muslim Indonesia to accept democracy as a tool to develop civility among Indonesians regardless of their identities. In a similar tone, Yahya Cholil Staquf, the general chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama’, shows his support for democracy as the Indonesian system of government. He believes that democracy should be developed continuously by all parts of society. Democracy, Yahya says, cannot be built merely through formal ways, but through popular support of Indonesian society in general.

In terms of acceptance towards democracy, the progressive-liberal group’s positions resemble those of moderate groups. Luthfie Assyaukani (2011), an advocate of liberal Islam, argues that democracy is currently the most proper system of government in the world, and this is also the case with Muslim polities. In other words, Assyaukanie believes that democracy is completely compatible with Islamic values. The other progressive-liberal proponent, the late Azyumardi Azra, also shows his positive attitude towards democracy. Azra argued that Indonesian Islam has a unique historical trajectory. This uniqueness has enabled Indonesian Islam to live hand-in-hand with democratic culture more organically compared to many other Muslim-majority countries in the globe, which witnessed authoritarianism or sectarian conflicts, resulting in the absence of democratic consolidation. Furthermore, Azra’s work relates democracy to two Indonesian indigenous values, namely Islam’s pluralist traditions and historical accommodation. These two elements, along with nationalist movements has laid fertile ground for democratic development in Indonesia.

In opposition to previous groups, the radical-conservative group deserves special attention for its resistance to democracy. They believe that democracy is incompatible with Islamic teachings and values. Ismail Yusanto, the prominent leader of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, views democracy in a very negative tone. In his words, democracy is now seen as merely a procedure for attaining power. However, he critically noted that whether the procedure itself is followed with honesty or not, fair/authentic or not, is something that must be seen with doubt. Furthermore, Yusanto underlines the pragmatic element in democracy as a system of government. The ultimate goal of democracy is power, and only power, he says. Thus, pragmatism is on the rise. Ideology is no longer important. Consider how an Islamic party can ally itself with a secular party, which has long been known to obstruct anything Islamic. At the same time, fraud is becoming increasingly commonplace. The law is being manipulated. The law should control pragmatism. Instead, the law is being used as a tool to legitimize pragmatism.

Secondly, the other uniqueness of Indonesian democracy is that it is criticised but at the same time, the critics of democracy enjoy a democratic milieu. The case of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is the best example to explain this thesis. It is clear that Hizbut Tahrir strongly rejects democracy for several reasons. However, it is because of democracy that diverse Muslim groups include those Islamist, enjoy existence in Indonesia. As has been indicated earlier, democracy in Indonesia has enabled many orientations of Islam to exist, develop, and live in Indonesia. In other words, without democracy, Islamist groups will never gain the existence in the post-Suharto Indonesia. Here lies the paradox: democracy is criticised, but democracy is also enjoyed.

This paradox is that Australian-based Indonesian scholar Nadirsyah Hosen even further calls Hizbut Tahrir the smuggler of democracy. According to Hosen, Hizbut Tahrir has shown an ambiguous attitude toward democracy. They criticised and rejected democracy. But, when they were dissolved by the Indonesian government due to their advocacy of the caliphate system, which was in opposition to Indonesian state ideology, they exploited the democratic system. They argued that in a democratic system, all orientations should gain their right to live, and therefore, the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia violates democratic values.

Thirdly, as democracy in Indonesia is developing and Muslim groups show different attitudes towards democracy, the support of Indonesian Muslim groups is determinant for the future of democracy in the country. As the largest religious group, Muslim support or rejection will be an important consideration for Indonesian political leaders to take or not to take certain decisions. It is true that Indonesian Muslims voices towards democracy are diverse; however, the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are moderate. If by moderate is acceptance towards the Indonesian state ideology of Pancasila, the majority of Indonesian Muslims are moderate. According to Lembaga Survei Indonesia, a political survey think-tank, 86,5 percent of Indonesian Muslims accept the Indonesian state ideology.

Conclusion

In the post-Suharto era, Indonesia has been adopting democracy as its political system or system of government. Although doubt circulated among scholars and the public about whether Indonesia is factually applying democracy, theoretical and practical initial assessments show the compatibility of Indonesian democracy with the nature and basic elements of democracy.

As a newly introduced system of government, democracy has been responded diversly by Indonesian Muslim groups. Using a broad category of moderate, progressive-liberal, and Islamist-conservative groups, it is revealed that two former groups show a positive attitude and support towards democracy, on the basis that democracy is not in opposition with both Indonesian and Islamic values. However, Islamist group as exemplified by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia rejects democracy and see its incompatibility with Islamic values.

However, there is an important fact. Although Islamist groups reject democracy, basically their existence in Indonesia is a small part of benefit from democracy. In other words, the Islamist groups criticise democracy, but at the same time, they enjoy democracy without their awareness.

Lastly, as the majority religious group in Indonesia, the future of democracy in the country is strongly dependent on Muslims’ attitude towards democracy. Although Muslims groups’ attitude towards democracy is diverse, the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are moderate, which bring assumption that their acceptance of democracy is inevitable.

The word Edraak itself signifies more than simple awareness. It refers to a deeper form of understanding; one that moves beyond surface-level explanations and seeks to grasp the underlying social, economic, and political realities shaping contemporary Muslim societies. This principle lies at the heart of a broader effort to create enduring platforms for discussion, analysis, and reflection, building on earlier initiatives that brought scholars and thinkers together to engage with pressing issues facing the Muslim world.

Moving Beyond a Conflict-Centered Narrative

Conflict-driven narratives have been dominating the conventional discourse of Muslim-majority countries. International forums, regional leadership bodies, and media coverage often focus almost exclusively on war, security, and crisis management. While such challenges are real and significant, an excessive fixation on them produces two serious consequences.

