Azerbaijan is a pivotal player in this evolving map. It is located between Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Europe. This makes Baku unique compared to landlocked countries in having a direct maritime connection to the west. Azerbaijan is opening a door for Central Asia to the markets of Türkiye and Europe. Central Asia offers connecting links for Azerbaijan to China and the rest of the Eurasian economy. The relationship is therefore moving beyond transit toward deeper economic cooperation. It is becoming a partnership built on growing economic interdependence.

The Middle Corridor is at the centre of this transformation. In 2017, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) was formed. It is now at the centre of this transformation, connecting China to Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. In the 19^th century, external empires were competing for Central Asia and the Caucasus for dominance in the “Great Game era”. Today, the countries of the region are asserting control over their own destinies.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway is a new route that opened in 2017 and links Azerbaijan with Georgia and Türkiye. The Port of Alat then connects the railway network to the Caspian Sea trade and enhances Azerbaijan’s bridgehead between Central Asia and Europe, land and sea. The data shows that this strategic vision is already underway. In the first 11 months of 2025, Azerbaijan Railways handled 350 block trains from China, including 128 transit trains. Cargo volume in containers grew by 18% to 123,992 TEU. In 2024, container traffic reached 96,952 TEU, an increase of 40.8%. The Middle Corridor is about 2,500 kilometers shorter than the traditional northern route through Russia. Goods can get from China to Europe in 10-15 days, which is faster than the traditional way.

Azerbaijan is also expanding its connectivity beyond the Middle Corridor. It is part of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network designed to connect India with Russia and Northern Europe through Iran and Azerbaijan. The corridor was formed in 2000 by Russia, Iran and India, followed by Azerbaijan in 2005. The International North–South Transport Corridor is a multimodal transit line of approximately 7,200 kilometres which links the North Sea with the Indian Ocean. For Baku, it provides another important trade route, complementing its east–west connections through the Middle Corridor. This places Azerbaijan on the crossroads of the north–south and east–west trade routes of Eurasia.

Azerbaijan’s connectivity ambitions extend beyond its existing routes. The planned Zangezur route would connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and Türkiye. The Horadiz–Aghband railway is expected to be completed in 2026. It is expected to produce 15 million tonnes per annum. As for Azerbaijan, relations with Central Asian countries are expanding. At the end of 2025, the amount of mutual trade is USD 1.8 billion. Cooperation has been expanded to customs digitalization, investment, energy and logistics. Uzbekistan is even exploring a joint Caspian maritime fleet with Azerbaijan’s shipping company. That’s why Azerbaijan’s rise is significant. It’s not just about building roads, railways and ports. It is building connections between economies that were once separated by geography. Mackinder viewed Eurasia as the heart of the world. In a globalized world, Azerbaijan demonstrates another aspect of this concept: a country may gain influence by being a bridge between others.

Edraak is our newsletter that honours the Muslim world’s diversity, reflected in the multitude of its socio-economic conditions and political institutions spanning across the continents. Traced back to its Arabic origins, إدراك encompasses timely and thorough insights into the developments of the Muslim-majority countries.

We organise the Muslim-majority countries into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

The Four Zones

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide

Gaza: Aid, Negotiations Put on Hold

On August 3, Palestinian officials and humanitarian agencies reported that around 1.4 million people in Gaza were facing acute food insecurity, while medicine shortages had reached 47%. The scale of the crisis is reflected in the health system: shortages of laboratory testing materials had reached 85%, while shortages of maternal and child health medicines stood at 56%. Palestinian officials stressed that the situation remained fragile. As one UN humanitarian official put it, the improvement in some food-security indicators “should not be interpreted as the end of the crisis.”

Diplomatic efforts continued through mid-August around a possible ceasefire, but disagreements over Hamas’ disarmament and an Israeli military withdrawal remained unresolved.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability

Afghanistan: Five Years of Rule, and Women’s Participation Falls to 5%

Afghanistan has spent five years under Taliban rule, and the anniversary has brought a stark measure of what that rule has meant for women. A recent report from the ILO says women now account for only 5% of Afghanistan’s labour market. UN Women has also recently highlighted more than 100 decrees restricting women and girls since 2021, covering education, employment, movement, justice and family life. Two of the newest measures are particularly consequential. Decree No. 12 has entrenched discriminatory legal provisions, while Decree No. 18 removes a minimum marriage age and makes separation harder for women. The result is not simply fewer rights on paper.

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling

Pakistan: A Day for Minorities, and the Question of What Comes Next

On August 11, Pakistan officially marked National Minorities’ Day, with state officials reaffirming constitutional guarantees of religious equality. Yet the day also became a reminder of the distance between constitutional promise and lived experience. Minority rights activists marched in Karachi demanding equal political, economic and social rights, including reform of blasphemy laws. The contrast is especially striking because Reuters has reported that blasphemy-related cases have fallen by roughly two-thirds this year following a crackdown on hardline groups and a sharp decline in mob violence. That is encouraging, but the laws themselves remain, which leaves a troubling possibility: with a changing political climate, the same machinery that has been restrained simply returns.

Nigeria: Faith Leaders Turn Dialogue into a Freedom

Nigeria’s latest interfaith initiative moves beyond statements of tolerance toward an organised mechanism for dialogue. Muslim and Christian leaders have launched a new body dedicated to religious harmony, against a backdrop of years of extremist violence and deep religious polarisation. Religious liberty is not only the right to attend a place of worship; it also depends on whether communities can participate in public life without being treated as threats. Nigeria’s experience shows how quickly religious identity can become political identity. The new mechanism cannot solve that alone, but it offers a civic space where disagreement does not automatically become hostility.

Lebanon Gives Up Its Power to Execute

Lebanon has taken one of the clearest steps toward expanding the right to life by abolishing capital punishment. The country had not carried out an execution since 2004, but the death penalty remained on the books, leaving a gap between practice and law. That gap has now closed as the government that cannot execute a convicted person has accepted a principle larger than the crime itself: that punishment has boundaries. Lebanon’s decision is therefore more than a legal reform. In a region where capital punishment remains widespread, it offers a different vision of justice and state authority.

Morocco: Economic Desperation Meets a Border

Moroccan authorities arrested at least 111 people on August 14 as they attempted to reach Spain’s Ceuta enclave, while security measures along the northern border were tightened. Routes into the area were blocked, surveillance increased, and journalists were reportedly asked to leave the border town of Fnideq. The operation followed a larger border mobilisation in July, when thousands of migrants attempted to cross into Ceuta. Moroccan authorities have framed the measures around border security and preventing irregular crossings. For those attempting to leave, however, migration is driven by unemployment, low incomes and the prospect of better opportunities abroad. The tension is difficult to miss: how should governments balance border control with people’s desire to move in search of a better livelihood?

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies

Indonesia: When the State Wants to Set the Price

Indonesia is taking a bigger role in determining how its strategic commodities are priced. President Prabowo Subianto announced a new commodity exchange intended to set domestic prices for resources including nickel, tin and gold, arguing that Indonesia should become a price-setter rather than remain simply an exporter. Tighter oversight could reduce under-reporting, increase state revenues and prevent foreign markets from capturing too much value. However, investors are already concerned about competitiveness and operating costs. “Personally I don’t think the market will use it unless specific export rules are associated.”, says a Singapore-based metals trader quoted by Reuters.

Jordan: Incentives, Jobs and the Freedom to Build a Business

On August 2, Jordan’s cabinet approved a package aimed at encouraging investment and supporting industrial activity. The measures include tax exemptions, regulatory relief and subsidised electricity for projects in the Rawda Industrial Zone, with electricity discounts reaching 75% during the first two years. Companies can also receive support for workers’ salaries, social-security contributions and transport costs. The parliament said the measures are intended to strengthen investment, support employment and improve the competitiveness of industrial projects. For businesses, the package reduces some of the costs associated with starting or expanding operations, while for workers, the employment incentives could lower the cost of hiring. The effectiveness of the package will depend on whether these incentives translate into sustained investment and jobs.

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human interests & the higher objectives of the sacred law: the shared pursuit of the common good

“Actions are only with intentions, and every person will have only what they intended.” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 1, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 1907…

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In a globalized world, a war that disrupts a vital maritime chokepoint affects the economic performance of more or less every country. However, economic forecasts indicate that some economies rebound more than others, signalling greater resilience and resource utilization in such economies.

The US-Israel War on Iran and its impact on the economies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region illustrates these dynamics. On July 8, 2026, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published its World Economic Outlook report containing projections related to 2027. Notably, what stood out in the report was that after the war ends, the economies of the MENA region are projected to rebound and grow at a rate of 7.3% in 2027 compared to the 3.4% overall growth rate of economies around the world. The MENA region is also projected to grow at the fastest rate around the world.

This projected aggressive growth for the MENA region comes in the backdrop of the US-Israel War on Iran. During the war, Iran created disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz — a vital maritime trade chokepoint that, under normal conditions, accounts for approximately 20% of global oil exports. This sent economic shockwaves around the world, and oil prices averaged $89 per barrel in 2026. Thus, the IMF’s July 8 report projected global economic growth at a rate of 3.0% in 2026, a 0.5% drop from the average of 2024-2025. For the MENA specifically, the region was projected to contract by 0.5% in 2026. The IMF stated that these projections are based on the most probable assumption of continued disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz in 2026, while the rebound predictions are attributed to a corresponding ease of disruptions to the strait.

This ease of disruption to the Strait of Hormuz and corresponding rebound would have significant implications for the MENA region. It would create fiscal space for restoration in the Gulf region. After the easing of disruption to the Strait and the subsequent projected economic rebound, hydrocarbon revenues are expected to increase. This would allow the GCC states to redirect resources towards rebuilding depleted fiscal space, as the overall regional economic loss from the conflict is estimated at approximately $194 billion. Furthermore, economies with more diversified export routes, like Saudi Arabia, are expected to experience stronger gains during the 2027 period, with the country’s growth forecast at 5.5%.

Apart from these implications for the MENA region, the world would also be profoundly impacted by this rebound if it materializes as projected. The projected growth rate of 7.3% in the region would be accompanied by eased critical energy and supply chain disruptions. This would create downward pressure on energy prices. Eventually, as projected by the IMF, due to regional stabilization, global headline inflation would ease to 3.9% in 2027 from a heated 4.7% in 2026.

Ultimately, the IMF’s 2027 optimistic outlook for the MENA region would be beneficial for both the region and the world. However, crucially, the dynamics of the war between the US and Iran and the normalization of maritime trade traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would be the ultimate deciding factors for the 2027 economic outlook of the MENA region.

Across Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Papua, Sumatra, and the Moluccas, Indigenous (adat) lands are being cleared for nickel mining, palm oil plantations, and other large development projects. The Land Matrix noted that Indonesia is among the top countries for foreign investments in large-scale land acquisition. These are projects that provide jobs and investment. However, many communities claim to have lost their land without just compensation. Meanwhile, President Prabowo Subianto has expanded military involvement in forest governance pushing for more palm oil production. He dismissed the deforestation concerns, saying, “We don’t need to be afraid of... deforestation, right?

Human Rights Watch reported on the communities losing their land to nickel projects. In Tapunggaya, Southeast Sulawesi, villagers reported that seven-year leases were viewed as permanent sales. Near the 5,500-hectare Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP), residents reported losing access to their land without compensation. Families reported that they had been forcibly displaced on Obi Island. In addition, losses due to the environment are increasing. According to government data, 216,000 hectares of deforestation took place in 2024, but Auriga Nusantara estimated the figure was more than 260,000 hectares. The loss of forest occurred in 2025 at 433,751 hectares, an increase of 66 percent from 2024. Around 71% of deforestation was in state-managed forests. Meanwhile, Climate Action Tracker keeps Indonesia’s climate policies at the “Critically Insufficient” level. Those who protest such projects are subject to legal measures.

In Human Rights Watch’s report “Grabbed Land, Silenced Justice: The Persecution of Environmentalists and Indigenous Leaders in Indonesia,” the report examined more than 50 land-rights cases between 2015 and 2025, selecting 15 major cases from across Indonesia. The research included 69 interviews with Indigenous leaders, villagers, activists, lawyers, academics, and government officials. It found that criminal charges and Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are increasingly used against people defending their land. One of the best-known cases is that of James Watt, an Indigenous Dayak farmer from Central Kalimantan. He was sentenced to 10 months in prison after challenging a palm oil company’s claim over customary land. On reflection, he said: “They stole our land, they clamped down on the ones who wanted justice. The injustice is obvious. This is not a single incident. In 2025, Auriga Nusantara documented 33 threats and criminalization incidents involving 198 people against environmental defenders. Since 2014, at least 1,131 people faced criminal cases for defending their land rights. To this end, Amnesty International Indonesia documented 54 attacks against 104 human rights defenders in the first half of 2025.

Indonesia is also a signatory to the Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use in 2021, pledging to end and reverse forest loss by 2030. It also, in 2022, voted to declare a clean and healthy environment as a universal human right at the UN. In July 2025 the International Court of Justice ruled that the state is responsible for addressing climate change and ensuring human rights are respected. The gap between Indonesia’s international commitments and realities on the ground is reality to be seen in these commitments.

At first glance, education appears to be one of the least controversial elements of humanitarian aid. There is extensive international recognition that children displaced by war and persecution should have access to education, stability, and hope for the future. Yet the experience of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh demonstrates that education has never been only a humanitarian service. The curriculum, language of instruction, certification, and religious education have become highly politicized issues, reflecting larger struggles about sovereignty, citizenship, identity, and the destiny of one of the world’s largest stateless populations (Dryden-Peterson, 2016; Islam & Mia, 2024).

Systematic discrimination for decades in Myanmar culminated in a military crackdown in August 2017, which forced over one million Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh, where most remain in camps in Cox’s Bazar in extended uncertainty (UNHCR, 2025b). Bangladesh has shown remarkable humanitarian generosity, but what started out as an emergency response has turned into a long-term governance challenge. Education has become one of its most contested dimensions because it raises questions that extend beyond classrooms. Should refugee children follow Bangladeshi or Myanmar curricula? Should their education lead to recognized qualifications? How can humanitarian agencies respect the host state’s insistence that displacement be temporary, while upholding the universal right to education?

These questions reveal that humanitarian schooling is more than a mechanism for delivering educational services. It is a political arena where governments, humanitarian organisations, donors, and refugee communities negotiate competing visions of protection, authority, and belonging. In this essay, “humanitarian schooling” refers to refugee education delivered through humanitarian institutions outside the host state’s formal education system and continuously shaped by negotiation between humanitarian principles and sovereign political authority. This essay argues that humanitarian schooling in Bangladesh should be understood as a form of humanitarian governance through which refugee populations are simultaneously protected and regulated (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). Based on the scholarship of Dryden-Peterson (2016) on refugee education and Agamben’s (1998) concept of the state of exception, it demonstrates how the Rohingya experience exemplifies the ongoing contestation between the universal right to education and the sovereign right of states to determine the conditions under which displaced populations are able to learn, belong, and envision their futures.

These questions imply that humanitarian schooling is more than a mechanism of providing educational services. It is a political arena where governments, humanitarian organizations, donors, and refugee communities negotiate competing visions of protection, authority, and belonging. This essay argues that humanitarian schooling in Bangladesh should be understood as a form of humanitarian governance through which refugee populations are simultaneously protected and regulated (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). It is a political domain where governments, humanitarian organizations, donors and refugee communities negotiate competing visions of protection, authority and belonging. This study argues that humanitarian schooling in Bangladesh should be understood as a form of humanitarian governance that simultaneously protects and regulates refugee populations (Barnett & Weiss, 2008).

2. The Rohingya Crisis and the Right to Education

Education is an integral and defining feature of every refugee crisis. It not only provides knowledge and stability, but also shapes identity, belonging, and the future. The Rohingya experience demonstrates how these humanitarian and political issues become indistinguishable in situations of protracted displacement.

The contemporary Rohingya crisis is rooted in decades of systematic exclusion and statelessness. The 1982 Citizenship Law effectively nullified the Rohingya’s citizenship status and the military crackdown of August 2017 forced more than 740,000 people to flee to Bangladesh. The Rohingya population, along with earlier arrivals, now exceeds one million, making Cox’s Bazar the world’s largest refugee settlement (Kipgen, 2013; UNHCR, 2025b). What began as an emergency humanitarian response has now turned into a prolonged displacement crisis, with no immediate durable solution in sight (Islam et al., 2026).

Figure 1: Rohingya refugee flows in Bangladesh

Source: Hossain, 2023.

As displacement has become prolonged, education has become one of the most contentious dimensions of refugee protection. Education is a universal right regardless of nationality or legal status as recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Sustainable Development Goal 4 (United Nations, 1948, 1989, 2015). Refugee education is therefore, in principle, a matter of rights rather than charity. In practice, however, the implementation is determined by the political priorities of host states (Dryden-Peterson, 2016). Although Bangladesh is home to more than a million Rohingya, but is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and officially refers to them not as refugees but as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (Islam & Mia, 2024). This terminology reflects the state’s commitment to keeping displacement temporary and avoiding policies that might promote permanent settlement. Thus, decisions concerning curriculum, certification and access to formal education have become closely linked to broader concerns about sovereignty, national security and future repatriation (Shohel, 2020).

The Rohingya case, thus, reveals a core paradox of refugee governance. While education is a universal human right in international norms, the reality of education provision is still constantly negotiated within the limits of state sovereignty. This tension is key to understanding how humanitarian schooling in Bangladesh has become a politically negotiated space rather than simply an educational system (Dryden-Peterson, 2016).

3. Humanitarian Schooling in Bangladesh

Since the mass displacement of Rohingya in 2017, Bangladesh has embraced a model of refugee education that reflects a careful balance between humanitarian responsibility and political restraint. Instead of integrating Rohingya children into the national education system, the government has permitted education mainly through humanitarian learning centres run by international and non-governmental organizations. The arrangement has augmented access to education and further solidified the state’s broader objective of securing the temporary nature of refugee protection (Islam & Mia, 2024). Thus, humanitarian schooling has become a parallel system of education that is designed not only to educate refugee children but also to govern prolonged displacement.

Figure 2: Humanitarian Schooling as a Politically Negotiated System

Source: Adapted by the author based on Islam and Mia (2024); Dryden-Peterson (2016); UNICEF (2022); and UNHCR (2025a).

Education in the camps is facilitated through a broad humanitarian partnership led by UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM and their implementing partners. There are now thousands of learning centres providing literacy, numeracy, life skills and psychosocial support, greatly enhancing education access compared to the immediate post-2017 influx (ISCG, 2019; UNICEF, 2022). But these institutions are largely informal. Most students do not obtain nationally or internationally recognized qualifications, and scopes for progression to secondary or higher education remain extremely limited (Hossain, 2023).