First, it diverts attention away from the myriad developmental trajectories of more than fifty Muslim-majority countries. These Muslim-majority countries host societies with distinct political systems, economic models, institutional capacities, and social dynamics, which are often overlooked. Second, it reinforces a harmful association between Islam and violence, contributing to misconceptions that link Muslim societies primarily with extremism. The rise of violent groups in different regions has further entrenched these perceptions, even though such movements represent a marginal and destructive distortion rather than the lived reality of most Muslims.

Internal mindsets are also influenced by this persistent mindset, encouraging a sense of perpetual victimhood and obscuring conversations about reform, growth, governance, and human development. A more balanced framework is therefore essential; one that acknowledges suffering and injustice without allowing them to eclipse every other dimension of social life.

A Four-Zone Framework

To address this imbalance, Edraak News introduces a structured way of engaging with the Muslim world through four distinct zones, each reflecting different social and political conditions.

The first zone includes regions experiencing active war, oppression, or large-scale violence. Coverage here focuses on documenting realities on the ground and keeping attention on humanitarian crises that demand global awareness.

The second zone encompasses societies transitioning from conflict toward peace and stability. These contexts are marked by fragile recovery, where the emergence of order follows prolonged turmoil and where institutional rebuilding becomes a central concern.

The third zone consists of countries that are largely stable in terms of governance and public order but face persistent economic difficulties. While these societies may not be engulfed in large-scale violence, they grapple with challenges related to growth, institutional reform, and social policy.

The fourth zone includes developed or emerging economies where peace and stability are largely established, creating space for debates on governance quality, economic diversification, globalization, and long-term development.

By presenting developments across all four zones, Edraak News resists the tendency to collapse the Muslim world into a single narrative of crisis. Instead, it highlights complexity, variation, and the coexistence of multiple realities.

Making Complexity Accessible

A defining feature of Edraak News is its concise and accessible format. Rather than a lengthy analysis, it offers brief, structured snapshots of developments across regions. This approach serves readers who seek clarity without oversimplification, allowing them to grasp key issues without being overwhelmed by technical detail.

In an era shaped by algorithm-driven information, such an approach helps counter selective exposure and confirmation bias. By juxtaposing stories from different zones and contexts, the publication encourages readers to recognize the interconnectedness and diversity of Muslim societies.

The range of issues covered reflects this ambition. Political transitions, regional security developments, debates over religious law and civil rights, legislative reforms, and international cooperation all feature within its scope. Social questions, such as education, legal reform, and governance, are examined alongside regional and global dynamics, offering a holistic view of ongoing change.

From News to Analysis: The Role of Edraak Essays

While Edraak News focuses on informed brevity, Edraak Essays are designed to provide depth. Building on issues highlighted in the newsletter, the essays and articles offer long-form analysis that delves into the structural roots of contemporary challenges.

Each issue centers on selected themes explored through original essays contributed by our ILN fellows, scholars, and researchers. These articles move beyond description to examine economic policy, democratic institutions, religious authority, governance models, and social transformation within specific national or regional contexts.

Edraak Essays integrates diverse formats, including analytical articles, reflective pieces, and critical reviews of relevant books. It also serves as a platform to revisit and disseminate research presented at conferences and workshops, ensuring that scholarly insights reach wider audiences beyond academic circles.

Long-Form Thinking in a Fast-Paced World

The choice to invest in long-form writing may seem counterintuitive at a time when attention spans are shrinking. Yet there is growing evidence of renewed demand for rigorous, well-researched analysis. Universities, research centers, and policy communities continue to seek content that offers depth, context, and intellectual seriousness.

Rather than abandoning shorter formats, the Edraak model strategically combines them. Weekly summaries, social media highlights, and key takeaways coexist with in-depth essays, allowing readers to engage at different levels according to their time and interest. This layered approach ensures accessibility without sacrificing substance.

Moreover, slow and reflective reading increasingly functions as a form of resistance to superficial engagement. On complex issues, such as governance, faith, freedom, and social change, careful analysis remains indispensable.

Islam, Liberty, and a Universal Framework

At the heart of Edraak lies a sustained engagement with the relationship between Islam and liberty. This discussion faces persistent challenges, both internally and externally. Within Muslim societies, liberty is sometimes misunderstood as moral relativism or cultural erosion. Externally, it is often framed through selective applications of international norms, undermining confidence in liberal principles.

Edraak approaches liberty primarily as an institutional concept that shapes political systems, economic policy, governance, and international relations. It emphasizes sovereignty, the rule of law, and respect for human dignity as universal values compatible with Islamic ethical traditions.

Recent global events have intensified skepticism toward liberal frameworks, particularly where international law appears inconsistently applied. Yet abandoning these principles risks conceding moral ground altogether. The task, therefore, is not rejection but critical engagement: reaffirming universal norms while addressing their failures in practice.

Knowledge, Community, and Sustainability

Beyond publishing, Edraak is conceived as a community-building project. Readers are not treated as passive consumers but as participants in an evolving conversation. Engagement, feedback, and sustained financial support are viewed as essential to building a durable intellectual platform that transcends borders and cultures.

This community-oriented vision also extends to writers and researchers. While the initiative begins with a core group of contributors, its long-term success depends on attracting new and younger researchers willing to engage seriously with complex issues and contribute original perspectives.

Toward a Deeper Understanding

Ultimately, Edraak represents an effort to reshape how the Muslim world is understood by others and by itself. Through balanced coverage, analytical depth, and intellectual openness, it seeks to move beyond crisis-driven narratives toward a richer appreciation of social reality.

By investing in knowledge, fostering dialogue, and building networks of thinkers and readers, Edraak aims to strengthen the quality of debate and contribute meaningfully to discussions on faith, freedom, governance, and development. In doing so, it affirms that deeper understanding is not a luxury but a necessity.

Adapted from the Edraak Introductory Podcast with Dr. Ali Salman.
Transcribed and Narrated by Hira Zia, Editorial Manager, Islam and Liberty Network.