This distinction between humanitarian learning and formal education is politically important. The question has never been whether Rohingya children should be educated, but rather what kind of education is compatible with Bangladesh’s refugee policy. For years, the Learning Competency Framework and Approach (LCFA) was followed by children which was designed as an emergency curriculum in humanitarian contexts. Concern that a prolonged dependence on emergency education could lead to a “lost generation” without recognized qualifications led the Government of Bangladesh to approve the phased introduction of the Myanmar national curriculum in selected learning centres from 2021, supported by UNICEF and other humanitarian partners (UNICEF, 2022). This policy represented a political compromise: to improve educational continuity while strengthening the expectation that the Rohingya would eventually return to Myanmar, rather than integrate into the national education system of Bangladesh.

Despite this policy shift, application has been constrained due to the shortages of qualified teachers, inadequate learning materials, language barriers, overcrowded classrooms and ongoing uncertainty about the future of Myanmar (Shohel, 2020). At the same time, learning centres offer far more than academic instruction including psychosocial support, protection from child labour and early marriage, and opportunities to rebuild social relationships after displacement (Dryden-Peterson, 2016). Humanitarian schooling is thus simultaneously a means of education, protection and community support (Islam & Mia 2024).

This duality lies at the core of the Rohingya education system. Humanitarian schooling has kept hundreds of thousands of children out of educational exclusion, but its architecture also reproduces the political boundaries of refugee governance. It offers access to education but also limits long term integration, and exemplifies how humanitarian protection and state sovereignty are always being negotiated within the classroom itself.

4. Education as a Political Arena

Humanitarian schooling is not all about delivering education only; it is also a mechanism of negotiation among competing political interests. Educational decisions about curriculum, language of instruction, certification, and access to formal schooling in the Rohingya camps are inherently intertwined with larger political questions of authority, citizenship, identity, and the future of one of the world’s largest displaced populations (Islam & Mia, 2024). Hence, education has become a political space where the priorities of a state, humanitarian organizations, international donors and refugee communities converge.

Figure 3: Education Between Protection and Sovereignty

Source: Adapted by the author from Barnett and Weiss (2008); Agamben (1998); Dryden-Peterson (2016); Shohel (2020); Islam & Mia (2024); UNICEF (2022).

For the Government of Bangladesh, education cannot be detached from the wider politics of displacement. The state has consistently emphasized the temporary character of the Rohingya presence, while also providing humanitarian protection. This goal is reflected in its naming the Rohingya Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals, instead of refugees, and in its policies focused on tightly controlled humanitarian learning centres instead of accredited formal education (Shohel, 2020; Islam & Mia, 2024). Accordingly, the curriculum, certification and institutional expansion are carefully managed to avoid the possibilities of permanent integration. In many ways, the Rohingya camps illustrate what Agamben (1998) describes as a state of exception, where displaced people are subject to state authority without enjoying the full rights of citizenship.

Education is viewed by the humanitarian organisations from a different perspective. For agencies such as UNICEF and UNHCR, education is a universal human right and a critical part of child protection and long-term resilience (Dryden-Peterson, 2016; UNICEF, 2022). But these organisations operate within the political boundaries of the host state. The core of humanitarian governance is inherently political, as humanitarian actors always negotiate between universal principles and state sovereignty (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). The Rohingya response exemplifies this dilemma: humanitarian agencies seek broader access to education, but only within the framework determined by broader refugee policy of Bangladesh.

International donors add another layer of complexity. Its fragility has been brought out by donor priorities, while their funding has made it possible to extend humanitarian education. Human Rights Watch (2025) reports that recent funding cuts have derailed learning programs, halted recruitment of teachers, and jeopardized education for hundreds of thousands of Rohingya children. Simultaneously, Rohingya families have pursued their own educational aspirations through formal credentials, cultural identity preservation, and community-based initiatives. Their priorities do not always align with those of governments or humanitarian agencies. The refugee education space is not only shaped by institutions but also by the agency of displaced communities.

Source: Adapted by the author from Dryden-Peterson (2016); Shohel (2020); Islam & Mia (2024); UNICEF (2022); UNHCR (2025a).

Thus, the politics of refugee education extends far beyond the classroom. Humanitarian schooling has developed into a governance mechanism through which state sovereignty, humanitarian responsibility, donor priorities, and refugee aspirations are continuously negotiated. The Rohingya case demonstrates that education is neither politically neutral nor purely humanitarian; it is one of the central sites in which the future of displaced populations is imagined, managed and contested.

5. Religious Education, Identity, and Community Agency

Humanitarian learning centres are not the only educational institutions within the Rohingya camps. Alongside them, many families continue to rely on community-based maktabs and madrasahs. Their importance reflects more than religious preference. According to Islam and Mia (2024) these have emerged as community responses to prolonged displacement, limited access to recognized formal education, and enduring uncertainty about the future.

For a stateless community whose identity has long been denied, religious education serves multifarious purposes. Besides teaching Qur’anic studies, Islamic ethics, Arabic, and basic literacy, these institutions help to preserve cultural memory, strengthen communal solidarity, and provide children with continuity amid displacement (Parnini, 2013). They also provide psychosocial support through re-establishing routine and reinforcing social cohesion after conflict and forced migration (Hyunjung & Hoque, 2024). Hence, community-based religious education complements humanitarian schooling and meets needs beyond academic instruction.

At the same time, the growth of informal religious education has created concerns among government officials and humanitarian organizations. Karim (2023) notes that many madrasahs operate outside of formal regulatory frameworks, raising concerns about curriculum quality, teacher training, institutional oversight and child protection. Furthermore, Bangladesh authorities have expressed their security concerns about the unregulated educational spaces in the camps (Hossain, 2023). There is little empirical evidence of widespread radicalization, but these concerns have had a major impact on state policy towards community-led education.

However, seeing religious education through a security lens alone ignores the agency of the Rohingya community. Refugees are not just passive recipients of humanitarian assistance, but active participants in shaping the education of their children. Community-led religious schools are attempts to keep identity alive and fill the voids left by the formal humanitarian system (Islam & Mia, 2024). Therefore, a more balanced approach is one of proper regulation and positive engagement. Sustainable refugee education relies not only on humanitarian organizations and governments but also on active involvement of refugee communities themselves.

6. From Emergency Response to Long-Term Challenge

Recent developments have exposed the growing fragility of humanitarian schooling for the Rohingya. While earlier debates centred on curriculum and educational access, the most pressing challenge today is the sustainability of the system itself. Decreasing international financial support has revealed the vulnerability of an education model that heavily relies on humanitarian assistance, rather than on long-term institutional arrangements.

In June 2025, UNICEF reported that several education programs had been suspended or scaled back due to funding shortfalls, including the termination of contracts for more than a thousand education workers in the Rohingya camps (UNICEF, 2025). These cuts have endangered the learning opportunities of thousands of children and increased the chances of long-term educational loss. The funding crisis has also refocused attention on community-run schools, many of which continue to provide educational endurance to refugee children without formal recognition (Human Rights Watch, 2025).

These difficulties are compounded by the ongoing instability in Myanmar. The renewed fighting in Rakhine State and the lack of conditions for safe and voluntary repatriation make it increasingly clear that the displacement is unlikely to end soon (Reuters, 2026; UNHCR, 2025b). Education can therefore no longer be viewed as a short-term humanitarian response. It has become a long-term political and development challenge, which requires sustained international support, increased cooperation with refugee communities, and policies that reconcile Bangladesh’s legitimate sovereignty concerns with the universal right to education.

7. Conclusion

The Rohingya experience illustrates that refugee education is never simply about access to classrooms. In situations of prolonged displacement, education becomes intensely intertwined with issues of sovereignty, citizenship, identity and political belonging. Humanitarian schooling in Bangladesh demonstrates that educational policy is shaped not only by humanitarian commitments but also by negotiations among governments, international organisations, donors, and refugee communities.

Bangladesh has sought to strike a balance between its humanitarian obligations and legitimate concerns over sovereignty and the temporary nature of refugee protection. Meanwhile, humanitarian agencies have tried to defend education as a universal right. At the same time, Rohingya families have developed their own educational strategies to m preserve their identity and expand opportunities for the future. This generates a system that simultaneously protects and regulates refugee populations, reflecting the complexities of humanitarian governance.

The Rohingya experience is not an isolated example, but a case study of a wider global dilemma. As displacement is protracted, refugee education is shifting from an emergency response to a long-term question of governance, rights and political responsibility. It requires sustained political commitment, predictable international assistance, and greater acknowledgement of refugee communities as active partners in shaping education policy. Finally, the future of humanitarian schooling will depend not only on resources, but also on whether governments and the international community treat education as a foundation for dignity, resilience, and sustainable solutions, rather than simply as a mechanism for managing displacement.

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References

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Sejan, S. S., & Farque, M. O. (2026). Rohingyas as “FDMNs” in Bangladesh: Implications for their right to education. Opinio Juris. https://opiniojuris.org/2026/05/05/rohingyas-as-fdmns-in-bangladesh-implications-for-their-right-to-education/

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When raising one’s voice can lead to imprisonment and suffering, choosing silence may not be an act of cowardice, but rather a means of ensuring one’s safety and survival.

On June 5, 2026, security forces in Karshi, Uzbekistan, arrested Javokhir Muminov, a leading member of the Ezgulik Human Rights Society, alongside farmer Djura Akbarov. After the arrest, Muminov was subjected to suffocation with a plastic bag. He managed to inform his lawyer about the torture. Later, during a prison visit, his lawyer was also physically assaulted by the prison staff.

Djura Akbarov was a simple farmer. One day, two state bailiffs became violent with him and broke his arms. He was in pain, scared, and didn’t know whom to ask for help, so he reached out to Javokhir Muminov. Javokhir Muminov works for the Ezgulik Human Rights Society, where his job is to advocate for ordinary people. He demanded a simple thing from the bailiff: “You broke his arm, so pay for his treatment.”

Muminov had simply helped the farmer seek compensation for his medical treatment. Although one of the bailiffs sent the payment, he later accused Muminov of extortion. Muminov’s only crime was assisting a man with a broken arm, yet he faced a charge of extortion for doing so.

If someone breaks your arm and you ask for medical expenses, this is not an extortion; this is fixing a mistake. It becomes a crime only if the government allows officers to beat you freely.

Officers placed a plastic bag over his head, causing suffocation. They tortured him, but without leaving any marks. This is a direct violation of the UN Convention Against Torture.

Another major concern arises from an incident where Muminov’s lawyer was also physically assaulted during a prison visit. The officers assaulted him because they feared that the truth would reach the outside world.

Moreover, the prosecutor’s officers declined to order a forensic medical examination despite two complaints filed. A forensic medical examination would clarify whether torture occurred or not.

This is not the first case Uzbekistan has had a history of state repression. Under the late president, Islam Karimov, many instances of state repression were documented. In 2005, troops fired on protesters in Andijan, killing hundreds of people. Dissidents were tortured with methods like pouring boiling water on them, and forced labor in cotton fields was common during that era.

When Shavkat Mirziyoyev became president, he promised a “new Uzbekistan” and even released some prisoners. However, he introduced an upgraded form of torture. While torture under Karimov often left visible marks, under Mirziyoyev, methods have included suffocating individuals with plastic bags, which leave no visible signs of abuse.

Under Karimov, they called you a traitor. Under Mirziyoyev, they labeled you an extortionist. The method may differ, but the goal remains the same: to destroy anyone who has the courage to speak against the government.

Ezgulik has always been a target because it refuses to be a “good NGO” that praises the government. It actually investigates broken arms, forced labor, and corruption. Muminov’s arrest is the government’s reward for that bravery.

Uzbekistan is not alone in using the legal system as a weapon. In Russia, lawyer Sergei Magnitsky was jailed and beaten to death for exposing corruption. In Egypt, researcher Giulio Regeni was tortured and killed for asking too many questions. In Belarus, Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski is serving 10 years for the “crime” of receiving international donations. The names and countries change, but the playbook is identical. When the state cannot win an honest argument, it writes a fake charge, closes the courtroom doors, and hopes the world looks away.

Javokhir Muminov is not an extortionist. He is not a criminal. He is a man who helped a farmer with a broken arm, and for that kindness, he is being destroyed. He is a prisoner of conscience, a hostage of a system that fears truth more than violence.

The world must demand his immediate and unconditional release. The bailiffs who broke Djura Akbarov’s arm must face justice, not wear the mask of victims.

Until then, the “New Uzbekistan” remains what it always was, a place where asking for your basic rights can cost you your freedom, your body, or your life.

Some scholars leave behind more than books. They leave ideas that continue to shape public debate for generations. John L. Esposito was one of those scholars. On July 15, 2026, he died at age 86, leaving behind years of scholarship that have changed the perception of millions of people of Islam and the Muslim world. Esposito was born in Brooklyn, New York, on May 19, 1940, and studied philosophy before receiving his doctorate in Islamic studies from Temple University. He devoted more than five decades to researching Islam, politics, and interfaith relations. As he progressed through his career, he remained steadfast in his quest to dispel misconceptions with informed discussion.

Esposito served as Professor of Religion and International Affairs and Islamic Studies at Georgetown University. He also founded the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Under his leadership, the center became one of the world’s leading institutions for the study of Islam and relations between Muslims and the West. He has also served as a consultant to governments, international institutions, journalists, and policymakers on matters concerning Muslim societies. His work included political Islam, democracy, Islamic law, globalization, extremism, and Muslim societies around the world. Esposito was one of the first American scholars allowed to go to Iran and interview the ayatollah and his family. He did not portray Islam as a monolithic tradition. However, emphasized the diversity of Islam. To understand them, it is necessary to consider their history, culture, and political situations they live in.

He is the author of the best-known books: Islam: The Straight Path, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, Who Speaks for Islam?, The Future of Islam, Islam and Democracy, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, and The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Students, researchers, and policymakers globally used these books as key reference texts.

Across 55 books and a distinguished academic career, Esposito challenged the “Clash of Civilizations” theory and worked to bridge divides between Muslims and the West. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Esposito became one of the most prominent voices advocating for the separation of Islam from acts perpetrated by extremist groups. He always insisted that terrorism should not be the name of a religion that is practiced by almost two billion people. His evidence-based approach won him respect in both Western and Muslim societies. The impact of John L. Esposito’s work reaches beyond the classroom walls. John L. Esposito presents an argument in The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? That the West is misinterpreting Islam. He rejects the false notion that Islam is inherently violent or anti-Western. In today’s polarized and misinformed times, his legacy will continue to serve as a reminder that knowledge is one of the most effective ways to bridge understanding.

Islamic finance is one of the most dynamic areas of world finance. According to the World Bank he global Islamic finance industry is valued at nearly US$4 trillion. Islamic finance, unlike traditional banking, does not accept Riba (interest). Instead depends on profit and loss sharing, trade, leasing and asset-backed financing. This will help attract investment into the formal banking sector, Uzbekistan hopes. The International Finance Corporation survey reveals that 56% of those surveyed will not use traditional loans because of religious concerns. Meanwhile, 75% said they would use Islamic financial services if they were available. The new law establishes a dual banking system. Islamic “windows” can be established within conventional banks, and conventional banks can also be licensed as fully Islamic banks. It also establishes legal frameworks for Islamic financial products like murabaha (cost-plus sale), mudaraba (profit-sharing partnership), musharaka (joint investment partnership), ijara (Islamic leasing) and salam (advance payment for future delivery). Uzbekistan now has new licensing regulations, tax breaks, governance norms and oversight requirements from Shariah.

To oversee these reforms, the Central Bank created a five-member Islamic Finance Council. The council will draft national Islamic finance standards, advise banks and microfinance institutions, and recommend regulatory reforms. It will also represent Uzbekistan at the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the world’s leading standard-setting body for Islamic finance. Most council members are Islamic law scholars from the Fatwa Centre under the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan. The council is chaired by Saidjamol Masayitov, while banking expert Akhrorjon Sadullayev, who has more than 20 years of experience in finance and auditing, provides technical expertise.

The government has set challenging goals. They believe that 10 Islamic banks will be active by 2030, and several state-owned banks are getting ready to open Islamic banking windows. The Central Bank also believes the reforms could draw in an additional $20-25 billion in new deposits and investment as previously unbanked savings enter the formal financial system. These reforms complement the overall economic strategy of Uzbekistan. The government is keen on enhancing financial inclusion, diversifying its sources of funding and seeking investment from Muslim-majority countries. Creating a law is just the first step. There remains a need for the banks to hire trained Shariah experts, clear regulations and strong supervision. It will also take time to establish an Islamic capital market, including sukuk (Islamic bonds). These reforms, if they are executed properly, could bring investment, increase financial inclusion, and make Uzbekistan the number one Islamic finance market in Central Asia.

Pakistan and Iran are a case in point. On June 18, 2026, both states reiterated their commitment to raise their bilateral trade to $10 billion. Iranian Ambassador Reza Amiri Moghadam and Pakistan’s Investment Minister Qaiser Ahmed Sheikh affirmed that the target would be achieved through operationalization of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the border region and greater economic engagement.

This reiteration comes against the backdrop of last year’s developments. In 2025, Iran and Pakistan signed agreements across diverse fields and economic sectors. These agreements originally established the target of boosting bilateral trade to $10 billion between the two countries.

This ambitious trade target by Iran and Pakistan is accompanied by complementary projects as well, which have critical economic implications for both countries. The trade target is complemented by cheap Iranian energy imports and work on the long-delayed critical gas pipeline. As Pakistan faces energy shortages, these cheap energy imports can substantially reduce the electricity and gas shortages in Pakistan. Both Iran and Pakistan also face border security threats. Governor of Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province, Mansour Bijar, stated during his visit to Pakistan that cross-border trade would not only be beneficial for the economy of both countries but would also help address the shared security challenges. Additionally, the governor mentioned the proposed upgradation plan of the Chagai-Sukkur railway track. This transport link would further enhance bilateral trade by improving cargo transportation. Notably, the chief minister of Balochistan, Sarfarz Bugti, stated that for facilitating border trade and generating employment opportunities, plans are underway to establish additional border markets alongside the three existing functional border markets.

All the above-mentioned implications of the ambitious trade target and complementary projects and initiatives hint towards a beginning of regional economic integration at the cross-roads of South Asia and West Asia. As the projects between Iran and Pakistan encompass development of transit links, address shared needs, and would potentially create employment opportunities for both countries, it ultimately means that both countries are laying the groundwork for deeper and sustained economic integration. This is the hallmark of regional connectivity, one that matters significantly in the “fragmentegrated” economic world order.