This newsletter covers developments from 30th January-16th February 2026 examining a historic electoral shift in Bangladesh and what it signals for democratic recalibration and student politics. It highlights the Damascus International Book Fair as a marker of tentative cultural reopening and the arrests following the deadly Islamabad mosque bombing. The issue also reviews Indonesia’s commitment to a Gaza stabilisation mission, Pakistan’s citizenship law reform, and Sri Lanka’s proposed changes to Muslim family law. Finally, it considers the United Nations’ deepening financial crisis and the broader implications for humanitarian efforts and global institutional stability.

For the purposes of this report, We organise Muslim-majority countries into four zones, based on their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life

Indonesia Commits Troops to Gaza Stabilisation Mission

Indonesia has begun preparing up to 5,000–8,000 troops for possible deployment to Gaza as part of a proposed international stabilisation force linked to a US-led peace initiative. Military officials emphasised that training is focused on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, rather than combat operations. The deployment, still under negotiation, would centre on relief coordination, rebuilding damaged infrastructure, and supporting civilian recovery efforts in war-affected areas.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution-building.

The Damascus International Book Fair marks an opening in cultural expression

The 2026 Damascus Book Fair saw a dramatic expansion of previously restricted literature, including Islamist works and Kurdish language sections, following political change in Syria, indicating a cultural thaw and a loosening of past censorship. Event organizers said almost all forms of literature are now permitted except those inciting hatred, suggesting a new space for intellectual and cultural liberty after decades of tight control.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

Pivotal Elections in Bangladesh

Recent election results in Bangladesh saw the return of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to government, while the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP) secured only two seats. The vote followed the 2024 student-led protests that began over public sector job quotas and later expanded into a broader anti-government movement that culminated in Sheikh Hasina’s departure. Hasina’s long tenure brought infrastructure growth and economic gains, but it was increasingly marked by allegations of electoral manipulation, shrinking civic space, crackdowns on opposition figures, and constraints on media freedom, fueling fatigue among urban voters and younger generations who viewed stability as coming at the cost of political liberty. Although student mobilisation played a central role in the upheaval, analysts note that sustaining campus-based political energy within South Asia’s patronage-driven party system remains difficult. The current results reflect the reassertion of established political actors rather than the consolidation of a new student-led political force. BNP leaders reassure that the party’s priority is to bring democracy back to Bangladesh that had been destroyed by Hasina’s overly authoritarian rule. They would focus primarily on restoring the democratic and financial institutions that suffered over the decade. This political outcome underscores a familiar pattern: when institutional politics tightens, student movements re-emerge as catalysts of democratic recalibration, keeping participatory politics alive even amid attempts at consolidation.

Islamabad mosque bombing arrests after deadly attack

On 6 February, a suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad killed 32 worshippers and injured roughly 170 during evening prayers, marking one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in the capital in recent years. Investigations have pointed toward an extremist outfit with a history of targeting Shia communities, reviving concerns about terrorist militancy despite years of counter-terror campaigns since 2014. While four suspects have been arrested in connection with the attacks, the incident underscores a persistent challenge for the state: the obligation to safeguard lives and maintain public security. The attack highlights the continuing test of the rule of law and the state’s capacity to prevent organised violence against civilians.

Sri Lanka Tabling Muslim Family Law Reform Bills

In Sri Lanka’s parliament, two private member bills were introduced on 5 February 2026 to reform personal status laws affecting marriage and divorce, including raising the minimum marriage age to 18, mandating the bride’s written consent, and expanding women’s roles in family law courts. These proposals touch on gender equality and individual rights within Muslim personal law frameworks.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

UN in Financial Crisis

The United Nations is facing what Secretary-General António Guterres has called an “imminent financial collapse,” warning that cash reserves could run dry by July as member states fall behind on mandatory dues. Only 77% of assessed contributions were paid in 2025, with the United States, its largest contributor, refusing to fully fund regular and peacekeeping budgets and withdrawing from several agencies. The shortfall is already curbing humanitarian relief, halting human rights investigations, and forcing aid cuts from Afghanistan to Sudan.

Article Pick

Read “Why Does Student Politics Remain Relevant in Bangladesh?” by Dr. Pranab Kumar Panday. This article explains how student activism in Bangladesh has historically shaped major political shifts, from liberation movements to democratic transitions, and why youth engagement continues to be a powerful force in national politics..

For the purposes of this report, We organise Muslim-majority countries into four zones, based on their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life.

Ceasefire Claims, Continuing Fire

Palestinians in Gaza have reacted with scepticism to Donald Trump’s announcement that the second phase of the ceasefire has begun. Israeli attacks have continued across the territory despite the declaration. Trump has also said he plans to lead a proposed “Board of Peace” to govern Gaza, while the symbolic ceasefire fails to shelter Palestinians from both the harsh winds and continued Israeli incursions deeper into the Palestinian Strip.

Reports suggest that at least 451 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire was declared last October. Since October 2023, Israeli military operations in Gaza have killed more than 71,000 Palestinians and wounded over 170,000

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution building.

UN Weighs In on Iran’s Protests — But Is Action Likely?

The UN Security Council convened an emergency session on 16 January 2026 to address Iran’s deadly nationwide protests, exposing sharp divisions but offering little indication of concrete international action. While UN officials documented widespread deaths, mass arrests, and allegations of serious rights violations, the meeting largely devolved into a war of words between Tehran and Washington, underscoring the Council’s limited ability to move beyond statements of concern.

Iran’s deputy UN envoy rejected accusations of repression and warned that any external aggression would be met with a lawful response under the UN Charter. The United States, meanwhile, condemned Iran’s crackdown and highlighted the regime’s internet blackout as an attempt to obscure the true scale of violence. Despite calls from UN officials and activists for independent investigations and accountability, the absence of consensus among Council members makes binding measures, such as sanctions or referrals, highly unlikely in the near term.