Ultimately, the contemporary global order is characterized by a multipolar trade model. Global disruptions and shifting geopolitical landscapes are challenging individual nations. In such a world, two states with porous and unstable borders coming together and establishing economic cooperation frameworks is a development worth noting because regional connectivity is a critical need of the hour. Moving forward, should the cooperation deepen and other regional states follow suit, it can be extended for the creation of an extended transit corridor between West and South Asia.

Indonesia is no longer asking “how” to expand Internet access. It is asking a better question: How can digital technology generate meaningful economic value?

The government introduced Digital Ecosystem Alignment (DEAL) 2026 in June 2026. This new digital agenda unified government agencies, technology companies, start-ups, universities, investors, and local communities under one platform. It aims to make digital growth more productive and create better businesses and services for the public. The initiative is based on three principles: “alignment of interests”, “shared responsibility”, and “national prosperity”.

Over the past decade, the digital economy has been steadily expanding in Indonesia. Over 81 percent of the population now uses the internet, more than 230 million people. The country’s digital economy was estimated at around US$99 billion in 2025, which is just under one-third of the total digital economy in Southeast Asia. Communication and Digital Affairs Minister Meutya Hafid said that Indonesia must not be only a market for foreign technology companies. Rather, it should develop its own innovations, keep more digital value at home and foster local competencies in cloud services, AI and digital infrastructure.

DEAL 2026 project has a measurable impact. The implementation of IoT technology in Sleman, Banjarnegara, and Lamongan has helped to improve the productivity of farm activities for fish farmers and farmers. AI training is supporting 100 to 150 MSMEs in Wonogiri and Banyuwangi. The government is also developing a Digital Addiction Response Assistance (DARA) program for digital addiction in children and an Ecosystem Dashboard as a national digital data platform.

Artificial intelligence is a central component of Indonesia’s digital strategy. Later this year, the government plans to introduce its first comprehensive AI regulation, featuring a National AI Roadmap, ethical guidelines, and risk-based governance. Indonesia’s goal is to foster innovation while simultaneously regulating potential issues like deepfakes, fraud, and the handling of personal information, as opposed to the EU’s more stringent stance. This vision will be discussed at the Second Asia AI Infrastructure Summit 2026 in Jakarta, where policymakers and industry leaders will explore trusted and scalable AI systems.

Also, there is significant focus on infrastructure. The government will expand the use of data centers across the country, strengthen cloud computing, boost investments in artificial intelligence, and promote the establishment of digital hubs in special economic zones such as Nongsa Digital Park in Batam. Meanwhile, Indonesia is investing in digital skills and talent, as AI can’t generate economic growth without skilled people. Challenges remain. Regional disparities remain, AI skills are limited, and inter-agency coordination is complex. One thing is clear in Indonesia’s strategy, however. The next big wave of digital transformation isn’t about making more people online. It is about technology making the lives of farmers, entrepreneurs, students, and small businesses better. The success of Indonesia will not be in developing smarter technology, but in developing the smartest technology. It will help build a sustainable and equitable economy.

Fifteen years after the Arab Spring, Tunisia is no longer trying to build democracy. It is trying to protect the freedoms it once achieved. Courts have played an increasingly prominent role in the repression of political opponents, journalists and civil society activists since President Kais Saied suspended parliament on 25 July 2021. But Tunisia’s most serious problem is not political opposition. It is the economy. When Saied was elected in 2019, he promised to fight corruption and improve people’s lives. Many supported his move in 2021, hoping it would bring stability and economic recovery. Five years later, those hopes have faded. The government is spending more time targeting opponents than solving economic problems.

The government’s priorities became clear on 8 and 9 July 2026. MP Fatma Mseddi on 9 July introduced a law that would declare the Islamist Ennahda movement a terrorist organisation and prohibit its members from holding public office for a period of 10 years. A day earlier, a Tunisian court sentenced lawyer and former presidential candidate Samir Abdali to 18 years in prison on terrorism and money laundering charges. In the same week, 18 other social media users were also sentenced to up to 27 years under Decree 54, the 2022 cybercrime law that criminalises the government’s definition of ‘false information’. These may be tough, but they will not make many changes. Ennahda is already weak. Its offices were closed in 2023, and many of its leaders, including Rached Ghannouchi, remain in prison. Declaring it a terrorist organisation changes little and shifts attention away from Tunisia’s economic crisis.

The crackdown now goes beyond Ennahda. Politicians, lawyers, journalists and activists are increasingly being targeted. Opposition leaders Abir Moussi, Ayachi Zammel and Lotfi Marraihi have all faced prison or prosecution. In June 2026, anti-racism activist Saadia Mosbah was sentenced to 8 years in prison and human rights defender Sihem Bensedrine was sentenced to 25 years. Zied El-Heni, an Egyptian journalist, was also found guilty of “incitement to violence” and sentenced to five years in prison for his criticism of the judiciary. On 18 June 2026, hundreds of lawyers across Tunisia went on strike, calling it judicial madness. These cases demonstrate that it is becoming increasingly dangerous to criticize the government in Tunisia.

Political parties are not the only ones under pressure. There is also growing restriction of civil society organizations. In April 2026, the government suspended the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LTDH) for one month. Accused of receiving suspicious foreign funding. It is one of Tunisia’s oldest and most respected human rights organizations. It was also part of the National Dialogue Quartet, which won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for helping Tunisia avoid violence after the Arab Spring. LTDH President Bassem Trifi rejected the decision, saying, “We oppose this decision, and we will lodge an appeal. We will continue our struggle for rights and freedoms.” The former president of the journalists’ union, Mohamed Yassine Jlassi, said the crackdown is expanding and affecting more people. It has come to affect all of us: “Journalism has become a crime, civil society work a crime, political opposition a crime. However, Tunisians are concerned about employment. Hundreds of university graduates protested in Tunis on 8 July 2026 to ask the government to implement the employment law of 23 December 2025. Their protest was part of a broader economic crisis. Unemployment is still at about 15 per cent, and graduate unemployment exceeds 24 per cent. Nearly 30,000 doctors, engineers and other skilled workers leave Tunisia annually for a better future.

Democracies become stronger when citizens feel justice is fair regardless of who is in power. The rule of law isn’t just determined by the judgments of a court. It is also determined by citizens’ faith in the institutions that give them those verdicts. Once that confidence begins to weaken, every investigation risks becoming part of a wider political struggle rather than a search for accountability. Turkey’s latest investigation into Ankara’s Çankaya Municipality has once again brought this dilemma into focus.

In a news release on 11 July 2026, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced it had issued detention warrants for 36 suspects and 27 people had been detained. Authorities issued an arrest warrant for Ankara’s Çankaya district Mayor Hüseyin Can Güner, a representative of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The suspects were charged with creating a criminal organization, accepting and receiving bribes, and bid rigging and manipulation of public tenders. Güner has rejected the allegations. Prior to his return to Ankara, he notified prosecutors of his whereabouts, provided a key to the house and directed municipal authorities to assist investigators as much as possible. Later he said, ‘My assets are those I had before being elected as mayor. They were acquired through personal savings and inheritance. I do not have a crypto account.’ The courts should decide whether these claims are valid or not.

But the investigation comes at a time of growing political tensions in Turkey. Since the CHP won the local elections in March 2024, several opposition-controlled municipalities have been subjected to investigations of corruption. The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, followed by investigations into other CHP municipalities, has increased public debate over the role of the judiciary. The government also says the courts are operating independently, but the opposition claims the investigations are politically motivated. But when politics is deeply divided, evidence alone is often not enough to convince the public. People also question the role of politics in the investigation.

This is where the real challenge begins. No public official should be above the law, and corruption should be investigated. However, individuals need to trust that the law is enforced uniformly. If they think only one political side is being targeted, trust in the justice system begins to weaken. As noted by Emmanuel Terray in Law versus Politics, the boundary between law and politics is often blurred. The real test for democratic institutions is whether they can preserve their independence even during intense political competition.

Lord Hewart, as he once said, “Justice should not merely be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. That principle is as timeless as it was 100 years ago. Trusting the public in the judiciary is not just about what the court does; it’s about how the court does it, being fair, equal, and free from political pressure.

Edraak is our newsletter that honours the Muslim world’s diversity, reflected in the multitude of its socio-economic conditions and political institutions spanning across the continents. Traced back to its Arabic origins, إدراك encompasses timely and thorough insights into the developments of the Muslim-majority countries.

We organise the Muslim-majority countries into four zones as per their current conditions of conflict, transition, stability, and development.

The Four Zones

Zone I: Experiencing War, Conflict, Oppression, Genocide

Taliban bans make-up, perfume, rings, and hair extensions at weddings as OIC’s 32-nation resolution declares these restrictions “inconsistent with Islamic values”

The Taliban issued a fresh directive banning women from wearing make-up, hair extensions, and perfume at weddings and engagement parties, declaring the exchange of rings a Western import forbidden under Islamic law. Simultaneously, OIC member states passed a 32-point resolution calling on Afghanistan to ensure “full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and girls in public life”, explicitly stating that Taliban restrictions are inconsistent with Islamic values. The same Islamic tradition invoked by Kabul to justify the bans was invoked by Islamabad, Ankara, and Kuala Lumpur to condemn them. The OIC resolution removes the Taliban’s most convenient justification that restrictions on women derive from Islam itself. When 32 Muslim-majority states formally declare those restrictions inconsistent with Islamic values, the theological claim is contested at its source.