Protests first broke out across Iran on 28 December, sparked by demonstrations of shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar against soaring inflation and the rapid collapse of the national currency. Since then, the unrest has escalated into a nationwide uprising, with rights groups reporting at least 2,571 deaths to date.The Iranian rial has lost approximately 96.07% of its value against the US dollar, pushing the exchange rate beyond one million rials to a single dollar, further eroding purchasing power and living standards. What began as economically driven anger has since morphed into broader political dissent, accompanied by mass arrests and allegations of widespread repression. Years of punitive sanctions, chronic economic mismanagement, and entrenched political constraints have set the stage for the current crisis.

Cracks Beneath the Emirate

A leaked audio recording obtained by the BBC has revealed growing divisions within the Taliban leadership. In the recording, Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada warns that internal disputes, not foreign threats, pose the greatest risk to the Islamic Emirate. The speech, delivered at a madrassa in Kandahar in January 2026, adds weight to long-standing rumours of rifts at the top, which the Taliban has repeatedly denied.

A BBC investigation points to two competing camps within the leadership. One, based in Kandahar and loyal to Akhundzada, favours a rigid and isolated Islamic system. The other, centred in Kabul, includes senior ministers and commanders who support limited engagement with the outside world, economic recovery, and modest social changes, including girls’ education. The divide raises new questions about unity and stability within Taliban rule.

Syria and SDF Ceasefire Deal

On 18 January 2026, the Syrian government and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed to a comprehensive ceasefire and integration deal. The agreement calls for an immediate ceasefire along all contact lines, the withdrawal of SDF units to areas east of the Euphrates River, and the full transfer of administrative and security control of the northeastern governorates of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa to the Syrian state. The deal also envisages creating conditions for incorporating SDF fighters and administrators into state institutions after appropriate security vetting.

Syrian officials framed the agreement as a step toward restoring sovereignty and national unity after over 14 years of fragmented governance in the northeast. While Damascus has hailed the agreement as a political breakthrough, significant challenges persist with respect to its long-term implementation. These include reconciling the local governance structures established by the SDF across nearly 25% of Syrian territory under its control, where local councils, women’s protection units, and civilian administrative bodies have long managed public affairs and service delivery. Additionally, the SDF maintains an estimated force of around 10,000 fighters, accustomed to autonomy and self-rule, who cannot be easily or seamlessly integrated into existing Syrian government structures. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that over 16 million Syrians require assistance and that northwest and northeast areas remain among the most fragile due to displacement, limited services and high needs.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

Pakistan’s Expanding Arms Footprint

Pakistan is close to finalising a $1.5 billion deal to supply weapons and aircraft to Sudan, a move that could significantly affect the country’s nearly three-year civil war between the national army and the Rapid Support Forces. While modest by global arms trade standards, the deal comes amid a conflict marked by mass displacement and serious human rights abuses. Reuters reported in early January that the agreement is nearing completion, though no official confirmation has been issued by Islamabad.

The Sudan deal reflects a broader expansion of Pakistan’s defence footprint beyond South Asia. Traditionally focused on training Arab forces, Pakistan is now pursuing direct arms sales across the Middle East and Africa, anchored by a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia signed last September. Islamabad has also secured a multi-billion-dollar arms deal with Libya and is in advanced talks with Iraq, while several other countries have shown interest in the JF-17 fighter jet. Officials describe the push as part of an export-driven strategy, though analysts warn Pakistan must balance growing influence with regional sensitivities.

WPS Index and Muslim Standing

The 2025/26 Women, Peace and Security Index by Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security assesses 181 countries on women’s inclusion, justice and security. The index uses 13 data indicators to show how women experience barriers to opportunities, legal protection and safety. Afghanistan ranks at the bottom of the global list, indicating the most severe challenges to women’s wellbeing in terms of education, economic participation and personal security. Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Palestine also feature among countries with low scores, reflecting major limitations on women’s ability to participate fully in society and access justice.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment

AlUla Marks Five Years as Saudi Arabia’s Cultural Showcase

Saudi Arabia’s AlUla Arts Festival returns for its fifth edition from 16 January to 14 February 2026, transforming the historic oasis city into a month-long hub of contemporary art, design, music, and performance. A central highlight is the fourth Desert X AlUla exhibition, running from 16 January to 28 February, featuring ten newly commissioned, site-specific works by Saudi and international artists set across AlUla’s natural landscape.

Curated under the theme “Space Without Measure” and inspired by the poetry of Kahlil Gibran, the artworks explore scale, imagination, and humanity’s relationship with place. The festival also previews AlUla’s forthcoming contemporary art museum through “Arduna” (Our Land), an exhibition opening on 1 February in collaboration with Centre Pompidou, showcasing over 80 works from Saudi Arabia and abroad. Alongside exhibitions, the festival includes design showcases, live music, film screenings, and public art installations, reinforcing AlUla’s growing role in Saudi Arabia’s cultural and creative ambitions.

Moonsighters Academy

The University of Leeds has launched the Moonsighters Academy, a programme designed to train community leaders in lunar observation and basic astronomy, enabling Muslim communities across the UK to independently organise moon-sighting activities and coordinate Islamic calendar dates. By combining scientific methods with long-standing religious practice, the initiative aims to support more informed and consistent moon sightings for key months such as Ramadan and Eid.

Indonesia Sets Course to Make Halal Certification Mandatory

Indonesia will make halal certification mandatory for all products from October 2026, expanding a policy aimed at strengthening its position in the global halal economy. The regulation will apply to all businesses, including small and medium enterprises, and cover food, beverages, cosmetics, medicines, and other consumer goods, including imports. As of October last year, 9.6 million products had already received halal certification. Authorities say the move is intended to boost competitiveness, protect consumers, and position Southeast Asia’s largest economy as a leading global hub in a halal market valued at over $2.4 trillion.

Malaysia Defies Headwinds with Strong 2025 Growth

Malaysia’s economy expanded by an estimated 4.9% in 2025, exceeding government and central bank forecasts, driven by strong domestic demand and solid performance in services, manufacturing, and construction. Growth accelerated to 5.7% in the final quarter, the fastest pace since mid-2024, while exports remained resilient despite the impact of US tariffs. Analysts say the stronger-than-expected outlook reduces pressure on Bank Negara Malaysia to ease monetary policy, with some now predicting a possible rate hike later this year.

Konya Named OIC Youth Capital 2026

Konya in central Türkiye was designated as the 2026 Youth Capital by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum (ICYF). Konya was selected after a vote by the ICYF executive board, beating other candidate cities including Tabriz and Tashkent. The designation is part of a programme that encourages solidarity, cultural exchange and shared youth engagement across the OIC member states.

Isra and Mi’raj: Meaning, Memory, and Devotion

Muslims around the world observed Isra and Mi’raj on the 27th night of Rajab, marking the Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) spiritual night journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and his ascension into the heavens. These events not only underscore the esteemed status of the Prophet (PBUH) but also mark the establishment of fundamental Islamic practices, notably the five daily prayers. In 2026, Isra and Mi’raj was observed as an official public holiday in several Muslim-majority countries, including Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, Indonesia, and selected Malaysian states, while in other countries, the day was commemorated by communities without official public holiday status.

Article Pick

Read The Ascendancy of Secular Trends in Iranby Ali Sarihan. This article provides crucial context for understanding the backdrop of Iran’s ongoing nationwide protests. It traces the rise of secularism in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, highlighting how even some religious clerics from that era now support separating Islam from the state. The study shows that 73% of Iranians today advocate for a secular government, and it examines the recurring waves of anti-Islamist and pro-democracy protests over the years, including those in 2009–2010, 2017–2018, 2019–2020, and 2022–2023. By exploring the influence of globalization, systemic issues within the regime, the Iranian diaspora, and rapid urbanization, the article offers a comprehensive background for readers seeking to understand the deeper social and political currents fueling Iran’s current unrest.

Edraak is our newsletter that honours the Muslim world’s diversity, reflected in the multitude of its socio-economic conditions and political institutions spanning across the continents. Traced back to its Arabic origins, إدراك encompasses timely and thorough insights into the developments of the Muslim-majority nations.

For the purposes of this report, we’ve organised the Muslim-majority nations into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life.

A Rivalry that Decides Yemen’s Future

There is no doubt that the offensives involving the Yemeni government-allied forces and the Southern Transition Council are but a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

On 30 December, Saudi Arabia bombed Mukalla, a Yemeni port city, after a weapons shipment from the UAE had arrived for the separatist forces, the Southern Transitional Council, which seeks an independent state in the south. The Kingdom even went as far as to warn the UAE of its “extremely dangerous” actions and to withdraw from Yemen in 24 hours’ time. The UAE later agreed to withdraw its remaining troops from Yemen.

However, over this last weekend, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces reclaimed the cities of Aden and al-Mukalla that had long been under the control of the separatist group.

Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

On 8 January, the Lebanese army announced that it had completed the first phase of its plan to disarm the Iran-backed Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim group, Hezbollah, which is bringing all non-state weaponry in the south between the Israeli border and the Litani River under state control.

The US-brokered ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel in November 2024 dictated Israel withdraw from Lebanese territory, but Israel continues to occupy five strategic points near the border, conducting multiple raids within Lebanon under the pretence of bridling any resurgence of Hezbollah.

Under the same agreement, Hezbollah was to withdraw its forces north of the Litani River and have its military infrastructure dismantled in the evacuated areas, which Hezbollah had agreed to, but refused to surrender its weapons in the rest of Lebanon, as it understood its complete disarmament not to be part of the truce. Israel, on the other hand, is far from satisfied with the progress and maintains Hezbollah’s full disarmament is part of the deal and one that is “imperative for Israel’s security and Lebanon’s future.”

Israel has intensified its strikes on southern and eastern Lebanon this week, specifically Marwahin, Kfar Hatta, and Annan in the south and the villages of Hammara and Ain el-Tineh in eastern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, claiming to target the military infrastructure of Hezbollah and ‍Hamas

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution-building.

Syria’s Fleeting Peace

On 3 January, British and French war planes bombed a site located in Palmyra thought to be used by IS militants, a follow-up to the US’s military strike last month, which came after an ambush had killed two American personnel. Tensions have also escalated with SDF as an agreement signed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa back in March last year, which planned to integrate all civil and military institutions of the Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state by the end of 2025, continues to be pushed back. This integration would also lead the Syrian government to control the north and northeastern part of Syria held by SDF, such as border crossings with Iraq and Turkiye, as well as airports and oil fields.

Fighting between the two first erupted on 22 December last month in Aleppo during a visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, but had quickly ended after both sides had agreed to halt firing. It should be noted that Turkiye considers the SDF a terrorist organisation because the latter largely consists of members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

On 4 January, following official talks between the Syrian government and the SDF, the state media reported that there were no “tangible results”. Clashes soon broke out the next day and, now entering its fourth day, have shaken Aleppo and its residents, displacing thousands. On 7 January, the Syrian Army Operations Command had ordered residents of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods to evacuate after having declared the SDF “military sites” in the areas as “legitimate military targets”.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

The Haunted Past

On 24 December, Algeria’s parliament unanimously approved passage of the bill that criminalised France’s colonisation of the country from 1830 to 1962, a crime and declared that Algeria was entitled to a formal apology and reparations for all the material and moral damages. The legislation has virtually brought a point of no return for Algeria and France. Immediately after its approval, the French foreign ministry termed the move “manifestly hostile, both to the desire to resume Franco-Algerian dialogue and to calm, constructive work on issues of historical memory.”

Bangladesh’s Mother of Democracy Lives On

Khaleda Zia, Bangladesh’s first female Prime Minister representing the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), intended to run for general elections in February 2026 but passed away after a long period of illness on 30 December 2025. Khaleda Zia’s entry into politics began after her husband, former President Ziaur Rahman, was killed in a military coup in 1981.