El-Obeid: 500,000 civilians trapped under RSF drone siege

UN Human Rights Commissioner Türk’s office documented 15 drone strikes on El-Obeid, capital of North Kordofan, Sudan, killing at least 45 civilians. RSF drone strikes have hit the city’s main power station, fuel facilities, and the main highway out. On 24 July, 15 more civilians were killed in an RSF attack on Burbur south of El-Obeid. The UN warns conditions may soon match El-Fasher, where over 6,000 people were killed in the first three days of its fall. Half a million people, including 105,000 already displaced, have nowhere to flee.

Zone II: Transition toward Peace and Stability

Syria writing its own new chapter

Syria is at the dawn of a new morning. The 210-member People’s Assembly convened in Damascus for its first session since Assad’s fall. The parliament will serve a 30-month transitional term, draft a permanent constitution, and approve the country’s budget, making it the first genuine legislative body Syria has had in over five decades. The Central Bank confirmed in July that approximately 80% of old Syrian currency had been replaced since January 1 with redesigned notes carrying roses, wheat, olives, and oranges. Two zeros were removed from the denomination; Assad’s portrait was removed from history. The old pound ceases to be legal tender after 31 July. Above all this, the arrival of UN Secretary-General António Guterres in Damascus on 25 July, the first visit by a UN chief in 17 years, confirmed what the parliament and the currency together signal; calling it “the pillar of stability of the Middle East,” Guterres urged full international reconstruction support, visited Saydnaya Prison, reaffirmed that the Golan Heights “cannot be taken away,” and declared the country stands at “a moment of possibility.”

Zone III: Stable but Economically Struggling

HRW documents systematic criminalisation of Indigenous land defenders in Indonesia, charged with “spreading communism” for contesting company land grabs

HRW’s 40-page report Grabbed Land, Silenced Justice documents how Indonesian police respond to complaints filed by company officials and politicians by opening criminal cases against the Indigenous villagers and activists who contested the land seizures in the first place. Charges range from defamation to “spreading communism” to trespass. In one documented case, a villager who reported illegal deforestation was prosecuted for criminal defamation after the logging company whose activities he reported filed a complaint. Indonesia’s criminal code and electronic information laws have become the primary tools for converting land rights claims into criminal exposure.

Uzbekistan establishes first Islamic Finance Council under the Central Bank Uzbekistan established a dedicated Islamic Finance Council under the Central Bank this week, making it the first institutional body in the country specifically tasked with coordinating the development, regulation, and supervision of Islamic financial services. The move follows Uzbekistan’s Islamic Finance Law signed in March 2026 and in force from June 2026, which exempts Sukuk and Islamic leasing from VAT, exempts Shariah-compliant deposits from personal income tax, and has already unlocked $1 billion in Gulf capital. Ten banks are currently preparing Islamic banking windows. The Council provides the regulatory architecture those windows will require to operate with legal clarity and investor confidence.

Zone IV: Developed or Emerging Economies

Malaysia detains over 100 Rohingya refugees seeking shelter at UNHCR, arrests made at the UN agency’s own gates

Malaysian authorities detained over 100 Rohingya refugees who had gathered at UNHCR’s Kuala Lumpur offices seeking protection and registration, arresting them outside the UN agency’s gates. The detentions raise acute concerns about refoulement: Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has no domestic legal framework protecting refugees. Detainees face deportation to Myanmar, where the Rohingya remain stateless and subject to documented genocide. The arrests come weeks after Malaysia’s new digital refugee registration system replaced UNHCR-issued cards, leaving hundreds in a registration gap and heightening detention risk for those not yet enrolled in the government’s biometric database.

John L. Esposito, the scholar who spent 50 years insisting Islam be understood on its own terms, passed away

Professor John L. Esposito, the Distinguished University Professor Emeritus of Religion, International Affairs, and Islamic Studies at Georgetown, and the founding director of the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, died on 15 July 2026 at 86, from complications from heart surgery. A towering intellectual who published more than 55 books, he uniquely shaped the modern study of Muslim societies during the late 20th and early 21st century, particularly at moments of sharpest friction: the 1979 Iranian revolution, 9/11, and the post-Gaza reckoning in his final year. Over more than five decades, he sought to correct Western misconceptions about Islam and build lasting channels of dialogue between Muslims and the societies around them. Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim described him as “an influential scholar who built the intellectual foundations for a deeper understanding of Islam in the West.” He directed the Bridge Initiative on Islamophobia until he departed from this world.

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Haroon Sidat

Beyond Maqāṣid

Recently, I have been spending some time reading contemporary Islamic legal thinking on maqāṣid al-sharīʿah. The higher objectives of the Sharīʿah have become a dominant language through which Islamic law is now being explained. Whether discussing Islamic finance, constitutionalism, bioethics, education, environmental ethics, or public policy, contempor…

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a month ago · 56 likes · 9 comments · Haroon Sidat

The dynamics of gender-based violence in Cameroon are a case in point. On June 24, 2026, Human Rights Watch published a report titled “I Live in Constant Peril”, documenting discrimination, lack of economic autonomy, and violence against women in Cameroon. The report established that despite the government of Cameroon’s 2011 commitment to halve violence against women by 2026, 4 out of 10 women in a relationship faced physical, sexual, psychological, and economic violence in their lifetime. Notably, in 2024 alone, 77 women were killed by their current partners or ex-partners. The trend of violence is particularly significant in the central region of Cameroon, where 64% of women are reported to have experienced all forms of violence.

A combination of legal hurdles, governance challenges and cultural beliefs has enabled this scale of violence against women in the country. According to the Civil Code of Cameroon, a husband is recognized as the head of a family, with authority over matrimonial property and the wife’s employment decisions, leaving women with little economic autonomy and increased vulnerability to abuse. Notably, a draft Family Code addressing a few of the inequalities in the established legal frameworks has existed for more than 20 years, but the government has failed to adopt it, leaving victims with little hope of any legal safeguards. The country also lacks a dedicated and comprehensive legal framework for domestic violence. Furthermore, discriminatory cultural beliefs also limit victims’ access to policing and legal safeguards, with women being discouraged from reporting abuse. In some cases of violence, the police also pressure victims to reunite with perpetrators, as the authorities believe that violence against wives by husbands is a private family matter.

The violence that is dismissed as a private matter has significant implications not only for women in the country but also for its economy. According to a 2024 study published in Archives of Public Health, out of 404 interviewed women who had either experienced emotional, physical, sexual, or economic abuse, 80.2% of them reported mental disorders, gynaecological trauma, physical trauma, or behavioural trauma, while some even reported having more than one of the aforementioned conditions. Furthermore, gender-based discrimination has ultimately led to a poverty percentage of 51.5% and an underemployment percentage of 79.2% for women in Cameroon. In a country where females make up approximately 50.16% of the total population, these statistics signify a substantial loss of economic growth potential.

Nevertheless, the case of Cameroon is not isolated. Violence against women is a pressing global human rights concern. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), nearly 1 in 3 women worldwide aged 15 and older have experienced physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime. The cost of this violence is huge for economic progress in countries, as research indicates it can cost countries up to 3.7% of their GDP due to the burden being placed on healthcare, police, and justice systems.

Ultimately, violence against women in Cameroon reflects patterns consistent with systemic gaps in protection, the cost of which is being borne by the women. Beyond the crisis, in a country where 39% of the population lives below the poverty line, without a systemic reduction of violence against women, economic progress will become a more tedious process than normal.

There is a very thin line between the exercise of sovereignty and misuse of authority by a state. When a state utilizes vague laws to regulate the media and those laws also breach international obligations, it becomes a misuse of authority rather than an exercise of sovereignty.

The case of Mali illustrates this tension. On 25 June, the High Authority for Communication, the media regulatory body of Mali, suspended the broadcast of a popular radio show, Allô Klédu. Allô Klédu was a radio call-in show where citizens, especially those without internet access, could voice their concerns and discuss politics and governance issues. The action was justified by the media regulatory body, citing broadcasts in which callers accused authorities of benefiting from and being apathetic to the country’s armed conflict.

This is not an isolated incident in Mali. It reflects an escalating pattern of restrictions and measures against independent journalism since General Goïta overthrew the government in a coup in 2020. These restrictions began with the suspension of two broadcasting channels: Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24. Later, the restrictions escalated, and since February, 3 journalists have been arrested by authorities under broad cybercrime laws. Additionally, days after the Pan-African Media Forum, two newspaper directors, Chahana Takiou and Abdourhamane Keïta, were arrested.

The statutory framework that authorities in Mali have utilized to implement the restrictions on media rests on the July 2000 press law and the 2019 cyber-criminality law. The July 2000 law defines hate speech, defamation, and false news publishing. However, the law is considered controversial as it includes prison sentences for specific press offences. These offences include severe forms of reputational harm, inciting public disorder, or breaching state security.

The restrictions against media outlets in Mali by the government led by General Goïta carry implications worth examining. These measures violate Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on freedom of expression. Notably, dissatisfaction with leadership among civil society and opposition is also growing. This was evident in Maison de la Presse’s—the umbrella organization representing Mali’s journalists—statement calling for a public rejection of the High Authority for Communication (HAC)’s sweeping order to halt all broadcasting of political activities, issued in April 2024. Additionally, Housseini Amion Guindo, the president of the Convergence for the Development of Mali (CODEM) opposition political party, issued a public statement in April 2024, calling for civil disobedience. Furthermore, the country’s international image is also suffering as major international and regional organizations have condemned the ongoing restrictions: the Committee to Protect Journalists called for the release of Takiou and Keïta following their June 2026 arrest, while the Media Foundation for West Africa condemned the 2024 suspension of political party activities and the accompanying media ban.