Bangladesh declared three days of mourning after the death of Khaleda Zia to honour the legacy of a leader who fought back against the military dictatorship, propelled economic reforms that moved the country towards the free market, and resisted the fascist rule of her rival, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

Protests in the Spotlight

Since 28th December, protests have erupted at the Grand Bazaar due to inflation and further devaluation of the Iranian Rial against the dollar and other major foreign currencies. Iran’s Central Bank significantly reduced the subsidised exchange rates for dollars it offers to importers and producers, prompting merchants to pass price hikes directly to consumers who still grapple with the effects of sanctions. In the eleven days since, protests have spread to 111 cities and towns across all 31 provinces, sparking violent clashes between demonstrators and the security forces.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

Turkiye’s Fight Against Terrorism

On 25 December, Istanbul’s chief prosecutor’s office had announced the capture of 115 suspected Islamic State members who were believed to be planning to carry out attacks on Christmas and New Year celebrations.

What’s in a Name?

In the first week of January, Saudi Arabia published a new naming regulation in the official Umm Al-Qura Gazette relating to the names of public facilities across the Kingdom. It mandates that any name for a mosque, school, hospital, or government building must comply fully with Islamic law and teachings.

Some of the interesting key provisions of this regulation include the use of only seven of Allah’s names: Al-Salam (The Source of Peace), Al-Adl (The Just), Al-Awwal (The First), Al-Nur (The Light), Al-Haqq (The Truth), Al-Shahid (The Witness), and Al-Malik (The Sovereign). Moreover, if a building is to be named after individuals, relevant authorities would need to verify the honoree’s Islamic conduct and moral standing.

Revamping the Penal Code

On 2 January, Indonesia replaced its Dutch-era criminal law that had governed the country for more than 80 years with its newly ratified penal code. Unanimously approved in December 2022, the 345-page new Indonesian Penal Code has now officially come into force.

Under the amended code, there are several morality-based provisions, such as the criminalisation of sexual relations outside marriage. Insulting a sitting president or vice-president, state institutions, and the national ideology are also punishable offenses. There are harsh penalties for individuals associating with Marxist-Leninist organizations and for those who spread communist ideology.

Article Pick

Read Legal Implications of Interfaith Marriage on Inheritance Rights and Child Status in the Perspective of Islamic Law and Civil Law by Shalihah, Nadia Rif’atul Karima, M. Fahmi Al Amruzi, which demonstrates the legal implications generated as a result of interfaith marriages in Indonesia, where civil law and religious law continue to face inconsistencies, particularly regarding the status of children and inheritance rights.

The Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam, KHI), which serves as a legal reference in religious courts in Indonesia, explicitly prohibits marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, a view based on fiqh law holding that such a marriage disrupts household harmony and the faith of descendants. Therefore, under Islamic law, interfaith marriage is void by law, and hence, children cannot claim inheritance. However, the civil law recognises the right of inheritance of children born of interfaith marriages, so long as the marriage is registered.

The inconsistency in these legal frameworks affects the legal rights of interfaith couples and their offspring. The authors propose an inclusive and contextual legal approach to address the needs of Indonesia’s plural society without compromising on religious principles.

Edraak is our newsletter that honours the Muslim world’s diversity, reflected in the multitude of its socio-economic conditions and political institutions spanning across the continents. Traced back to its Arabic origins, إدراك encompasses timely and thorough insights into the developments of the Muslim-majority nations.

For the purposes of this report, we’ve organised the Muslim-majority nations into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life.

Death’s Shadow and the Promise of the Second Phase

On 3 December, violent clashes broke out between Hamas fighters and Israeli soldiers in Rafah of the southern Gaza Strip. As has been the case, both parties assigned blame to the other. Later the same day, Israel labelled the incident a ceasefire violation and launched a missile as a response in al-Mawasi, west of Khan Younis, which killed five people, including two children.

Since then, Israeli air strikes and artillery shelling have been hitting areas of northern and southern Gaza, especially Khan Younis. On 22 December, Gaza’s Government Media Office condemned Israel’s “serious and systematic violations” of the ceasefire, noting that the Israeli authorities had breached the ceasefire 875 times since it came into force on 10 October. It also added that at least 411 Palestinians had been killed and 1,112 others had been wounded in Israeli attacks on Gaza since the ceasefire began.

On 19 December, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that a new governance structure for Gaza comprising an international board and a group of Palestinian technocrats would be established soon after the deployment of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF). He stated that the current situation where Israel continues to strike Hamas targets and the Palestinian resistance group’s constant assertion of control is not sustainable.

On 22 December, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, too, indicated that the second phase of the ceasefire was likely to begin early in 2026.

Facing the World Court

On 19 December, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced that it would hear the landmark case filed in 2019 by Gambia accusing Myanmar of committing genocide against the Rohingya, its minority Muslim group, from 12 till 29 January. The claimant will be presenting its case first from 12 till 15 January followed by the respondent, which has consistently denied the claims of genocide, detailing its position from 16 till 20 January.

The legal proceedings will establish precedents that may influence South Africa’s case against Israel regarding the Gaza genocide.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution-building.

All’s Fair in Hate and War

On 13 December, a gunman believed to be an IS member ambushed a US-Syrian joint patrol near Palmyra, killing three US personnel and wounding two, as well as two members of the Syrian security services. Syrian forces killed the gunman at the scene. Syria’s Interior Ministry revealed a different story, claiming the attacker was a member of its security forces who probably sympathised with the Islamic State.

The Islamic State, on 18 December, expressed satisfaction at the killing of US personnel but did not explicitly claim responsibility for the incident. On 19 December, in response to the Palmyra attack on American forces, the US Central Command (Centcom), which directs American military operations in the Middle East, north-east Africa, central and southern Asia, launched Operation Hawkeye Strike against the Islamic State group (IS) in Syria. The operation “struck more than 70 targets at multiple locations across central Syria” and “employed more than 100 precision munitions” targeting known IS infrastructure and weapons sites.

Banding Against IS-K

On 22 December, in a major operation, Turkiye’s intelligence agency captured Mehmet Goren, a senior member of the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group, in an area along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Goren was reportedly responsible for organising suicide attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkiye, and Europe.

Prominent members of IS-K, Sultan Aziz Azzam, the group’s spokesperson and supposed second-in-command, and Nisar Hakim, a key commander, were arrested and killed respectively in intelligence operations conducted by the Pakistani authorities this year. The presence of this group in Afghanistan markedly reduces the credibility of the Afghan Taliban’s repeated assertion that no militant groups operate from Afghan soil.

Closure of an Active Cultural Centre

On 21 December, the Imam Hussain (A.S) Cultural and Educational Complex in Kabul, one of the most active cultural centers for Shia communities, was shut down by the order of Abdul Hakim Sharaei, the Taliban’s Minister of Justice. Despite holding all necessary legal and religious licenses and lawfully carrying out scientific, cultural, and educational activities, the centre’s activities have been brought to a halt without an official explanation.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

Fatwas in the Digital Age

The Second International Symposium of the General Secretariat for Fatwa Authorities Worldwide took place in Cairo on 15–16 December 2025 under the theme “Fatwa and Contemporary Human Issues: Toward Sound Ijtihād that Responds to Contemporary Challenges”.

His Eminence Dr. Nazir Mohammad Ayyad, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, stressed the growing importance of responsible digital fatwa in the era of digital globalisation, emphasising that a fatwa is not merely an intellectual exercise but a vital tool for guidance, social stability, and public well-being.

Several initiatives expected to be introduced following the conference include the Fatwa and Respect for Human Dignity Charter, the crisis-fatwa procedural guide, a humanitarian fatwa manual, and some institutional and legal recommendations. These initiatives recognise the efforts necessary to position fatwa work as a driver of societal impact, grounded in research, evaluation, and measurable outcomes.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

Fines for Practising Faith

In December, the Mazhilis, the lower house of the Kazakh parliament, formally approved fines for the bill outlawing the use of a niqab or similar clothing that covers the face in a public place. Like its Central Asian neighbours, Kazakhstan also cites national security and counter-terrorism as reasons for the ban. While the first offense only receives a warning, a fine of $86 will be applied to subsequent offenses.

AI for the Islamic World

On 8 December, the international conference on the theme “Launch of the AI Index for the Islamic World” was held at the Heydar Aliyev Center in Baku. Co-organised by the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Science and Education in partnership with the Islamic World Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ICESCO), the conference aimed to enhance cooperation on artificial intelligence (AI) in the Islamic world as well as discuss the ethical, social and economic impacts of AI.

The ICESCO AI Index for the Islamic World, which measures trends in AI development among member states, currently only includes nine leading countries in the Islamic world, but is part of an effort to implement the Riyadh Charter on Artificial Intelligence in the Islamic world, which serves as the ethical and strategic reference for ICESCO member states.

The National Artificial Intelligence Strategy for 2025–2028 of Azerbaijan builds on the momentum of fostering technological creativity in establishing a national artificial intelligence ecosystem, developing the AI model in Azerbaijani for public services, defining the standards for government agencies, and establishing the Artificial Intelligence Academy.

Economic Growth and Progress in Central Asia

On 18 December, the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) published its Macroeconomic Outlook for 2026-2028, reviewing recent economic developments and offering projections for its seven member states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

According to the 2026-2028 outlook, aggregate GDP growth across the EDB region is forecast to reach 2.3% in 2026, and the Central Asian members—Kyrgyzstan (9.3%), Tajikistan (8.1%), Uzbekistan (6.8%), and Kazakhstan (5.5%)—are expected to remain EDB’s fastest-growing economies.

Indonesia Expands Market Access in EAEU Trade Deal

On 21 December, Indonesia and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia itself, signed a free trade agreement in St. Petersburg. Under this agreement, the EAEU will grant Indonesia preferential rates for 90.5% of its total tariff lines, which gives Indonesia’s leading export products like palm oil, coconut oil, coffee, and cocoa broader and more competitive access.

Between January to October 2025, total trade between Indonesia and the union stood at $4.4 billion, with Indonesian exports at $1.76 billion and imports from the bloc amounting to $2.64 billion, according to the trade ministry.

Article Pick

Read Islamic Law in Responding to the Phenomenon of Artificial Intelligence by Irma Rahman to explore the adaptability of Islamic jurisprudence to emerging technological issues in a world building reliance on robotics and AI. The study finds that the maqaasid al-shariah offer guidance in addressing the challenges posed by AI around privacy, accountability, justice, and human dignity.

The author understands that while certain states, such as the United Arab Emirates, are motivated to employ AI to support distal fatwas, many remain cautious of this. Issuing a fatwa requires ijtihad, the critical contextual reasoning by qualified jurists, and hence AI fails to be eligible.

A fascinating aspect of Islamic jurisprudence is in its nature, where it is also able to accommodate innovations from printing technologies to medical breakthroughs without losing its ethical grounding. The goal lies, as the author states, not in “rejecting AI but in ensuring its development and application remain aligned with the objectives of sharī ‘ah.”

Linda Whetstone was a lifelong champion of freedom, ideas, and individual liberty. The daughter of entrepreneur and think tank pioneer Sir Antony Fisher, she carried forward a legacy of principled leadership through her tireless work with institutions dedicated to economic liberty and open societies around the world.

Linda served as Chair of the Atlas Network, President of the Mont Pelerin Society, and a board member and adviser to several leading institutions supporting free markets, free speech, and property rights. She was an extraordinary mentor to academics, students, activists, and entrepreneurs, especially in societies where freedom was most constrained.