These restrictions reflect a broader pattern of media restrictions across the continent. Press conditions are rated “difficult” or “very serious” in 29 of Africa’s 48 countries in RSF’s 2026 Index. Mali ranked 121st out of 180 countries in the RSF World Press Freedom Index 2026, a drop of 22 places in five years. This data highlights the dynamics of declining press freedom in Mali and the African continent.

Ultimately, the press restrictions in Mali and the official justifications given have drawn sustained international criticism. A state has the authority to regulate media, but that should be done through clear laws with a clear purpose, and those laws should not be a breach of a state’s international obligations.

Many Muslim-majority countries in different continents grapple with severe underdevelopment, technological backwardness, acute internal political tensions, and civil unrest. This negative outlook is reflected by the bad performance of the Muslim-majority countries in some leading international indices such as Index of Economic Freedom, Rule of Law Index, Human Development Index, and Corruption Perceptions Index. It is an issue of debate why and how the Muslim world—once stood as the global epicenter of science, philosophy, astronomy, and governance—arrived at this point. It is logical to think the set of factors leading to the decline and unpromising outlook of today falls into two broad categories: external and internal factors.

The contemporary debate surrounding the socio-economic and political challenges faced by many parts of the Muslim world often focuses heavily on macro-level structures—political systems, economic policies, or global historical legacies, i.e., external factors. Many people, especially politicians and intellectuals, tend to refer only to these external factors (Western imperialism, colonialism, military occupation, exploitation, puppet administrations,..) and never mention the internal factors. This is because announcing the external enemies as a scapegoat gives you mental comfort and takes away all responsibility from you.

However, we must place the truth above everything and everyone else and confront painful realities. We cannot see the truth or solve our problems without looking at ourselves in the mirror and engaging in profound self-criticism. The external factors story is just one side of the coin. But there is another, probably a darker side: our own flaws, inadequacies, or mistakes. In this regard, an increasingly prominent perspective argues that our macro-problems are deeply rooted in some micro-foundations: specifically, the daily habits, civic behaviors, work discipline, and moral qualifications of individuals living in our societies.

As mentioned, we have already discussed the major external factors in our previous article. In this article, we are going to focus on one of the two major pillars of the internal factors in explaining the Muslim world’s negative outlook today. In a broad sense, internal factors can be divided into two: 1) Mentality-related, political, institutional problems, 2) Individual, behavioral, habitual, moral problems. In our opinion, the internal factors reflecting themselves at the individual and moral level in our daily lives are as important as external factors and the first group of internal factors in explaining the ongoing reality. Mentality-related problems (fatalism, traditionalism, literalism) have been discussed in another study¹. In this short article, we will discuss some other internal and micro-level factors: individual, quality-related, and moral problems.

From this viewpoint, one can argue that the overarching struggles of a society are a direct reflection of its human capital, human quality, and civic culture. When individual standards of everyday ethics and social responsibility decline, the entire societal fabric weakens, making large-scale progress exceptionally difficult to sustain.

The Micro-Foundations of Macro Problems

The argument centers on the idea that national progress, level of welfare, and economic development rely, in the last analysis, on predictable, respectful, productive, and disciplined daily interactions. When basic civic duties and individual responsibilities are widely neglected, societal trust, efficiency, and productive capacity collapse. This manifests in several critical areas of daily life in the following ways:

• Keeping your promise, trust and reliability: One of the most important moral conducts—and in fact a religious commandment—is keeping one’s promise. When individuals routinely break their promises or fail to pay debts on time, economic credit systems suffer, and interpersonal trust—the foundation of any functional market—erodes. Failing to keep one’s word constitutes a violation of the rights of others. The economic repercussions of this are highly detrimental.

• Punctuality and keeping appointments: Failing to observe scheduled times disrupts professional environments and signals a broader lack of respect for others’ time, hindering organizational productivity. Similarly, failing to keep and not arriving at an appointment on time constitutes a violation of the rights of others. The economic repercussions of this are more detrimental than you think.

• Work ethic and work discipline: Work ethic, doing your best at your work, targeting to be the best in your field, and finishing your duties on time are extremely important. Shirking, pretending to work but not doing your job, neglecting your responsibilities at work, or failing to aim for professional excellence lowers the overall quality of goods, services, and governance across a nation. Lower productivity means lower GDP and lower national income per capita.

• Civic order, keeping your turn in line: It is a very important moral conduct to keep and wait for your turn in lines. Disregarding waiting for your turn in lines or queues, disrespecting the rights of others in public leads to social decay, undermines trust, leads to a verbal altercation, shoving and pushing, and a fight.

• Paying attention to hygiene and cleanliness both at home and in public spaces: Paying attention to hygiene, keeping one’s body, home, and environment, especially public facilities (schools, hospitals, public buildings,...) are extremely important for our health. It is also a religious duty. Disregarding cleanliness and hygiene in public spaces is obviously disrespecting the rights of others. Littering in parks, highways, airports, train stations, and other public facilities leads to physical and social decay, causing epidemic diseases sometimes. A lack of cleanliness in public spaces reflects a deeper breakdown in communal responsibility.

• Tolerance and Diversity: High-quality human capital requires an openness to dialogue and a tolerance for differences. A narrow-minded person cannot tolerate any social, political, ideological, religious, or ethnic difference. Disregarding tolerance and adopting a radical-salafi type takfiri (accuser of apostasy) very often leads to violence and breaks down social cohesion. When societies struggle to tolerate diverse perspectives, social cohesion splits, leading to political instability, ethnic, ideological, or religious violence.

The Path Forward: Cultivating Human Capital

According to this perspective, structural reforms—whether political or economic—cannot succeed unless they are built upon a solid foundation of individual character and civic morality. Therefore, the primary strategy for long-term improvement must begin at the individual level.

To shift the current outlook, a collective emphasis must be placed on elevating human quality. This involves fostering a culture that prioritizes absolute cleanliness, strict punctuality, unwavering integrity in financial and personal promises, and a deep-seated respect for public order. Furthermore, cultivating virtues like mercy, tolerance, and an openness to dialogue is essential for managing internal differences smoothly.

By systematically improving human capital and individual moral qualifications, societies can create the necessary conditions to resolve their larger social, political, and economic challenges more effectively and sustainably.

This Essay is an extension of a previous article published on Edraak, titled, ”Understanding the Modern Realities of the Muslim World: Current Challenges and Historical Drivers” by Mustafa Acar

The Previous Article Can Be Read Here

¹_{A more detailed discussion can be found in Acar, M. (2016), “Reason versus tradition, free will versus fate, interpretation versus literalism: intellectual underpinnings of the negative outlook for the Muslim world, in Harmouzi N. & Whetstone, L., Islamic Foundations of a Free Society, eds., London: The Institute of Economic Affairs. https://www.academia.edu/42016346/Reason_versus_Tradition_Free_Will_versus_Fate_Interpretation_versus_Literalism_Intellectual_Underpinnings_of_the_Negative_Outlook_for_the_Muslim_world}

The Present Landscape: Crisis and Stagnation

The modern landscape across the vast majority of the Muslim world—particularly in parts of the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia—is characterized by a stark developmental deficit.

• Economic and Technological Stagnation: While exceptions exist in oil-rich Gulf nations, a significant portion of the Muslim world lags behind in development, technological innovation, high-quality educational infrastructure, and diversified economic growth.

• Political Instability: Internal political tensions frequently paralyze state institutions. The absence of robust, participatory, inclusive governance models has led to a cycle of authoritarianism and institutional fragility.

• Civil Conflict: In the most severe cases, these internal tensions have fractured into protracted civil wars, leading to humanitarian crises, mass displacement, and destroyed infrastructure in nations like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.

The Catalysts: External Interventions and Colonial Legacy

Explaining this modern stagnation requires looking beyond current headlines to examine the structural foundations laid by centuries of external intervention and colonization. The modern negative outlook is deeply intertwined with the legacies of Western colonialism, imperialism, and continuous foreign military occupations.

The Impact of Post-WWI Border Engineering: The arbitrary borders drawn by colonial powers following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire intentionally disregarded ethnic, tribal, and sectarian realities. This deliberate fragmentation laid the groundwork for the structural instability we see today.

1. Colonial Extraction and Economic Disruption

During the 19th and 20th centuries, European colonial powers dismantled native administrative, educational, and economic systems. Rather than fostering local industries, colonial rule optimized these regions for resource extraction. This left newly independent nations with crippled economies and institutions poorly equipped to handle self-governance.

2. Cold War Exploitation and Imperialism

During the Cold War and the decades that followed, the region became a chessboard for global superpowers. Foreign intervention frequently prioritized securing oil reserves and maintaining geopolitical spheres of influence over supporting stable local democracies. Local autocrats were often propped up by external powers, suppressing organic political development and worsening internal corruption.

3. Modern Wars and Occupations

The late 20th and early 21st centuries brought direct military interventions and prolonged foreign occupations. The invasions and subsequent conflicts in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan caused immediate loss of life and deeply destabilized entire regional ecosystems. The resulting power vacuums provided fertile breeding grounds for extremist groups and civil strife, further derailing any prospects for sustainable human and technological development.