Her connection to the Islam & Liberty Network was both foundational and deeply personal. Linda was a co-founder of the network, which emerged from the Istanbul Network for Liberty, and she played a central role in shaping its vision. She believed strongly that the universal values of religious, political, and economic freedom were fully consistent with Islam, and she worked to ensure that these ideas reached scholars and students across the Muslim world.

Among her most enduring contributions was co-editing Islamic Foundations of a Free Society, a landmark project that brought together scholars from diverse countries and contexts. Through translations and seminars across South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond, Linda helped open intellectual space for conversations that were often difficult, and sometimes risky, but always vital.

Linda Whetstone passed away unexpectedly on December 15, 2021, at the age of 79. Her passing is a profound loss to the global liberty movement. She is remembered not only for the institutions she helped build, but for her humility, generosity, and unwavering belief that human flourishing depends on freedom. Linda was a member of the Islam and Liberty Council, where she remained actively engaged till her last days. Her legacy continues through the Islam & Liberty Network and the many individuals and institutions she inspired around the world.

More than ever, ideas matter. Linda showed us how to turn ideas into action, with humility, courage, and unwavering conviction.

Edraak is our newsletter that honours the Muslim world’s diversity, reflected in the multitude of its socio-economic conditions and political institutions spanning across the continents. Traced back to its Arabic origins, إدراك encompasses timely and thorough insights into the developments of the Muslim-majority nations.

For the purposes of this report, we’ve organised the Muslim-majority nations into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide
This zone includes countries where violence, civil war, and mass atrocity crimes dominate daily life.

Another Day, Another Coup

Citizens of Guinea-Bissau voted in elections on November 23, after which the Election Commission was due to announce provisional results of the presidential and parliamentary elections on November 27. However, on November 26, the military announced its takeover, the arrest of the incumbent president, the suspension of the electoral process, and the closure of the country’s borders.

The West African nation is not new to coups; in fact, it has been the only constant political action since the country gained independence from Portugal in 1974. General Horta Inta-A Na Man, formerly the army’s chief of staff, has been sworn in as president and is due to stay in power for a transition period of one year.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability
Countries in this zone are emerging from conflict or undergoing volatile transitions. They are in the process of political reconstruction and institution-building.

Desiring a Buffer Zone

On November 28, an Israeli incursion in the village of Beit Jin in Damascus killed at least 13 people, including women and children. Syria’s Foreign Ministry condemned the deadly attack, calling it a “war crime”.

More recently, on December 2, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended the operation by claiming that it was directed at militants and put forward the demand of a demilitarised “buffer zone” between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (illegally annexed by Israel in 1967) and Damascus.

While Netanyahu maintains the territorial demand as a non-negotiable “security principle,” Trump has warned against actions that could “interfere with Syria’s evolution into a prosperous state” and instead advised to seek “a strong and true dialogue with Syria”.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling
These countries enjoy relative peace and order, yet face fundamental economic, governance or social challenges.

On December 2, during a joint congressional briefing, United States lawmakers were called upon to pressure the Nigerian government to abolish Sharia law in northern states and disband the religious-enforcement Hisbah commissions amid escalating concerns about anti-Christian persecution. This joint briefing also comes after US President Donald Trump’s October directive and designation of Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern.

Civil rights activists have also been campaigning for a truly secular Nigeria, as the federal constitution recognises and dictates, with the removal of shariah law from the Nigerian constitution. Christianity and Islam are the major religions in Nigeria, each accounting for roughly half of the population, with Christianity dominant in the southern states and Islam dominating in the northern states.

Banning Child Marriages

On November 14, the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan (Pakistan) raised the legal age for marriage to 18 for both males and females, thus declaring marriage below the age of 18 punishable by law now in ICT, Sindh, and Balochistan.

The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), a constitutional body that advises the Pakistani government on the compatibility of laws with Islam, however, has been a sharp critic of these bills, terming them “un-Islamic”.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies with Peace and Stability
Zone IV encompasses those countries that have achieved a baseline of political or security stability, and which are now focused on economic growth, globalisation and strategic alignment.

C5+Azerbaijan

On November 16, Uzbekistan hosted the VII Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, with leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan in attendance. Previously, an observer, Azerbaijan has now officially joined the Consultative Meeting as an equal member.

The deepening cooperation between the Central Asian Republics and Azerbaijan reflects a broader trend toward institutionalising regionalism in Central Asia, with consultative meetings having evolved into a central platform through which regional leaders coordinate policy, harmonise regulations, and address shared challenges.

Assam Passes Anti-Polyamy Bill

On November 27, Assam became the second state after Uttarakhand to pass a law banning polygamy, that is, entering into a second marriage while the first subsists. This makes contracting a second marriage during the existence of the first a criminal offence with imprisonment of up to 10 years. Only scheduled tribes and areas under the Sixth Schedule are the exception.

While it applies to all religions, this law practically criminalises an essential part of Islamic personal law. Moreover, it is also a direct violation of the freedoms protected in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

CSTO Summit in Bishkek

On November 27, Kyrgyzstan hosted the annual summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), often viewed as an Eurasian NATO, bringing together foreign ministers, defence ministers, and security council secretaries from member states. The CSTO consists of Russia and the former Soviet states of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, but Armenia refuses to participate in the summit, seeing the inadequacies of the military alliance and its tepid responses to its own security challenges.

Article Pick

Far from being considered discriminatory because of the principle of a double share to a man and a single share to a woman, “Justification of Inheritance Distribution for Women According to Islamic Inheritance Law” by Md Yazid Ahmad, Ezad Azraai Jamsari, Mohd Hafiz Safiai, Anwar Fakhri Omar, and Nor Adila Mohd Nor argues that the ultimate aim of Islamic inheritance law is to uphold justice for all eligible heirs without discrimination based on gender, age, or physical ability. Even the 2:1 ratio between men and women is not absolute, as there could easily be cases where women receive equal or even greater shares than men.