Looking Forward

The current reality of the Muslim world cannot be detached from its history. The compounding effects of past colonialism, ongoing imperialist interests, and devastating military interventions have created a highly complex environment. For the region to shift toward a brighter, more stable outlook, it requires both a reconciliation with these historical wounds and a concerted internal effort toward governance reform, educational renewal, and economic diversification.

Having said that, we should also point out that the current negative outlook of the Muslim world cannot be explained thoroughly by simply referring to the external factors mentioned above. There are many other internal, mental, philosophical, political, individual, and behavioral factors playing a critical role in this process. We will discuss them briefly in our next short article.

The Super Tax began in the Finance Act 2015 as a temporary, narrowly targeted measure under Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, meant to fund the rehabilitation of people displaced by Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Like many “temporary” taxes, it did not stay temporary. In 2022, the government sharply expanded both its rate and its reach, pulling in a much broader set of high-income individuals and companies to plug widening fiscal gaps. A one-off emergency measure had become a permanent fixture of the tax code, a pattern that tends to erode, rather than build, business confidence.

That erosion was not merely theoretical. Business groups and economists have long argued that steep marginal taxes on profitable firms discourage investment, slow hiring, and push economic activity into informal channels where it isn’t taxed at all. The 2022 expansion compounded this by applying retroactively, a design choice that the IMF itself flagged as a source of policy uncertainty. When firms cannot predict their tax liability even after a fiscal year has closed, they discount future investment in Pakistan accordingly, a cost that shows up in foregone jobs and growth rather than on any government ledger.

Pakistan’s low tax-to-GDP ratio is a real constraint on public spending, and there is broad agreement that domestic revenue mobilization matters for fiscal stability. But raising revenue by squeezing an already-narrow base of compliant, profitable taxpayers is a different strategy than broadening the base, and it carries a cost in competitiveness that a revenue figure alone doesn’t capture.

The Finance Bill 2026 begins to correct course. Super Tax has been abolished entirely for individuals, companies, and associations of persons earning up to Rs. 500 million annually, removing a compliance and cash-flow burden for the vast majority of businesses that were ever subject to it. For income above that threshold, the top rate falls from 10% to 8%, a modest but directionally welcome step toward restoring predictability for larger firms as well.

Banking, oil and gas exploration, and fertilizer companies are carved out of this relief and remain taxed at 10% above Rs. 150 million, reflecting the government’s reluctance to give up revenue from its most reliably profitable sectors. Whether singling out specific industries for continued high taxation is sound policy, or simply the path of least political resistance, is a fair question; sector-specific carve-outs tend to distort investment decisions even when the sectors involved can currently absorb the cost.

The bill also repeals Section 7E, which taxed deemed income on certain capital assets regardless of whether that income was ever realized. Tax professionals have largely welcomed this move, since taxing unrealized gains sits uneasily with basic principles of ability-to-pay and creates liabilities that bear little relation to a taxpayer’s actual cash position.

Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb has indicated the government intends to phase out the Super Tax entirely over time, which, if followed through, would remove a persistent source of uncertainty for Pakistani businesses. Officials caution that further cuts will require offsetting revenue from elsewhere, underscoring that the more durable fix lies in widening the tax base and improving collection, not in extracting more from the same narrow pool of formal, high-earning taxpayers.

Lower, more stable taxes on profit and capital tend to improve after-tax returns, which in turn supports investment and hiring; the current reform, however partial, moves in that direction. Whether it translates into durable growth will depend on complementary steps: continued rate reductions, an end to retroactive tax design, and progress on broadening the base so that fiscal sustainability doesn’t require repeatedly returning to the same compliant taxpayers. Critics of further cuts note that Pakistan’s revenue needs are pressing and that relief for high earners must be weighed against funding for public services, a legitimate tension that will shape how far this reform ultimately goes.

Since the military junta was established in Burkina Faso in 2022, it has been enacting measures to regulate the civic space. According to Africanews, the military government has suspended or dissolved over 900 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Along with this, the junta has suspended international media outlets, including BBC and Voice of America. A law was also passed in July 2025 — Law No. 011-2025/ALT — that restricted CSOs and NGOs’ operations and registration via tedious bureaucratic processes. Later, on January 29, 2026, the government also dismantled all political parties. These measures by the Burkinabe government sit in tension with its international obligations, enshrined in Articles 12 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on freedom of expression and association, a treaty Burkina Faso has ratified.

In January, days after the junta had dismantled all political parties, the UN High Commissioner Volker Turk publicly urged the government in Burkina Faso to stop the ongoing curb on civil liberties. In response, the Burkinabe government suspended the operations of the UN in the country in February. Foreign Minister Traore of the country justified this move and the move of suspending other international organizations in the country by arguing that these organizations infringe upon the sovereignty of the country. Though controversial, this position is justifiable under International Law, as the sovereignty argument permits states to determine the terms of international presence on their territory.

Furthermore, the decision by the UN Human Rights Office to close its operations is also justifiable under International Law. Under international law, the terms of the UN’s presence in any country are governed by host country agreements, and when a host government renders those terms inoperable, the UN retains the right to wind down its operations— a condition that was satisfied in the case of Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, the move also has broader implications. The closure has removed the last remaining international body in the country for monitoring the condition of human rights in the country. This is significant as Human Rights Watch has documented war crimes committed by the country, which included executing 223 civilians in Nondin and Soro, killing 19 in the Bouro neighbourhood, and ethnic cleansing against the Fulani community.

This case of Burkina Faso is not unique. It reflects a broader pattern of juntas in the Sahel region expelling international oversight. This is evident in the withdrawal of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso from the ICC. This pattern highlights a significant gap between states’ international human rights obligations and the voluntary nature of the monitoring mechanisms enforcing them.

Ultimately, the case of Burkina Faso and the broader Sahel pattern highlight a structural tension within international law itself: when enforcement mechanisms rest on voluntary consent, obligations on paper offer little protection in practice.

Qatar’s tax-free economic model is a practical manifestation of this principle. On June 23, 2026, Qatar’s National Planning Council published a report announcing that the country ranked first in economic resilience in the region and fifth in the world, according to the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2026. Qatar also ranked first globally for the absence of personal income tax, consumption tax, capital and property taxes, and social security contributions, making it one of the world’s most competitive countries for businesses and individuals. The IMD rankings also placed the Gulf countries of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia first and twelfth in the world for economic performance, all states with minimal taxation. These rankings reveal how Gulf States are leveraging hydrocarbon revenue to foster rapid growth in non-oil sectors and successfully transition away from oil to non-oil economies as the world shifts to renewable energy.

The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook is an annual report by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), a Swiss-based business school. It ranks countries worldwide on economic wealth and competitiveness using statistical data and surveys. Countries are evaluated using a framework composed of four main pillars: economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency, and infrastructure. In the 2026 report, Qatar was ranked among the top 5 countries in the world for economic resilience and 2nd globally for energy infrastructure. The country also ranked first in the region for balance of trade and entrepreneurship.

Central to Qatar’s strong performance, as highlighted in the report, is its tax-free economic model. Qatar imposes no personal income, inheritance, gift, or wealth taxes, and no corporate tax on Qatari-owned enterprises. This makes the country one of the most business-friendly countries in the world. The corporate tax burden is low, with no corporate income tax on Qatari corporations wholly owned by Qatari or GCC nationals, and foreign companies paying a 10% corporate tax rate. It is a model that allows corporations to retain most of their profits, giving them the opportunities to reinvest; a model that encourages business creation, increases foreign direct investment (FDI), and creates jobs. Consequently, Qatar has been named the country with the lowest unemployment rate in the world and the most competitive environment for businesses and individuals, ranking first globally for the absence of personal taxes. The country also tops the Gulf region in terms of productivity, disposable income, banking sector assets, and country credit rating.

The IMD Yearbook also ranked the UAE first in the world for economic performance, while Saudi Arabia was ranked twelfth. Both countries levy zero personal income tax and earn revenue from profit taxes, royalties, and dividends paid by state-owned hydrocarbon companies. These rankings of Gulf states among the top-performing economies of the world according to the Yearbook reveal that Gulf states are utilizing revenue from hydrocarbon industries to fund massive investments, reinvesting the money into infrastructure, technology, and non-oil industries. This capital induces foreign direct investment and advances knowledge-based economies in the post-oil world. Thus, before the world transitions towards renewable energy and oil loses its worth as an asset, Gulf states are maximizing efforts to generate massive revenue from the oil sector to channel that into non-oil sectors and develop those sectors.

In a world where 17 countries impose zero personal income tax and 145 countries have committed to imposing a 15% minimum corporate tax, the global debate around taxation is heavily focused on whether minimum taxation is beneficial for the world economy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) favours minimum taxation, arguing it prevents harmful tax competition and ensures multinationals contribute fairly to public revenues wherever they operate, while critics argue that minimum taxation undermines tax competition, as the competition acts as a check on government behaviour. However, the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook acts as a bridge between both models by evaluating countries against one another and helping policymakers make sense of varied economic structures.

Ultimately, whether minimum taxation is beneficial depends on how effectively the model is implemented. Nonetheless, in the case of Qatar and Gulf States, implementation of the model has demonstrated measurable economic development, as reflected in their standings in the IMD Yearbook.